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The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections
on Bennett v. Berg
G. Robert Blakev*
I. Introduction
/Tjhe ofle of all the Judges is always to make such. . . construction as
shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle
inventions and evasions for continuation of the mischief, .. and to addforce
and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the
Act pro bono publico.
Hdon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (Ex. 1584).
In Bennett v. Berg,' the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, as a matter of "first impression in the Circuit Courts
of Appeals," 2 faced and resolved a number of significant issues in the
construction of Title IX, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations (hereinafter "RICO") provisions of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970. 3 In Bennett, the plaintiffs, residents in a "life
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. A.B. 1957, J.D. 1960, Notre Dame. Pro-
fessor Blakey was the Chief Counsel of the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Pro-
cedures of the United States Senate in 1969-1970, when the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970), was processed.
1 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982). A rehearing en banc in Bennett was granted on Septem-
ber 17, 1982. Oral argument was held on January 13, 1983.
2 685 F.2d at 1057.
3 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976). Judge Shadur in Parnes v. Heinold Commodities,
Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 21 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1982) wondered, "[gliven. . .[RICO's] very awkward
title and the convenient acronym it generated. . . [whether] the person who christened the
legislation was a movie buff with a sense of humor . . .[for in] 'Little Caesar,' the first
Hollywood gangster movie of the '30s. . ., Edward G. Robinson played the thinly disguised
Al Capone leading role-and was named 'RICO."' Judge Shadur's question was first raised
by Newsweek reporters, Tony Marro and Elaine Shannon, in a story on RICO that appeared
in The Legal Times of Washington, Oct. 8, 1979, at 32, col. 1. They reported that G. Robert
Blakey, "who had a major role in drafting the statute. . . will neither admit nor deny that
the title was [so] constructed." See Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrapt Organiza-
lions (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1025 n.91
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Basic Concepts] for an alternative, but not necessarily inconsistent
explanation of the development of RICO's title.
The following state statutes are modeled on the federal act: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-2312 (1978); CAL. PENAL CODE § 186 (West Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-17-
101 (1981); 1982 CONN. PUB. AcTs 343; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 895.01 (West Supp. 1982); GA.
CODE ANN. § 26-3401 (Supp. 1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 842-1 (1976); The Narcotics Profit
Forfeiture Act, H.B. 2450, State of Ill. (1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-6-1 (Burns Supp.
1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:41 (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-42-1 (Supp. 1978); OR.
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care" retirement village, sought treble damages and equitable relief
under 18 U.S.C. § 1964 from a number of defendants, including
named individuals, a not-for-profit corporation, the John Knox Vil-
lage, attorneys, accountants, the firm of Snyder, Ernst & Muehling,
and the Prudential Life Insurance Company, a mortgage lender.
The district court dismissed the complaint, and an appeal was taken.
On appeal, the defendants sought to sustain the dismissal by arguing
that:
(1) no allegation of a connection between organized crime and
the plaintiffs had been made;
(2) no allegation of a culpable "person" separate from the
charged "enterprise" had been made;
(3) no allegation of an "enterprise" separate from the charged
"pattern of racketeering activity" had been made;
(4) no allegation of a "pattern of racketeering" had been made;
(5) no allegation of "investment," "acquisition," or an association
with the "conduct" of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity had been made;
(6) no allegation of a cognizable "injury" had been made; and
(7) the equitable relief sought was not available to private
plaintiffs.
4
The court of appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part the district
court's dismissal of the complaint. Because the Bennett court's deci-
sion represents the first comprehensive effort by a court of appeals to
treat a number of important issues regarding the construction of
RICO in the context of civil litigation, it merits extended comment.
5
REV. STAT. § 166-715 (1981); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 911 (1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-15-1
(Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 946.80 (Supp. 1982). Legislation is under consideration in
Louisiana, New York, and Ohio. For newspaper coverage of the use of the state legislation,
see Siegel, Arizona Hits Racketeers hz Wallet, L.A. Times, May 3, 1982, at 1, col. 1; Granelli,
Playing for Keeps With State RICO, The National Law Journal, July 5, 1982, at 1, col. 4.
4 685 F.2d at 1057. For purposes of analysis, the order of the defendants' appellate
arguments has been altered.
5 The courts of appeals for the Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have also faced civil
RICO appeals. In Cullen v. Margiotta, 618 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1980), the court of appeals
dismissed an appeal of the dismissal of a civil RICO suit for the failure to allege a sufficient
connection to interstate commerce, holding that certifying the orders under Rule 54(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as final was an abuse of discretion. See United States v.
Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982) (mail fraud and extortion conviction of political leader
of Nassau County, N.Y., upheld). In Grayson v. Wooden, No. 80-5460 (6th Cir. Feb. 10,
1982), the court of appeals affirmed the granting of a motion for summary judgment and the
dismissal of a civil RICO suit, since the plaintiff did not allege two acts of racketeering. In
Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 177 (1982),
the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of a civil RICO counterclaim, since only "indirect
injury" was alleged. In USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94 (6th Cir.
1982), the court of appeals upheld the issuance of an injunction to preserve the status quo
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Before examining the court of appeals' opinion in that case, however,
this article will discuss the facts of the case, the text of RICO, the
legislative history of RICO, and the jurisprudence under RICO.
II. The Facts of Bennett v. Berg
6
The plaintiffs in Bennett alleged to be present and former resi-
dents, 423 in number, of the John Knox Village retirement commu-
nity in Lee's Summit, Missouri. 7 Owned and operated by a not-for-
profit corporation, the John Knox Village is the "largest retirement
community of its kind in the country."8 The residential community
consisted of approximately 2,500 residents, who occupied units in the
facility pursuant to "Occupancy Agreement" contracts. In return for
the payment of an initial lump sum-an "Entrance Endowment"-
the residents were entitled to occupy specific apartments for life. En-
dowments paid ranged from $9,000 to more than $50,000. In addi-
tion, the "Occupancy Agreement" provided for the payment of a
monthly lodging and service charge, "in such amounts as determined
by the Board of Directors of the Village."9 More than fifty million
dollars has been paid in endowments or collected in monthly fees. t0
The monthly charge was to cover fifty-one services and facilities, in-
cluding tray and diet service, building and grounds maintenance,
scheduled transportation, laundry service, and various forms of medi-
cal care. According to the complaint, the Village was also "pro-
moted as being a religiously or spiritually oriented, Christian
community."'"
The plaintiffs alleged, however, that the Village was in fact on
pendente lite in a civil RICO suit. Neither Cullen nor Grayson merits further comment. Cenco
Inc. is discussed at text accompanying note 139 infra; USACO Coal Co. is discussed at note 217
infra.
6 The facts are taken from the opinion of the court of appeals, except where
supplemented, as noted, from the pleadings or papers. Since the appeal was heard on the
pleadings, the facts alleged in the pleadings were accepted as true. 685 F.2d at 1056 n.4
("accept. . .factual allegations as true"), 1057-58 ("A complaint must be viewed in the light
most favorable to plaintiff"). In addition, the court followed the "accepted rule that a
complaint states a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 45-46 (1957); 685 F.2d at 1057. See McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 246 (1980).
The pleadings, too, were construed to do "substantial justice" under FED. R. Civ. P. 8(f). 685
F.2d at 1058.
7 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 5, Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982).
8 Complaint para. l(a).
9 685 F.2d at 1056.
10 Complaint para. l(c)(1).
I 1 Complaint para. 41.
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the verge of bankruptcy, that service had markedly deteriorated,
and that they faced the loss of the "life care" that they had expected
and would have received but for the "fraud . . in the inducement
of residents to live in the community and in the operation of the
Village."'
2
According to the complaint, the various defendants, through the
use of the mails, had fraudulently promoted the retirement commu-
nity with materially false statements relating to its financial sound-
ness. In addition, the lawyers, accountants, and the mortgage lender
were alleged to have conspired to conceal from the plaintiffs the
fraudulent promotion and operation of the Village, which included a
pattern of self-dealing in breach of fiduciary duties. The complaint
was drafted in eleven counts, two of which were premised on RICO,
the rest of which were premised, under principles of pendent jurisdic-
tion, on theories of common law fraud, breach of fiduciary duties,
and specific Missouri statutes. Count I, a RICO count, prayed for
treble damages, costs, and attorneys fees; Count II, a RICO count as
well, prayed for equitable relief, including, if appropriate, the reor-
ganization of the Village.
III. The Text of RICO
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted, the scope of a stat-
ute is to be determined in the first instance by examining its text.'
3
12 685 F.2d at 1057.
13 It ought to be, but apparently is not, a matter of embarrassment for lower court judges
and lawyers that the Supreme Court has felt the need, "repeatedly of late," to point out that
the "language of [a] statute" is the "starting point" in ascertaining legislative intent. Lewis v.
United States, 445 U.S. 55, 60 (1980) (citing Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337
(1979)); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979); Southeastern Commu-
nity College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405 (1979). RICO, too, falls within that basic rule.
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1980) ("[w]e look first to . .. [RICO's] lan-
guage"). See also United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 121 (1980) (construction of Title
II of Organized Crime Control Act, "absent clear evidence of a contrary legislative intent, a
statute should be interpreted according to its plain language"); Iannelli v. United States, 420
U.S. 770, 786-89 (1975) (construction of Title VIII of Organized Crime Control Act, general
rule ofstatutory construction must "defer to a discernible legislative judgment. . .[as] act is a
carefully crafted piece of legislation"). ChiefJustice Burger in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303, 318 (1980), described the proper role of courts in construing statutes:
We have emphasized in the recent past that "[o]ur individual appraisal of the wis-
dom or unwisdom of a particular [legislative] course. . . is to be put aside in the
process of interpreting a statute. . . .Our task, rather, is the narrow one of deter-
mining what Congress meant by the words it used in the statute; once that is done
our powers are exhausted.
See also Bread Political Action Comm. v. Federal Election Comm., 50 U.S.L.W. 4291 (U.S.
March 18, 1982) ("plain language" controls "construction, at least in the absence of 'clear
[December 1982]
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Section 1964(c) of RICO authorizes "[a] person injured in his busi-
ness or property by reason of a violation of Section 1962" to "sue.' 4
A congressional grant of the right to sue conveys, in the absence of
statutory limitations, the availability of all necessary and appropriate
relief. Significantly, the right to sue clause of section 1964(c) reads
"sue and," not "sue to. '"15 Accordingly, all necessary and appropriate
relief is included in the text of section 1964(c). Recovery of treble
damages, costs, and attorney's fees is explicitly added.
Under section 1961(3), "person" is defined to include "any...
entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property."'
6
On its face, the text of section 1964 contains no modifiers.' 7 It is diffi-
evidence' . . . of a 'clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary' "); United States v.
Martino, 681 F.2d 952, 954, 956 n.16 (5th Cir. 1982) (plain meaning controls construction of
RICO in criminal context), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2006 (1982), cert. grantedsub nom. Russello v.
United States, 51 U.S.L.W. 3497 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983); USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin En-
ergy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 95 n.1 (6th Cir. 1982) ("literal reading of RICO is consistent with
* * .Turkette and. . . Congress[ional]. . . inten[t] that RICO be liberally construed to effectu-
ate its remedial purpose in a civil context'). See note 150 infta for an outline of the proper
approach in the interpretation of RICO.
14 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976) provides:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of Section
1962 of this chapter may sue therefore in any appropriate United States district
court and shall recover three-fold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
15 See, e.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 239 (1969); Bell v. Hood,
327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946). In Bell, the Court stated: "[I]t is [a] well-settled [rule] that where
legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue...
federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done." See note 217
infra for a discussion of Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940), which
broadly construed the more narrow language of the securities laws.
16 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3)(1976) (emphasis added) provides:
As used in this chapter
(3) 'person' includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or bene-
ficial interest in property.
The use of the term "includes" in the definition manifests an intent to adopt an illustra-
tive, not an exhaustive definition. United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 394 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980) ("enterprise" illustrative not exhaustive since defined to in-
clude); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 681 (N.D. Ind.
1982) ("Includes is a term of enlargement, not of limitation"); United States v. Thevis, 474 F.
Supp. 134, 138 (N.D. Ga. 1979), aJ'd, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1982) ("includes" rather than
"means'). See note 166 infra.
17 See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55,60,62 (1980) ("directed unambiguously at any
person"; "no modifiers. . . present"; "on its face. . . contains nothing by way of restrictive
language"); Pfizer Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 312 (1978) ("person" under § 4 of Clayton Act
given "naturally broad and inclusive meaning"). But see United States v. Cooper Corp., 312
U.S. 600, 604 (1941)("person" under § 4 of the Clayton Act does not include "United States"
as "in common usage, the term 'person' does not include the sovereign."). The broad reading
of "person" under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) ought to be particularly
[Vol. 58:237]
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cult to see, therefore, how the plaintiffs in Bennett could have been
excluded from the class of "persons" entitled to sue under it. The
moneys obtained by the defendants through the alleged fraud, more-
over, constituted "property." 8 Accordingly, it is also difficult to see
how the plaintiff's injuries could have been excluded from the class of
injuries meriting relief under section 1964(c).
Section 196219 is violated by "any person . . . associated with
persuasive authority for a similar reading of § 1964, since § 1964 was modeled on antitrust
law. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1969); H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 56-60 (1970). To the degree that RICO was drafted outside of the antitrust provisions, it
was to avoid restrictive antitrust precedent. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of
Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D. Ind. 1982) ("[S]ection 1964(c) was. . . cast as a separate
statute intentionally to avoid the restricted precedent of antitrust jurisprudence") (emphasis
added). See text accompanying notes 72-74 infra. RICO ought, therefore, be read at least as
broadly as the comparable antitrust provisions; it should not be read as narrowly.
18 Such "injury" has been held to be injury within § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1976). Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338 (1979) ("property" held to have "natu-
rally broad and inclusive meaning'). See note 199 infra for a detailed analysis of the litigation
in Reiter. See a/so Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 50 U.S.L.W. 4723, 4724-25 (U.S. June
21, 1982).
19 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976) provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection
of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the
meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indi-
rectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of
any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is en-
gaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A
purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without
the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assist-
ing another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of
the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or
their accomplices in any pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of any
unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of
the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in
fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or
indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com-
merce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enter-
prise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful
debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provi-
sions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
The plaintiffs alleged violations of subsections (a) through (d). 685 F.2d at 1057. Never-
theless, the court of appeals chose to analyze only § 1962(c), since it was "the statutory section
under which "[plaintiffs] state[d] their strongest claim." Id. at 1060 n.8. The court did not
reach the plaintiffs' other claims. Id.
[December 1982]
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any enterprise. . . the activities of which affect. . . commerce, con-
duct[ing] . . .[the] enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity .... "20 As noted above, the definition of a "person," is,
of course, not limited by language in the text of the statute. "Enter-
prise," too, is defined to include "any corporation."12' "Pattern[ed]"
20 Section 1962 states "standards" enforced through "criminal" and "civil" remedies.
Section 1963 sets out the criminal remedies. Section 1964 sets out the civil remedies. See S.
REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969) ("section 1962 is subject to the remedies of...
sections 1963 and 1964."). Accordingly, § 1962 is not a criminal statute; it says "unlawful,"
not "criminal." Not all courts, however, have recognized that the role of § 1962 is to set a
legal standard, not to define a crime. Compare Bays v. Hunter Savings Ass'n, 539 F. Supp.
1020, 1023 (S.D. Ohio 1982) ("RICO has a criminal provision (§ 1962) and a civil remedies
provision (§ 1964) and there can be no recovery of damages under § 1964 unless there has
been a violation of § 1962."), with State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540
F. Supp. 673, 675-76 (N.D. Ind. 1982) ("Section 1964(c) refers to a 'violation' of the standards
of Section 1962, not to the criminal penalties of Section 1963. Section 1962 says that acts in
violation of it are 'unlawful,' not criminal. Criminal and civil sanctions are applied to viola-
tions of Section 1962 by Section 1963 (criminal) and Section 1964 (civil)."). State Fann, not
Bays, correctly read the statutory scheme, as the court of appeals noted in USACO Coal Co.
v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 95 n.1 (6th Cir. 1982). Indeed, RICO is not a crimi-
nal statute at all in the traditional sense, since its violation depends on the commission of at
least two acts that violate independent criminal statutes; it does not "draw a line" between
innocent and criminal conduct. See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)
(Holmes, J.). That line is drawn by the offenses that constitute the "racketeering activity" of
18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1976 & Supp. 1980). United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246, 1249
(D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979). Note, too, that the class capable of commit-
ting a violation of § 1963 is not defined by "person," but "whoever." "Whoever" is, in turn,
defined by 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) to include "corporations, companies, associations, firms, part-
nerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals." As such, it does not
extend to sovereign governments. United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 275 (1946); United
States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604 (1941). See also Attorney General v. City of
Woborn, 322 Mass. 634, 637, 79 N.E.2d 187, 189 (1948) (definition of "whoever" for civil and
penal liability of unit of government). Nothing in RICO purports, therefore, to make crimi-
nal penalties applicable to state and local units of government. Civilly, however, state and
local units of government can sue and be sued, as they are "entities" capable of holding
property. Accordingly, it is also not necessary to have a criminal violation of § 1962 through
§ 1963 before a civil suit can be brought under § 1962 through § 1964. United States v.
Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975) (government
equity suit); USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 95 n.1 (6th Cir. 1982)
(private treble damage suit); Farmers Bank v. Bell Mtg. Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1279-80
(D.C. Del. 1978) (private treble damage); Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. McCarty, 513 F.
Supp. 311, 313-14 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (private treble damage); Glusband v. Benjamin, 530 F.
Supp. 240, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (private treble damage); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 675-77 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (private treble damage). See also
note 59 infra (antitrust rule).
21 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976) provides:
As used in this chapter-. . ..(4) 'enterprise' includes any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individu-
als associated in fact although not a legal entity.
See Basic Concepts, supra note 3, at 1023-28; text accompanying notes 152-66 infra.
The district court "expressly declined to rule on the interstate commerce element of the
[Vol. 58:2371
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activity means activity that is not "isolated" or "sporadic," but is
"continu[ous] and relat[ed]. ' ' 22 Finally, "racketeering activity" may
be conducted "through" the offense of "mail fraud.
'23
As such, the possible application of RICO to the fact pattern
alleged by the plaintiffs in Bennett should have been considered
"neither absurd nor surprising. '24 If there were thought to be any
complaints." 685 F.2d at 1064 n.17. Accordingly, the court of appeals did not pass on it. Id.
Common methods used to prove an effect on commerce, on the other hand, include the move-
ment of goods, money, or people among the states. See, e.g., United States v. Altomare, 625
F.2d 5, 8 (4th Cir. 1980) (supplies and materials purchased out of state by prosecutor's office);
United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 379 (5th Cir. 1981) (arson ring used mails to obtain
insurance proceeds by fraud), re'd on other grounds en bane, 681 F.2d 952 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 2006 (1982) cert. granted sub. nom. Russello v. United States, 51 U.S.L.W. 3497 (U.S.
Jan. 11, 1983); United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436, 442 (5th Cir. 1976) (interstate travel
associated with rigged card game). Interstate phone calls, too, will suffice. United States v.
Morelli, 643 F.2d 402, 411 (6th Cir.) (interstate phone calls to obtain money for illegal
scheme), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981). As such, the element would not have been difficult
to meet under the facts as alleged. But see Fields v. National Republic Bank, 546 F. Supp.
123, 125 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (bank not thought to engage in interstate commerce). The
dictum in Fields can hardly be squared with the general jurisprudence of commerce under
RICO.
22 S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969). See United States v. Starnes, 644
F.2d 673, 677-78 (7th Cir.) (single arson with mail fraud sufficient), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 116
(1981); United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 601-02 (7th Cir. 1978) (multiple mail-
ings in fraudulent operation of a Veterans Administration supported school held sufficient);
United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855, 860-61 (7th Cir.) (multiple payments to union represen-
tative held sufficient), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 921 (1977). Seegenerally United States v. Weisman,
624 F.2d 1118, 1121-23 (2d Cir.) (bankruptcy and securities fraud in operation of theatre;
analysis of cases that acts need not be related to each other, but may be related to the conduct
of the affairs of the enterprise), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980); Basic Concepts, supra note 3, at
1029-31.
23 18 U.S.C. § 196 1(1)(B). See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 649 F.2d 534, 541 (7th Cir.
1981) (stock purchase agreement). Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part 1), 18 DuQ. L.
REV. 771 (1980), is the best general treatment of the statute. See also Shaw, Mail and Wire
Frauds, in I MATERIALS ON RICO: CRIMINAL OVERVIEW, CIVIL OVERVIEW, INDIVIDUAL
ESSAYS 120 (Cornell Institute on Organized Crime, G. Blakey ed., 1980) [hereinafter cited as
MATERIALS]. While the scope of mail fraud is wide, no honest person need fear a civil suit
under RICO based on the underlying theory of mail fraud, for good faith has always been a
complete defense. Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 314 (1896) (if evidence had shown
that defendant acted in good faith, "no conviction could be sustained."); United States v.
Martin-Irigona, 684 F.2d 485, 492-93 (7th Cir. 1982)("[G]ood faith, or the absence of an
intent to defraud, is a complete defense to a charge of mail fraud."); United States v. Curry,
681 F.2d 406, 417 (5th Cir. 1982) ("Because there was evidence to support a good faith de-
fense, it was reversible error to not include the instructions."); New England Enters. v. United
States, 400 F.2d 58, 71 (1st Cir. 1968) (good faith defense "settled law"), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1036 (1969); United States v. Westbo, 576 F.2d 285, 288 (10th Cir. 1978) ("entitled to in-
struction covering good faith").
To date, the courts have declined to create an implied civil cause of action under either
the mail fraud or wire fraud statutes. See, e.g., Ryan v. Ohio Edison Co., 611 F.2d 1170, 1177-
79 (6th Cir. 1979); Bell v. Health-Mor, Inc., 549 F.2d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 1977).
24 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981).
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ambiguity in the language of RICO, moreover, it should have been
"liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes. ' 25 In addi-
25 The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947
("The provisions of. . . [RICO] shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial pur-
poses."). RICO has been construed liberally in the application of its criminal remedies. See,
e.g., United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993, 997-98 (6th Cir. 1982) (extension of "enter-
prise" to government); United States v. Lee Stoller Enters., 652 F.2d 1313, 1317 (7th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 636 (1982) (extension of "enterprise" to government); United
States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (extension of "enterprise" to illicit
association), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880, 899 (5th
Cir.) (extension of "enterprise" to illicit association), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1021 (1978); United
States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1089-92 (3d Cir. 1977) (extension of "enterprise" to gov-
ernment), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978); ,United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 439 n. 12
(2d Cir. 1974) (extension of "enterprise" to foreign corporation), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105
(1975). Even among those judges (and a law professor) who have questioned applying the
liberal construction clause in criminal prosecutions, no objection has been voiced to applying
it in civil actions. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1369 (8th Cir. 1980)
("The extent ofjudicial deference that should be accorded [to the liberal construction clause]
stands unclear."); United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 692 (7th Cir. 1979) (Swygert, J.,
dissenting) ("unclear whether Congress intended its directive to apply to those sections which
establish criminal liability or merely to the 'remedial' provisions of Title IX"), cert. danied, 446
U.S. 935 (1980); United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d 1065, 1070 (3d Cir. 1978) (Aldisert, J.,
dissenting) ("I detect nothing [in the liberal construction clause] that precludes the applica-
tion of the rule of narrow construction. . . to defining crimes"); United States v. Altese, 542
F.2d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1976) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting) ("Notwithstanding" the liberal
construction clause, choice to make conduct a crime should be of harsher alternative only
where language is "clear and definite'), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); United States v.
Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1022 (D. Md. 1976) ("Congress may instruct courts to give broad
interpretations to civil provisions, [but] it cannot require courts to abandon the traditional
canon of interpretation that ambiguities in criminal statutes are to be construed in favor of
leniency.'), rev'd, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.),aJ'db equal' divided court en banc, 602 F.2d 653 (4th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980); Bradley, Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts: An
Anaoysirof(RICO, 65 IOWA L. REV. 837,860 n.126 (1980) ("Presumably,... the congressional
statement is only applicable to the remedial civil portions of the statute.") [hereinafter cited
as Bradley]. See also United States v. Computer Sciences, 689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982)
(liberal construction clause overlooked, lenity followed, and "person" and "enterprise" held
mutually exclusive); United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 990-93 (5th Cir. 1977) (strict
construction followed, but forfeiture provision held to extend to union office), vacated and re-
manded, 439 U.S. 810 (1978), reinstatedin relevant part, 591 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 864 (1969). Rubin is discussed in note 177 infra; Computer Sciences is discussed in note
181 infia. In fact, the clause has been implicitly or explicitly given effect in civil RICO suits
brought by the government, United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1974)
(implicit), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975), and private parties, USACO Coal Company v.
Carbomin Energy Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 95 n.1 (6th Cir. 1982) (explicit); State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 681 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (explicit). Indeed,
those judges (and the law professor too), who have objected to the application of the liberal
construction clause in criminal prosecutions and suggested that strict construction or the rule
of lenity should apply have misunderstood both the clause and the rule. See note 150 infira.
The modern rule of lenity is rooted in two policies: the principle that fair warning of crimi-
nality ought to be given, and the related principle that the moral condemnation of criminal-
ity should be based on a legislative, not a judicial determination. Dunn v. United States, 442
U.S. 100, 113 (1979); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971). The principle of fair
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tion, the application of RICO to the facts alleged would have been
warning, however, is fully met when the predicate offenses are so construed. See United States
v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (notice stems from predicate offenses), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979). See note 20 supra. Once the policy of leniency has been imple-
mented in the construction of the underlying "racketeering activity," and the line has been
crossed in the sphere of criminality, not once, but twice, it would be perverse to apply it
again. Similarly, it is the violation of the two predicate offenses that underwrites the basic
moral condemnation of the community. To the degree that RICO adds to that condemna-
tion through liberal construction, that construction and its condemnation are the product,
not of a judicial determination, but an express congressional direction. For a comprehensive
analysis of the background and rationale of the liberal construction clause, see Note, RICO and
the Liberal Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 167 (1980). The American Bar Associa-
tion gave "unqualified" support to the Organized Crime Control Act in 1970. It suggested
only two amendments, both adopted, to Title IX: the treble damage provision, and an
amendment giving courts discretion to close certain proceedings. Organized Crime Control,
Hearings on S. 30 and Related Proposals Before Subcomm. No.5 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 538, 543-44 (1970) (testimony of ABA President Edward L.
Wright) [hereinafter cited as House Hearngs]. Nevertheless, at the urging of the Section on
Criminal Justice, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association adopted a recom-
mendation that the liberal construction clause be repealed, not only for criminal, but also
civil proceedings. ABA: REPORT TO THE HousE OF DELEGATES, SECTION ON CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 12-13 (1982) [hereinafter cited as ABA]. See also notes 88 & 150 infia. The fallacious
reasoning employed by the Section to persuade the House reflects the misguided minority
judicial view, noted supra. There is also an echo of the sound of a losing litigant in the ABA's
plea that issues lost in a judicial forum now be reversed in the legislative arena.
The principal moving force behind the ABA's position has been Mr. Barry Tarlow, a Los
Angeles criminal defense lawyer. See Burke, Did Jurors Hear About 'MaTia "?, National
Law Journal, Mar. 28, 1981, at 3, col. 1; Seigel, supra note 3, at 17. Mr. Tarlow has written
urging a narrow construction of RICO. See, e.g., Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecu-
tor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REv. 165 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Tarlow]; Using the RICO
Statute in Civil Litigation, The National Law Journal, May 24, 1982, at 1, col. 3. He also filed
an amicus curiae brief for the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice in United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 577 (1980), which advocated that RICO be held not to apply to illicit
associations, a position that the Supreme Court rejected eight to one. Like the Supreme
Court, but unlike the ABA, it is doubtful that Congress will be misled by Mr. Tarlow's efforts.
See S. REP. No. 307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-28 (1981) for the Judiciary Committee's ration-
ale for rejecting an amendment to the criminal code bill, S. 1630, which would have imposed
a rule of "strict" construction on the code; the committee adopted instead a rule of "fair
import."
A significant majority of states has abolished the common law rule of strict construction
either by expressly abrogating it or adopting some variation of "fair import" or "liberal"
construction. ALA. CODE § 13A-1-6 (repl. 1982) ("fair import"); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.100
(Supp. 1982) ("fair warning"); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-104 (West 1978) (abrogated "fair
import"); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 1-203, 1-204 (repl. 1976) ("fair warning"); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 4 (West 1970) (abrogated "fair import"); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1-102(1)(a) (repl. 1978)
("fair warning'); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 203 (rev. 1974) (abrogated "fair import'); GA.
CODE § 26-102(b) (rev. 1982) ("fair warning"); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 701-104 (repl. 1976)
("fair import"); IDAHO CODE § 73-102(1) (Supp. 1982) (abrogated "liberal construction");
ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 1, § 1002 (West 1980) ("liberal construction"); IOWA CODE § 4.2
(West 1967) (abrogated "liberal construction"); KY. REV. STAT. § 500.030 (Baldwin 1975)
("liberal construction'); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:3 (West 1974) ("fair import"); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 71 (1979) ("plain meaning"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 4, § 6 (Law.
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fully consistent with RICO's express purpose and statutorily stated
findings of fact.26 Congress found that "organized" criminal "activ-
ity" used "fraud" to "drain" "dollars" from the American economy
Co-op. 1980) ("common and approved usage"); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.192(2) (Callaghan
1981) (abrogated "fair import"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.01 (West 1964) ("fair import');
MISS. CODE ANN. § 1-365 (1972) ("common and ordinary meaning'); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 1.010 (Vernon 1969) ("liberal construction'); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-1-102(2) (1981) (ab-
rogated "fair import'); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-102 (1979) ("fair import"); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 193.030 (1979) ("fair import"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.3 (1974) (abrogated "fair im-
port"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-2(c) (West 1982) ("fair import"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-2
(1978) ("approved usage'); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 5 (McKinney 1975) (abrogated "fair im-
port"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-01-29 (repl. 1974) (abrogated "liberal construction"); OR.
REV. STAT. § 161.025(2) (1981) (abrogated "fair import'); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 105 (Pur-
don 1973) (abrogated "fair import'); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 22-1-1 (Rev. 1979) (abro-
gated "fair import'); TENN. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 39-6-1706 (1982) ("liberal construction');
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 1.05(a) (Vernon 1974) (abrogated "fair import'); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-1-106 (1978) (abrogated "fair import'); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.04.02(2)
(1977) ("fair import'). Only two states expressly provide for strict construction. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 775.021 (West 1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.04(A) (Page 1982). Modern
courts have expressed no reservations about following the legislative directive setting aside the
common law rule. See, e.g., State v. Roger A., 424 A.2d 1339, 1341 (N.H. 1981); People v.
Ditta, 52 N.Y.2d 657, 659, 422 N.E.2d 515, 517, 439 N.Y.S.2d 855, 857 (1981). See aLro Tur-
ner v. State, 8 Okla. Crim. 11, 12, 126 P. 452, 455-56 (1912) (statutory abrogation and "fair
import" followed) ("Judges and lawyers have been educated in and are accustomed to an
antiquated system of procedure, and have been taught to look with reverance upon old legal
theories, and are thereby unduly biased against any change in legal procedures. . . . When
the Legislature has made a change in legal procedure, it is the duty of the courts to lay aside
their preconceived ideas, and construe such legislation according to its spirit and reason ...
The great trouble with the judiciary of the entire country is that many judges try to so twist
and evade statutes as to enable them to substitute their own private views for regularly en-
acted statutes.'). It may be wondered if the ABA has now committed itself-at least in prin-
ciple-to seeking to reverse these legislative judgments, too. On how the liberal construction
clause should be interpreted, see note 150 infia.
26 The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 922-23 (1970) states:
Statement of Findings and Purpose
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly
sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of
dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force,
fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power
through money obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan
sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of
narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitation; (3) this
money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business
and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; (4) organ-
ized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation's eco-
nomic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with
free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the
domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens;
and (5) organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gath-
ering process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evi-
dence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the
unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions
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and to "harm innocent investors. '27  Congress, therefore, passed
RICO to "provid[e] enhanced sanctions and new remedies. ' 28
"Nothing on the face of. . .[RICO] suggests a congressional intent
to limit its coverage .... "29 In fact, the "words do not lend them-
selves to restrictive interpretation. '30 "The language of the statute
[is] the most reliable evidence of its intent . . . . 3 "[I]n the
absence of a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that
language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive. '32 Obviously,
no contrary legislative intent was expressed on the face of RICO. It
is appropriate, therefore, to determine if any was expressed in its leg-
islative history.33
and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and
impact.
It is the purpose of this'Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by
establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new
remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.
See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 61 (1980)("obvious breadth of the language may well
reflect the expansive legislative approach revealed by Congress' express findings and
declarations.").
27 84 Stat. 922-23. See note 26 supra.
28 Id. at 923. It is a mistake to argue that the findings and statement of purpose that now
appear before the Organized Crime Control Act do not apply to Title IX or have primary
application to other titles. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993, 1003 (6th Cir.
1982) (Lively, J., dissenting); Note, Racketeer Influenced and Corupt Organizations Act: An Anal~ysis
of the Confision in Its Application and Proposalfor Reform, 33 VAND. L. REv. 441, 474 (1980). In
fact, the basic findings appeared before S. 1861, the predecessor of Title IX. Measures Relating
to Organized Crime.- Hearings on S 30, S. 994... Before the Subcomm. on Cim'zal Laws and Proce-
dures of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciap, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 61-62 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Hearings]; S. REP. No. 617, 9 1st. Cong., 1st Sess. 83 (1969)CITitle IX "derived from" S.
1861).
29 United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 373 (1978) (apropos of an argument that
"racketeering" ought to be read into 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970)).
30 Id. See also United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 398 (1930) ("[T]here is no war-
rant for seeking refined arguments to show that the statute does not mean what it says.').
31 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 593 (1981). Chief Justice Marshall made the
same point more than 100 years ago: "[A] law is the best expositor of itself." Pennington v.
Coxe, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 34, 52 (1804).
32 452 U.S. at 580.
33 While RICO's legislative history establishes that Congress meant what it said, courts
have unfortunately and improperly read the absence ofspecifr legislative history on a particu-
lar point to negate the general language of the statute. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson,
669 F.2d 1143, 1145 n.2 (6th Cir.) (government held not to be an "enterprise"), reverseden banc,
685 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1982). That approach is mistaken. Albernaz v. United States, 450
U.S. 333, 341 (1981)("Congress cannot be expected to specifically address each issue of statu-
tory construction that may arise"); Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 20 n.12 (1980)
(need not mention in committee report); Harrison v. PPG Indus., 446 U.S. 578, 592
(1980) ("[i]n ascertaining the meaning of a statute, a court cannot, in the manner of Sherlock
Holmes, pursue the theory of the dog that did not bark."). See also United States v. Turkette,
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IV. The Legislative History of RICO
A. The Origins of the Ideas in RICO
After the Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in
Interstate Commerce (the Kefauver Committee) disclosed in 1951
the problem of organized crime's infiltration into legitimate business
and state and local government, 34 the American Bar Association
("ABA"), in response to a request of the chairman of the Special
Committee, Senator Estes Kefauver, established the ABA Commis-
sion on Organized Crime.3 5 The Commission examined various leg-
islative proposals to strengthen the law as it dealt with organized
crime, including measures that recognized that "money . . . [was]
the key to power in the underworld. '36 By 1960, the problem of
criminal infiltration into labor unions had been fully documented by
the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or
Management Field (the McClellan Committee) 37 Hearings, too,
had been held exposing the structure of the national syndicate of or-
ganized crime known as the Mafia or La Cosa Nostra.38 In addition,
the Department of Justice had begun to move against racketeer infil-
tration of various unions by imaginatively utilizing antitrust theo-
452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981)(negative inference from legislative history impermissible; one pur-
pose cannot be read negatively as sole purpose). Similarly, the technique of pointing to one
expressed aspect of RICO's legislative history-a concern, for example, with organized crime
(in the classic mobster sense) and its infiltration of legitimate business-and then confining
the application of RICO's general language, despite contrary legislative history and the lib-
eral construction clause, to that one aspect of its legislative history is improper. See, e.g.,
Noonan v. Granville-Smith, 537 F. Supp. 23, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)(RICO count in federal se-
curities fraud litigation dismissed, as "[n]othing suggested in . . .[complaint] even remotely
brings. . .[it] within the ambit of. . .[the] purpose 'to deal' with organized crime's control
over business."). That approach, too, is mistaken. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,
315-16 (1980)(The "Court frequently has observed that a statute is not to be confined to the
'particular application[s] . . . contemplated by the legislators.' "). See Basic Concepts, supra
note 3, at 1035 n.l17 ("common mistake"). Nor is it proper to invoke the "spirit" rule of
Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892), for it has been confined to
"rare and exceptional cases." TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 187 n.33 (1978) (quoting Crooks v. Har-
relson, 282 U.S. 55, 66 (1930)).
34 See generally Basic Concepts, supra note 3, at 1014-15.
35 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 544 (testimony of Edward L. Wright). While the
Kefauver Committee attracted a great deal of national attention in the 1950s, the process of a
national examination of organized crime and racketeering in fact had its origins in the hear-
ings held by Senator Royal S. Copeland in the 1930's. See Investigation ofSo-Called 'Rackets,"
Hearings Before a Subcomm. ofthe Senate Comm. on Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933). S. REP.
No. 1189, 75th Cong. 1st Sess. 1 (1937) contains a "complete picture" of the work of the
"Rackets Committee."
36 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 544.
37 Basic Concepts, supra note 3, at 1015 n.22.
38 Id. at 1015 n.23.
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ries.39 Accordingly, the pervasive problem of organized crime 40 and
racketeering 4 1 in the world of government, business, and unions
42
39 See, e.g., Los Angeles Meat & Provision Drivers Union v. United States, 371 U.S. 94
(1962); United States v. Pennsylvania Refuse Removal Ass'n, 357 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1966);
United States v. Bitz, 282 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1960).
40 On the many meanings of "organized crime," see Basic Concepts, supra note 3, at 1013
n.15. In addition, the tendency of some to identify "organized crime" with the principal
syndicate involved in it, the Mafia, has been decried by no less than the sponsor of the Organ-
ized Crime Control Act, Senator John L. McClellan. GAMBLING IN AMERICA: REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION ON THE REVIEW OF NATIONAL POLICY TOWARD GAMBLING 181-82 (1976)
("in none of the hearings or in the processing of legislation in which I have been involved has
the term been used in. . .[such a] circumscribed fashion"). For a breakdown of the concept
into "syndicate," "enterprise," and "venture," see ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE: REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS RELATING TO
WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 190-92 (1976)(concerning statement of
Commissioner Blakey). See also United States v. Compagna, 146 F.2d 524, 525, 526 (2d Cir.)
(prosecution of motion picture industry extortion by Capone syndicate), cer. denied, 324 U.S.
867 (1944); TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 10 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK
FORCE REPORT]. The Second Circuit had this to say in United States v. Carter, 493 F.2d 704
(2d Cir. 1974), in defining "organized crime" in Title VI of the Organized Crime Control
Act, cod//fed at, 18 U.S.C. § 3503 (1976) (deposition taken where attorney general certifies
"organized criminal activity"):
The fact that the alleged perpetrators are presumably respected and entrusted with
responsibility. . . by stockholders does not suggest. . . that they are incapable of
engaging in organized criminal activity. We all stand equal before the bar of crimi-
nal justice, and the wearing of a white collar, even though it is starched, does not
preclude the organized pursuit of unlawful profit.
493 F.2d at 708. See United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 303-04 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
41 Burke put it well to his son in 1793: "A very great part of the mischiefs that vex the
world arises from words. People soon forget the meaning, but impression and the passion
remain." E. BURKE, SELECTED WRITING AND SPEECHES 269 (P. Stanlis ed. 1963). Contrary
to the contentions of defense counsel, "racket" and "racketeer" have never been words limited
to "organized crime" in the classic mobster sense. Etymologically, the basic term is probably
onomatopoeic. VIII THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 94 (1933). Its principal meaning is
"noise"; its secondary meaning is "reveling" or "merrymaking"; and its tertiary meaning is "a
fraudulent scheme, enterprise or activity." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIC-
TIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1871 (1966). See also THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Morris ed. 1970) (" 'racket': 1. A
clamor; uproar. 2a. A business that obtains money through fraud or extortion, b. An illegal or
dishonest practice;" "' racketeer': One engaged in an illegal business."). Murrary I. Gurfein
wrote:
Racketeering, a term loosely applied to a variety of criminal schemes has not yet
received exact legal definition . . . . It . . .applies to the operation of an illegal
business as well as to the illegal operation of a legal business. . . . The word
gained currency in the 1920s, but its origin remains obscure. . . . [T]he most plau-
sible [theory notes that the] word racket has long been used to describe a loud noise
and hence a spree or party or 'good time.' In the 1890s social clubs of young men in
New York City, under the auspices of political leaders, gave affairs called rackets;
since among their number there were members of neighborhood gangs, it was
found easy to coerce local tradesman to buy tickets.
[December 19821
RICO CIVIL ACTIONS
was well-known by 1967, when the President's Commission on Law
ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA 181-82 (G. Tyler ed. 1962). Hence, "obtaining money by
coercion or fraud" became "racketeering."
Similarly, the Supreme Court noted in United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 375
(1978) that the Copeland Committee "found that. . .[racketeering] and the associated word
'racket' had 'for some time been used loosely to designate every conceivable sort of practice or
activity which was either questionable, unmoral, fraudulent or even disliked, whether crimi-
nal or not.' S. REP. No. 1189, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937)."
RICO, of course, follows this common usage by terming its predicate offenses "racketeer-
ing activity" and making, for example, the operation of an "enterprise" through a "pattern of
racketeering activity" that "affects commerce" the gravamen of one of its standards of unlaw-
ful conduct. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 (1),(4),(5), 1962(c) (1976). This usage did not trouble
the ABA Criminal Justice Section (or its Council) in 1970. See House Hearings, supra note 25,
at 556-59. The principal objection voiced was to vagueness and overbreadth; the suggested
amendments were requiring three (rather than two) acts within five (rather than ten) years to
form a pattern; making the criminal forfeiture sanction discretionary (rather than
mandatory); affording courts discretion in holding proceedings in private; and adding the
remedy of treble damages in private suits. The Section has, however, now convinced the
House of Delegates of the ABA to recommend to Congress that "criminal" be substituted for
"racketeering" in RICO.
The present law brands the accused as a racketeer with resulting prejudicial impact
on judges and juries. This stigma is particularly unfair since RICO is not applied
solely to racketeers or offenses committed by racketeers but has also been applied to
businessmen and politicians engaged in criminal conduct unrelated to traditional
notions of organized crime.
ABA, supra note 25, at 4. If the suggestion of the ABA were carried to its logical conclusion,
the Congress should also rename federally cognizable "murder," "rape," and "robbery" with
less pejorative terms. Apparently the Section-and now the House of Delegates-has forgot-
ten the proper role of social opprobrium in the administration of justice, criminal and civil.
See, e.g., J. FEINBERO, DOING AND DESERVING 98, 100-05, 115-16 (1970)("At its best, in civi-
lized and democratic countries, punishment surely expresses the community's strong disap-
proval of what the criminal did. Indeed, it can be said that punishment expresses thejw4menl
(as distinct from any emotion) of the community that what the criminal did was
wrong.") (emphasis in original); II J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENG-
LAND 81-82 (1883) ("iTlhe sentence of the law is to the moral sentiment of the public in
relation to any offence what a seal is to hot wax. . . . In short, the infliction of punishment
by law gives definite expression. . . to. . .the moral or popular. . . part of morality."). On
the role of euphemisms in encouraging public and official reluctance to enforce the law and
providing rationalizations for the violators themselves in the "white-collar crime" area, see
TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT: TASK FORCE ON AS-
SESSMENT, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE 104-08 (1967)("most white collar crime is not at all morally neutral"); D. CRESSEY,
OTHER PEOPLES MONEY 102 (1952) (that embezzlers rationalize their conduct as different
from theft is important factor in behavior pattern). Indeed, it was persuasively argued in
1934 before the Copeland Committee that it was in part our failure to bring "white-collar
crime" to justice that significantly contributed to the developments during prohibition of
what all now concede to be "organized crime," a problem that did not end with prohibition's
repeal:
Both crime and racketeering of today have derived their ideals and methods from
the business and financial practices of the last generation. . . : It is a law of social
psychology that the socially inferior tend to ape the socially superior. . . . It was
inevitable that, sooner or later, we would succeed in "Americanizing" the "small
[Vol. 58:237]
THE NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (the Katzenbach
Commission) made its monumental report and recommended a com-
prehensive crime control strategy.43 Among other things, the Com-
fry"--especially the foreign small fry .... All was relatively safe, since the legal
profession was already ethically impaired through its affiliations with the reputable
racketeers. . . . The idea that when prohibition is ended the racketeers . . . will
meekly and contritely turn back to blacking shoes. . . is downright silly. They will
apply the technique they have mastered to the dope ring. . . . They will find
crafty lawyers all too willing to defend them from the "strong arm" of the law for
value received. . . .So long as the lawless can get protection in return for keeping
corrupt politicians in office, we shall not be free from the crime millstone about our
necks.
Investigation of So-Called "Rackets": Hearings Before a Subcomm of the Senate Committee on Commerce,
73rd Cong. 2d Sess. 710-11 (1934) (testimony of Harry Elmer Barnes). It will be interesting to
see if the ABA can persuade Congress to so amend RICO. See also White Collar Crime: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the HouseJud Comm., 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 109 (1978) (testimony
of Donald R. Cressey) ("It is not just that businessmen have a reckless disregard for the law.
Also significant is the fact that they have a powerful voice in determining what the law shall
be, how it shall be interpreted and enforced.").
Nevertheless, it must be conceded that "racketeer" is a "fighting word." See Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942) ("Argument is unnecessary to demonstrate that
the appellations 'damned racketeer'. . . [is an epithet] likely to provoke the average person to
retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of peace."). Care must be used, therefore, in trying all
RICO cases, criminal and civil, to see that the opprobrium rightly attaching to the conduct of
one who violates RICO is not a factor in determining whether the conduct occurred and was
engaged in by the person charged as a defendant. Where a RICO charge is improperly
brought, it may, for example, warrant a new trial. Compare United States v. Guiliano, 644
F.2d 85, 88-89 (2d Cir. 1981) ("distinct risk that the jury was influenced in its disposition of
the [case]. . .by the allegations of the RICO count"), with United States v. Sam Goody Inc.,
506 F. Supp. 380, 391 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (RICO charge facially proper for fraudulent operation
of record store as "enterprise," where corporations and individuals charged as defendants);
and United States v. Sam Goody, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 1223, 1225-26 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (after
dismissal of RICO charge, court "remain[ed] concerned about the effect of the . . . charge,
particularly the 'racketeering' implications [although in a] normal case. . . might not order a
new trial'), appeal dismissed, 675 F.2d 17, 26, 27 (2d Cir. 1982) ("less concerned" about possi-
bility of prejudice but not clear and indisputably wrong) (Mansfield, J., dissenting in part:
verdict "fairly-won and fully-supported" as prosecutor made clear not "organized crime or
the mob"). That possibility alone ought to counsel care. In addition, a RICO conviction
may warrant exercising discretion under the concurrent sentence doctrine to review the
RICO count, even though it might not otherwise be necessary. United States v. Webster, 639
F.2d 174, 183 (4th Cir. 198 1),modif6edon other grounds on rehearing, 669 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1361 n.2 (8th Cir. 1980). RICO convictions may
also carry parole and other confinement consequences. See, e.g., Carter v. Carlson, 545 F.
Supp. 1120, 1122 (S.D. W. Va. 1982) (RICO conviction warrants classification of prisoner in
"sophisticated criminal activity').
42 THE ABA REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 10 (1952-1953)
[hereinafter cited as ABA REPORT], for example, echoed the Kefauver Committee and
observed:
[T]he largest single factor in the breakdown of law enforcement agencies in dealing
with organized crime [documented by the Kefauver Committee was] the corruption
and connivance of many public officials.
43 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
[December 19821
RICO CIVIL ACTIONS
mission analyzed various aspects of organized crime,4 4 but it paid
special attention to infiltration of legitimate business.45 It recom-
mended the use of new approaches to control such infiltration.46 Fi-
nally, the fundamental reexamination of federal criminal
jurisprudence undertaken between 1966 and 1971 by the National
Commission on Reform of the Federal Criminal Law (the Brown
Commission) developed significant insights into the character of the
issues that faced the Congress.
47
B. The Initial Stages of the Legislative Process
In 1967 Senator Roman L. Hruska proposed bills S. 2048 and S.
2049 to implement aspects of the Katzenbach Commission's recom-
mendations, particularly the suggestion that antitrust theories be
TICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 200-09 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
PRESIDENT'S REPORT].
44 The Commission looked at the structure of the 24 "families" of the national syndicate,
id at 193, as well as such organized crime activities as gambling, id at 188; loan sharking, id
at 189; narcotics, id; the infiltration of legitimate business, id ;,labor racketeering, id at 190;
and political corruption, id. at 191.
45 The President's Crime Commission noted that legitimate businesses "rang[ing] from
accounting firms to yeast manufacturing" have been corrupted. PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra
note 43, at 190. See Basic Concepts, supra note 3, at 1015 n.24.
46 Basic Concepts, supra note 3, at 1015 n.25. Two seminal papers commissioned by the
Commission were Cressey, The Functions and Structure of Criminal Syndicates, in TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 40, at 25, and Schelling, Economic Analsis and Organized Crime, id at 114.
Each contributed important elements to the development of RICO, particularly the concepts
of "enterprise" and "pattern of racketeering activity." Indeed, the concept of "enterprise
criminalty" that RICO embodies-whether organized crime, white collar crime, or violent
crime--owes its origin, in significant part, to Professor Cressey's paper. See id at 56-60 for a
discussion of "organization" plus "crime."
47 The Commission was created by Act of Nov. 9, 1966, Pub. Law No. 89-801, 80 Stat.
1516 (1966). Its chairman was Edmund G. Brown; its vice-chairman was Congressman
Richard H. Poff. Two of its members were Senators John L. McClellan and Roman L.
Hruska. In addition, staff work for the Commission examined a number of concepts subse-
quently embodied in RICO. See, e.g., Consultants Report on Conspiray and Organized Crime, I
WORKING PAPERS: NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 381
(1970) (Professor G. Robert Blakey) ("enterprise," "pattern of racketeering"). The staffwork
is important, for it indicates how the appropriate scope of the predicate offenses in RICO was
narrowly conceived at the earliest stages of the legislative process.
The principle of selection followed in designating the 'racket' crimes is to include
those crimes which experience has shown to be the specialities of the criminal syndi-
cates, yielding illicit funds and power. Excluded from the list are ordinary crimes
of violence, . . . ordinary commercial frauds, violators [sic] of antitrust, securities,
and other regulatory laws.
Id at 383-84. Subsequently, the scope of RICO was deliberately both widened and nar-
rowed. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976). Ultimately, Congress decided that "ordinary commercial
frauds" should be included in RICO; included, too, were "crimes of violence."
[Vol. 58-237]
THE NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
brought to bear on organized crime.48 As originally introduced, S.
2048 focused on the use of unreported income from one line of busi-
ness in another line of business, while S. 2049 dealt with the "invest-
ment" of proceeds from "criminal activity" in a "business
enterprise. ' 49 Congressman Richard H. Poff introduced companion
bills in the House.50 Although no action was taken on them, they
were studied by the ABA.5' Significantly, while commenting that the
48 Basic Concepts, supra note 3, at 1015-16. See 113 CONG. REC. 17,997-18,002 (1967) for
Senator Hruska's introductory remarks discussing previous studies, the nature of organized
crime, and its infiltration into legitimate businesses; for example, "brokerage houses" and
"accounting firms." Id. at 17,998. He also noted that "[m]ergers and acquisitions, real or
imagined, were promoted. When stock values soared to desired levels, profit-taking would
occur. Then the helpless management, stockholders, and creditors were left holding the bag."
Id. Accordingly, Senator Hruska was manifestly concerned even at this early stage of RICO's
processing with a wide range of victims, including stockholders and creditors.
49 See S. 2048, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. 2049, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The
original text of S. 2049 defined "criminal activity" more narrowly than the ultimate text of
RICO, largely excluding the fraud type offenses, although bankruptcy fraud was included.
"Persons" who could violate the bills were limited to "individuals," "corporations," or other
"legal entities." Id. Criminal and civil remedies were provided for governmental and private
suits. Id.
Professor Bradley, supra note 25, at 884, suggests that society "is not harmed further by
the investment" of rackeetering proceeds. His reasoning has led one court to term the concept
of the legal sterilization of the fruits of racketeering "basic[ally] irrational." United States v.
Loften, 518 F. Supp. 839, 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Professor Bradley's, and the court's, view is
mistaken. It illustrates a common mistake in reading RICO. See Basic Concepts, supra note 3,
at 1035 n. 117. While RICO had as one of its purposes preventing the takeover of legitimate
business by organized crime, it is myopic to read RICO as if that were its only purpose. RICO
was also aimed at racketeering. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981) ("deal[s]
with problem at its very source"). Ultimately, organized crime's "revenue and power" stem
from its illicit activities. Id.; United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1979) (denied
the source of income to use to invest), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980). Accordingly, prohibit-
ing the investment of racketeering proceeds makes engaging in racketeering itself less attrac-
tive. "[T]o the extent that profits earned in organized crime can be safely invested in
legitimate activities to yield additional profits, the expected return to organized crime [in its
illicit activities] is higher than it would otherwise be." R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW § 7.6, at 176 (2d ed. 1977). "[T]he illegal market enterprises of [organized crime]...
members generate a considerable illegal cash flow." A. ANDERSON, THE BUSINESS OF OR-
GANIZED CRIME 77 (1979). Attempting legally to sterilize that cash flow from direct or indi-
rect investment in licit--or illicit--enterprises is, therefore, hardly irrational.
50 Basic Concepts, supra note 3, 1016 n.27. Congressman Bob Wilson, co-sponsor with
Congresssman Poff, also noted, citing the Crime Commission, "accounting firms." 113 CONG.
REc. 17,949 (1967). He also spoke of the "novel" approach of the bills. Id. Congressman
Poff had noted that the "package [would] not only sharpen old tools but forge new tools of
law enforcement." Id at 17,947. Another co-sponsor, Congressman Robert McClory, noted
that "business racketeers" and "criminal cartels" employ "staffs of attorneys, accountants,
and business consultants" to "protect themselves from suit and prosecution." Id at 17,950.
See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 63 (1980) (sponsor's statements entitled to weight);
Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 13 (1978).
51 The ABA's report of its study is reprinted in 115 CONG. REc. 6994-95 (1969).
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"time tested machinery of the antitrust law contains several useful
and workable features," the ABA suggested that the underlying the-
ory of the antitrust law-the maintenance of competition-might
make the direct use of the antitrust laws maladapted to the goal of
curtailing organized crime's influence in the upperworld. The ABA
expressed particular concern that antitrust concepts like "standing"
and "proximate cause"--"qppropriate in a purely antitrust con-
text"-would create "inappropriate and unnecessary obstacles" in
the way of persons injured seeking "treble damage recovery. ' 52 Ac-
52 The Report observed:
Some of the conduct of organized crime in legitimate businesses can be ...
reached by the existing antitrust laws. . . .Other activities of organized crime in
legitimate businesses may or may not be subject to antitrust laws. Thus, some ex-
tortion tactics and business take-overs by organized crime might not be reached
under the antitrust laws, particularly if they affected only the victimized business
rather than resulted in a lessening of competition in an entire line of com-
merce. . . . As described above, S. 2048 and 2049 extend the use of the antitrust
machinery as a weapon against organized crime.
The Antitrust Section agrees that organized crime must be stopped. It further
agrees that the antitrust machinery possesses certain bhdvantages worthy of utiliza-
tion in this fight. It therefore supports and endorses the principles and objectives of
both S. 2048 and S. 2049, and similar legislation.
However, it prefers the approach of S. 2049. By placing the antitrust-type
enforcement and discovery procedures in a separate statute, a commingling of crim-
inal enforcement goals with the goals of regulating competition is avoided.
S. 2048, on the other hand, by inserting in the Sherman Act a provision which
does not have as its primary objective the establishment or maintenance of free
competition, may result in an undesirable blending of otherwise laudatory statutory
objectives. Criminal conduct which violates existing antitrust laws can be pro-
ceeded against under those laws. Additional conduct sought to be reached should
be attacked under separate legislation.
Moreover, the use of antitrust laws themselves as a vehicle for combating or-
ganized crime could create inappropriate and unnecessary obstacles in the way of
persons injured by organized crime who might seek treble damage recovery. Such a
private litigant would have to contend with a body of precedent-appropriate in a
purely antitrust context--setting strict requirements on questions such as "standing
to sue" and "proximate cause."
For the foregoing reasons, the Section of Antitrust Law recommends that the
House of Delegates adopt the attached resolution endorsing the principles and
objectives of S. 2048 and S. 2049, and all similar legislation having the purpose of
adapting the machinery of the antitrust laws to the prosecution of organized crime,
but recommending that any such legislation be enacted as an independent statute
and not be included in the Sherman Act, or any other antitrust law.
Id at 6995. The ABA's recommendation for separate legislation was, of course, adopted.
Accordingly, any suggestion that RICO actions be limited by antitrust-type limitations-
"competitive," "commercial," or "direct/indirect" injuries-flies in the face of the very con-
sideration that led to the drafting of RICO as a separate statute from the antitrust statutes
that are so limited. Compare State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp.
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cordingly, the ABA recommended that the Hruska and Poff bills be
redrafted outside of the antitrust context to avoid the impact of re-
strictive antitrust precedent.
53
C. The Introduction of the Organited Crime Control Act
On January 15, 1969, Senator John L. McClellan introduced S.
30, the Organized Crime Control Act. The Act was drafted to imple-
ment a number of the recommendations of the Katzenbach Commis-
sion, although it did not at that time contain a RICO-type title.
5 4
On March 11, 1969, Senator McClellan made a major speech on the
floor of the Senate, in which he reviewed the development of organ-
ized crime in the United States, including its structure and its activi-
ties in gambling, narcotics, loansharking, the infiltration of
businesses, the takeover of unions, and the subversion of democratic
processes. 55 In addition, Senator McClellan addressed the failure of
traditional laws and law enforcement procedures to arrest its growth,
and he analyzed the various provisions of S. 30 that were designed to
change those laws and procedures. Noting the specific businesses in-
filtrated, Senator McClellan had this to say about that infiltration:
Usually, after [the] takeover [of a business]. . . defaulted loans are
liquidated by professional arsonists burning the business and then
collecting the insurance or by various bankruptcy fraud techniques,
which are called "scam." . . . Often, however, the organization,
using force and fear, will attempt to secure a monopoly in the serv-
ice or product of the business. When the campaign is successful, the
organization begins to extract a premium price from customers.
Purchases by infiltrated businesses are always made from specified
allied firms. With its extensive infiltration of legitimate business,
673, 679-80 (N.D. Ind. 1982) ("contrary to express legislative history") and Crocker Nat'l
Bank v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., No. C-81-4099 SC (N.D. Cal. 1982) ("by reason of" limitation
rejected), with Harper v. New Japan Sec., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1004-05, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 1982)
("by reason of" limitation imposed on civil RICO based on antitrust analogy that Congress
considered). State Farm and Crocker were correctly decided; Harper was wrongly decided; the
court's legislative history and policy analysis is contrary to what actually happened. Because
the argument in Comment, Reading the "Enterprise" Element Back Into RICO: Sections 1962 and
1964(c), 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 100 (1981), for adoption of a "competitive limitation" ignores
significant aspects of the legislative history materials, it should be rejected. The proper ap-
proach is set out in Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety ofJudicial Restriction, 95
HARV. L. REv. 1101 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note,Judicial Restriction]. The Northwestern
note's use of legislative history has been aptly termed "selective." Strafer, Massumi, Skolnick,
Civil RICO in the Public Interest: "Everybody's Darling", 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 655, 707 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Civil RICO].
53 115 CONG. REC. 6995 (1969).
54 Basic Concepts, supra note 3, at 1017.
55 115 CONG. REC. 5872 (1969), reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 28, at 493-511.
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organized crime thus poses a new threat to the American economic
system. The proper functioning of a free economy requires that
economic decisions be made by persons free to exercise their own
judgment. Force or fear limits choice, ultimately reduces quality,
and increases prices. When organized crime moves into a business,
it usually brings to that venture all the techniques of violence and
intimidation which it used in its illegal businesses. Competitors can
be effectively eliminated and customers can be effectively confined
to sponsored suppliers. The result is more unwholesome than other
monopolies because the newly dominated concern's position does
not rest on economic superiority.
56
Senator McClellan had this to say about the infiltration of unions:
Closely paralleling its takeover of legitimate businesses, organized
crime has moved into legitimate unions. Control of labor supply
through control of unions can prevent the unionization of some in-
dustries or can guarantee sweetheart contracts in others. It pro-
vides the opportunity for theft from union funds, extortion through
the threat of economic pressure, and the profit to be gained from
the manipulation of welfare and pension funds and insurance con-
tracts. Trucking, construction, and waterfront entrepreneurs have
been persuaded for labor peace to countenance gambling, loan-
sharking and pilferage. All of this, of course, makes a mockery of
much of the promise of the social legislation of the last half
century.
57
Senator McClellan had this to say about the subversion of demo-
cratic processes:
To exist and to increase its profits, .. organized crime has found
it necessary to corrupt the institutions of our democratic processes,
something no society can long tolerate. Today's corruption is less
visible, more subtle and therefore more difficult to detect and assess
than the corruption of the prohibition and earlier eras. Organized
56 115 CONG. REC. 5874; Senate Hearings,supra note 28, at 496. The list included "adver-
tising, amusement, appliances, automobile, baking, ballrooms, bowling alleys, banking, bas-
ketball, boxing, cigarette distribution, coal, communications, construction, drugstores,
electrical equipment, florists, food, football, garment, gas, hotels, import-export, insurance,
juke box, laundry, liquor, loan, news services, newspapers, oil, paper products, radio, real
estate, restaurants, scrap, shipping, steel, surplus, television, theaters, and transportation." Id
Here, too, the concern of Senator McClellan with the direct victims-the immediate business,
the insurance company, and the customers-is clearly manifested. More than the narrow class
"competitor" was, in short, of concern.
57 Id. Here, too, the point must be made: when a union fund is looted, how are competi-
tors injured? Limiting civil suits under RICO to competitive injuries would exclude union
members from the class who could civilly sue under RICO, hardly a result consistent with
Senator McClellan's express concerns. Nor would the members' injuries be solely "commer-
cial" in character. But see Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1136-37
(D. Mass. 1982) (RICO injury must be "commercial"). Van Schaik was wrongly decided; it is
discussed in note 147 inra.
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crime operates even in the face of honest law enforcement, but it
flourishes best in a climate of corruption. As the scope of organized
crime's activities has expanded, its efforts to corrupt public officials
at every level of government have grown. For with the necessary
expansion of governmental regulation of private and business activ-
ity, its power to corrupt has given organized crime greater control
over matters affecting the everyday life of each citizen. The poten-
tial for harm today is thus greater if only because the scope of gov-
ernmental activity is greater.58
D. The Introduction of S 1623
On March 20, 1969, Senator Hruska introduced S. 1623, the
Criminal Activities Profits Act.59 Senator Hruska noted Senator Mc-
58 Senate Hearings, supra note 28, at 497. What was said above about unions applies
equally to governments. How can they be hurt competitively or commercially? Should they
not be able to sue under RICO to vindicate their rights civilly? State and local governmental
units can sue under the antitrust statutes as victims. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S.
251, 260-64 (1972); Chattanooga Foundry v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906). Surely,
RICO ought to be read at least as broadly as the antitrust statutes on which its civil relief
provisions were modeled. See note 17 supra.
59 The focus of the bill, as then drafted, was reflected in its title. The final scope of
RICO, too, is reflected in its title, which is not limited to investment in or takeover of legiti-
mate businesses, but extends to the operation of "enterprises," lawful as well as unlawful, by
"racketeering acts" defined to include various forms of crime. See Basic Concepts, supra note 3,
at 1025 n.91 (history of development of language of title). Assistant Attorney General Wilson
criticized S. 1623 because its "remedies [were not] . . . at least as broad as the evil sought to
be suppressed." Senate Hearings, supra note 28, at 387. He called for legislation that went
beyond investment and attacked operation too. Id. He found S. 1861, however, more to his
liking because it went beyond investment, and because he foresaw the usefulness of its civil
remedies that could be invoked "by the lesser standard of proof, i.e. by a preponderance of
the evidence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt." Id at 388.
Traditionally, of course, what measure of proof should be applied in establishing a civil
"violation" of a statute has been left to the courts. Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1395
(1982). The issue, however, is first a matter of legislative intent. Id at 1403, 1404 n.2;
Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 96 n. 10 (1981) ("task of determining the appropriate standard
of proof is one of discerning congressional intent."); Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 265
(1980) ("traditional powers... to prescribe. . . standards of proof. . .). Here that intent
was clearly manifest in the legislative history as "preponderance of the evidence." Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 28, at 388 (testimony of Assistant Attorney General Wilson) (testimony of
Senator McClellan) ("preponderance"). See also House Hearings, supra note 25, at 106-07 (not
"proof beyond reasonable doubt," but "[s]ince. . .civil sanctions would be remedial rather
than punitive. . .[there would be] procedural equality."). Id at 664 (remarks of Congress-
man Pofi) "[T]itle IX is really in two parts, one criminal and one civil. The burden of proof
under the civil-remedy section, section 1964, is much less.". Accordingly, the measure has
been adopted by the courts. United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1974)
(government civil suit), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 677 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (private civil suit); Parnes v. Heinold
Commodities, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645, 647 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (same); Heinold Commodities, Inc.
v. McCarty, 513 F. Supp. 311, 313 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (same); Farmers Bank v. Bell Mortgage
Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1280 (D. Del. 1978) (same). Congressional intent might well be
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Clellan's March 1 1th speech, commenting that he "need not reiterate
frustrated, however, should a specifically defined "organized crime" or "racketeering" type
limitation focusing only on mobsters in the classic sense be adopted to curtail the scope of civil
RICO, for then a civil RICO proceeding might well be thought to carry a "stigma"-con-
trary to Congress's intent-and powerful arguments could be made for the adoption of a
higher measure of proof. See Civil RICO, supra note 52, at 715-17; NoteJudicial Restrictions,
mupra note 52, at 1107 ("RICO claims can stigmatize defendants only if courts restrict the
applicability of the broad statutory language to proven organized criminals.") (emphasis ad-
ded). Congress knew that the old "sanctions and remedies available" were "limited in scope
and impact." The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 923
(1970). It sought, in RICO, to "establish . . .new remedies." Id. The implementation of
those new remedies ought not now be frustrated by judicial fiat through the adoption of a
"strained construction" of Title IX having no support in the "statutory language itself, nor in
its legal history." United States v. Sutton, 642 F.2d 1001, 1004 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc rever-
sal of panel opinion excluding illicit "enterprises" from "enterprise" under RICO). Courts
should, therefore, "decline. . .[any] invitation to emasculate Title IX." Id. See Stockwell v.
United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 531, 547 (1871) (multiple damage award does not warrant
different rules of evidence).
The general practice that obtains under the antitrust statutes, moreover, is equally suita-
ble under RICO. A suit to restrain a violation of the antitrust statutes is civil, not criminal, in
character. United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 338, 348 (1947) ("civil, not a
criminal proceeding"; "not . . .for punishment. . .[but]. . .future prevention'); Georgia
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439,446 (1945) ("civil, not a criminal, proceeding"). No prior
criminal conviction is necessary before a civil suit may be brought. Standard Sanitary Mfg.
Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 52 (1912) ("[T]he Sherman Act provides for a criminal
proceeding to punish violations and suits in equity to restrain such violations, and the suits
may be brought simultaneously or successively. The order of their bringing must depend
upon the Government. . . .[An] action for damages by a 'person injured' . . . [need not]
also wait."). A judgment may be returned against a defendant based on a showing not
greater than a preponderance of the evidence. See Ramsey v. UMW, 401 U.S. 302, 307-11
(1971) (general rule of preponderance applies in treble damage antitrust suits against union,
except as modified by Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 U.S.C. § 106) for question of authorization);
South-East Coal Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 434 F.2d 767, 778 (6th Cir. 1970) (preponder-
ance), ceri. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971). No reason exists to vary the time-tested practice under
the antitrust statutes or to repudiate the developing practice under RICO. See generally IX J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2498, at 327 (3d ed. 1940) ("Policy suggests that the. . .[reasonable
doubt standard] should be strictly confined to its original field."); Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S.
91 (1981) (preponderance standard followed for fraud determination in administrative hear-
ing); SEC v. Joiner Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943) (securities fraud; criminal proceed-
ings beyond reasonable doubt; civil proceedings--preponderance of the evidence).
Professor (now Judge) Posner, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw § 21.2, at 432 (2d ed.
1977), argues, however, based on the diminishing marginal utility of money income, that a
"somewhat higher standard of persuasioif than mere preponderance" should be adopted in
civil matters. Posner reads the preponderance standard as an evaluation of the probability
(.5) that an undeserving plaintiff will win or that a deserving plaintiff will lose. Posner's view
is mistaken; it assumes that only one issue is faced in litigation; it also assumes that plaintiffs
and defendants are relatively equal in wealth--or at least wealth available for legal execu-
tion. In fact, there are four crucial areas in civil litigation: liability, causation, damages, and
execution, and plaintiffs in certain classes of litigation may in fact not be relatively equal in
wealth. To prevail, a plaintiff must win all-or most-of the issues in each area; if a prepon-
derance of the evidence standard is applied to fact finding at each stage, the probability of
winning for a deserving plaintiff is certainly not greater than .0625 (.5X.5X.5X.5). In addi-
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everything that the distinguished senator from Arkansas . . . set
tion, RICO type litigation, particularly where mob-type organized crime is in fact present,
will also not involve plaintiffs relatively equal in wealth to defendants, and it will pose an
especially difficult problem at the point of execution. In 1963, for example, the McClellan
Committee looked into the organized crime operations of Santo Trafficante, the Tampa Flor-
ida Mafia boss. Neil G. Brown, the Tampa Chief of Police, testified: "We know of no legiti-
mate businesses that are owned or controlled by Santo Trafficante. He owns no real estate,
nor any other property, real or personal. His house, automobile and all his other possessions
are held in the name of others." Organized Crime and Illicit Trft in Narcotics: Hearings Before
the Senate Perm. Subcomm. on Investigations of the Comm. on Government Operations, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 519, 527-28 (1963) (testimony of Neil G. Brown). See also Forfeiture of Narcotics Proceeds,
Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Crimina/Justice, Comm.- on theJudiciay, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
96-97, 114 (1980) (testimony of Irvin B. Nathan) (three problems: 1) ascertaining what the
assets are, 2) reaching them if they are in the hands of third parties, and 3) preventing their
dissipation before trial; problems compounded since "sophisicated criminals ... have access
to the best lawyers and accountants money can buy"); STIkONGER FEDERAL EFFORT
NEEDED IN FIGHT AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME: REPORT BY COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF
THE UNITED STATES 31-34 (1981) (problems in criminal forfeiture: 1) uncertain status of
assets, 2) third party holdings, and 3) dissipation prior to seizure); ASSET FORFEITURE-A
SELDOM USED TOOL IN COMBATTING DRUG TRAFFICKING, REPORT OF COMPTROLLER
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 30-42 (1981) (same); J. CALIFANO, THE 1982 REPORT ON
DRUG ABUSE AND ALCOHOLISM 97 (1982) ("greater use of federal statutes [like RICO] and
[the Controlled Substances Act] should be amended to provide for the forfeiture of all profits
of . . . enterprise"). It is not without significance, too, that Frank Diecidue, a Trafficante
associate, has been prosecuted under RICO, albeit unsuccessfully, for murder in connection
with the operation of a legitimate business. United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535, 553-55
(5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980). See also State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 682 (N.D. Ind. 1982) ("Nor is it fanciful to suggest that
organized crime figures' assets may be held by nominees or corporate shells."); Urban Indus.
v. Thevis, 670 F.2d 981 (11th Cir. 1982) (one million dollars in jewelry and cash seized from
fugitive in United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1982) (RICO murder) subject to
IRS lien rather than claim by judgment creditor of estate of victim). Accordingly, the moral
and economic considerations underlying the structure of civil RICO may be simply stated. A
preponderance standard makes sense at the point of unlawful conduct, for society ought to be
assured that it is more likely than not that the defendant has violated RICO's standards.
Thereaffer, as in the antitrust area, while proof of cause and the fact of damage ought to have
to be maade out, how a plaintiff meets its burden of proof as to the amount of damage ought to
be ameliorated considerably. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S.
100, 123 (1969) ("damage issues . . . rarely susceptible of the kind of concrete, detailed
proof'); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 697-701
(1962) (fact of injury from violation may be inferred from circumstantial evidence); Bigelow
v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946) ("jury. . .[may] return a verdict...
even though damages. . . [can] not be measured with exactness"; "just and reasonable esti-
mate. . . based on relevant data"); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.,
282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931) (uncertainty as to extent of damages distinguished from uncertainty
as to fact of damage); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359,
379 (1927) ("damages are not rendered uncertain because they cannot be calculated with
absolute exactness"). A theory of full compensation, too, warrants the award of multiple
damages for victims of behavior that is also criminal. See note 89 infra. Finally, special pre-
cautions must be taken in the course of the litigation to assure that the defendant's assets, if




forth." 6 He did, however, want to "focus"' 6 t on the senator's point
about the infiltration of the legitimate economy.62 Senator Hruska
then indicated that S. 1622 had been drafted to "synthesize" the ear-
lier legislation on which he and Congressman Poff had worked and
on which the ABA had favorably commented.
63 The bill, he said,64
attacked "the economic power" of organized crime "on two fronts-
criminal and civil," but that the "criminal provision . . .[was] in-
tended primarily as an adjunct to the civil provision," which he
"consider[ed]. . .the more important feature" of the bill.65 As intro-
duced, S. 1623 in fact included express provisions for private equita-
ble relief and treble damages.
66
60 115 CONG. REc. 6993 (1969).
61 Id Sentor Hruska's remarks, therefore, are illustrative, not exhaustive, of the pur-
poses of the bill. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981) (negative inference
impermissible).
62 Senator Hruska noted:
Not only will organized crime bring to a business venture all the techniques of
violence and intimidation which it used in its illegal business, but it is also a fore-
gone conclusion that those individuals who have made a career of cheating and
stealing will continue to do so in their new roles. The consumer public will suffer
from inflated prices, shoddy goods, and outright frauds.
In short, this entire matter of racketeer infiltration of legitimate business inevitably
creates unfair competition. It is a situation made to order for the application of the
Federal antitrust powers that have been in existence for many years.
115 CONG. REc. 6993 (1969). Here, too, Senator Hruska expresses a concern beyond those
competitively injured.
63 Id at 6993. The ABA Report was inserted in the. Congressional Record. Id. at 6994.
Senator Hruska explicitly said the redrafting to place the bills outside of the antitrust statutes
had been undertaken at the ABA's suggestion. Id.
64 Id.
65 Id at 6993-94. Senator Hruska observed:
[T]he criminal provisions are intended primarily as an adjunct to the civil provi-
sions which I consider as the more important feature of the bill. . . . I believe that
the time has arrived for innovation in the organized crime fight. The bill is innova-
tive in the sense that it vitalizes procedures which have been tried and proved in the
antitrust field and applies them into the organized crime field where they have been
seldom used before. Hopefully, experts on organized crime will be able to conceive
of additional applications of the law. The potential is great. For these reasons the
bill is worthy of careful consideration.
Id at 6993. Here, too, Senator Hruska manifested an intent to go beyond antitrust precedent.
66 See id at 6995-96. Note, however, that its "criminal activity" definition did not at this
time include mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341), wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343), the interstate
theft-fraud provisions (18 U.S.C. §§ 659, 2314-2315), or securities fraud. Only bankruptcy
fraud was included. The express extension of RICO to other forms of fraud and the adoptioA
of the liberal construction clause came later. The American Bar Association testified in sup-
port of S. 1623. Senate Hearings, supra note 28, at 268 (testimony of Rufus King) ("I . ..
report that the American Bar Association favors the measures.").
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E. The Introduction of S 1861
On April 18, 1969, Senators McClellan and Hruska introduced
S. 1861, the Corrupt Organizations Act.67 Senator McClellan indi-
cated that it was "in part a product of the testimony developed in
four days of hearings on S. 30. '' 68 He also indicated that Congress-
man Poff had "been in contact with . . . [him] in reference to [the]
bill."'69 As introduced, S. 1861 did not, however, expressly include
provisions for private equitable relief or treble damages. 70 Its provi-
sions only provided expressly for criminal sanctions and equitable re-
lief sought in government suits.7 1 Senator McClellan noted that S.
67 Basic Concepts, supra note 3, at 1017. As the focus of the bill was not limited to the
investment of illegal funds, its title differed from that of S. 1623.
68 115 CONG. REC. 9567 (1969).
69 Id Congressman Poffs status as a major sponsor of the legislation, therefore, contin-
ues to be clear. See note 50 supra.
70 Senator McClellan later indicated that this was not because of opposition to the con-
cepts, but merely because "[d]etailed consideration was not given [at the time] to carrying the
antitrust parallel out." 117 CONG. REc. 46,386 (1971).
71 It is likely, however, that a private cause of action would have been implied, as the bill
contemplated not only "fine, imprisonment, criminal forfeiture, and civil divestiture dissolu-
tion [and] injunction" relief at the hand of the government, but also "other relief." STATE-
MENT OF FINDINGS AND STATEMENT OF POLICY OF S. 1861, 115 CONG. REC. 9568 (1969).
See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). The findings of the bill, moreover, not only noted the
wide scope of organized crime in the United States (the language parallels that which finally
appeared before the entire bill as ultimately enacted), but that "innocent investors" were
"harmed." 115 CONG. REC. at 9568. That these findings prefaced S. 1861, too, undermines
the argument that the findings before the text of the final Act cannot be used to interpret
Title IX. See Basic Concepts, supra note 3, at 1026 n.91. See also note 28supra. In addition, the
legislation was termed "remedial," and its "liberal construction" was mandated. 115 CONG.
REC. at 9571. Finally, nowhere in his remarks did Senator McClellan indicate that the express
provision for suits by the government was designed to exclude private suits. Compare Passenger
Corp. v. Passengers Ass'n, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) (expressio unias est excusio alterius plus une-
quivocal legislative history held to preclude not-expressed right), with Wyandotte Co. v.
United States, 389 U.S. 191, 200 (1967)(specific not exclusive). The maxim is, in short, "by
no means of universal conclusive application." H. BROOM, LEGAL MAXIMS 668 (7th Am. ed.
1874). The question always is "the intention of the legislature." Id. at 664; SEC v. Joiner
Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943)(Ejiisdn generis and expressio unius est exc/usio altenizs gives
way to intent and policy); United States v. Barnes, 222 U.S. 513, 519 (1912)("a rule of con-
struction, not of substantive law"). It depends on whether the intent is "general" or "restric-
tive." H. BROOM, LEGAL MAXIMS 668 (7th Am. ed. 1874). Usually, where a remedy is
"cumulative" of others, the maxim is inapplicable. Id. Obviously, the proposed bill was "cu-
mulative," as its application depended on the commission of "racketeering activity" already
made criminal by independent federal and state offenses. The intent to add to existing crimi-
nal and civil remedies on the federal and state level-is also manifest; it later became explicit in
The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(b), 84 Stat. 947 ("Noth-
ing in. . .[RICO] shall supersede any provision of Federal, State or other law imposing crim-
inal penalties or affording civil remedies."). Unless an overlap existed, it would not have been
necessary to speak of an intent not "to supersede." Note, too, that the scope of the state
offenses was wide: "any act involving . . . danger of violence to life, limb or property...
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1861 drew "heavily upon the remedies developed in the field of anti-
trust," but he added that as sponsor of the bill he had "no intention
: . . of importing the great complexity of antitrust law enforcement
into" the enforcement of S. 1861.72 Nor did he intend to "limit the
remedies available to those which have already been established.1
73
He wanted, he said, to retain the "ability of our chancery courts to
formulate a remedy to fit the wrong. ' 74 In addition, Senator Mc-
Clellan expressed his hope that "provisions [of S. 1861] might well be
incorporated by way of an amendment into S. 30 itself.
' ' 75
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year." 115 CONG. REC. at 9560. However,
mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341), wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343), and securities fraud were not
yet among its "racketeering acts." These statutes were only added later. See generaly Merrill,
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 50 U.S.L.W. 4457 (U.S. May 3, 1982) (im-
plied cause of action for fraud found under Commodity Futures Exchange Act).
72 115 CONG. REC. 9567 (1969). Senator McClellan commented:
[S. 1861]. . .draws heavily upon the remedies developed in the field of antitrust.
Nevertheless, Mr. President, I believe it necessary to make several clarifying re-
marks on the antitrust remedies this bill provides. The first is that the equitable
remedies used in the field of antitrust always existed. Because the remedies have
been effective in removing and preventing harmful behavior in the business seg-
ment of our economy, they show great promise as tools for attacking organized
crime. There is, however, no intention here of importing the great complexity of
antitrust law enforcement into this field. Nor is there any intention of using the
antitrust laws for a purpose beyond the legislative intent at the time of their pas-
sage.
The many references to antitrust cases are necessary because the particular
equitable remedies desired have been brought to their greatest development in this
field, and in many instances they are the primary precedents for the remedies in
this bill. Nor do I mean to limit the remedies available to those which have already
been established. The ability of our chancery courts to formulate a remedy to fit
the wrong is one of the great benefits of our system of justice. This ability is not
hindered by the bill.
Id. Under S. 1861, as now under RICO, federal district courts were given "jurisdiction to
prevent and restrain violations of Section 1962" (emphasis added). Since the operative language
on which government injunctions were premised is identical to the operative language on
which private civil suits are now based, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) ("injured in .. .business or
property by reason of a violation of Section 1962") (emphasis added), it is appropriate to cite
Senator McClellan's general comments on § 1964 on the need not to circumscribe private
civil actions. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D.
Ind. 1982). The final statute blends both types of actions in a common section; they should
receive, therefore, a similar construction. As Mr. Justice Cardozo stated in Moore Ice Cream
Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 378 (1933): "There is a unity of verbal structure that is a symptom
of an inner unity, a unity of plan and function." See Perrine v. Chesapeake & Delaware
Canal Co., 50 U.S. (9 How.) 172, 187 (1850) (Taney, C.J.) ("an interpretation of [a] statute
which . . . would render different sections inconsistent with each other cannot be the true
one.').
73 115 CONG. R.c. 9567 (1969).
74 Id.
75 Id. S. 1861, in fact, became Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act. S. REP.
No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 83 (1969), repi'ntedin 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEwS 4010.
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The Department of Justice commented on S. 1861 on August
11, 1969.76 A central concern of the Department was the breadth of
predicate offenses. 7  It suggested that they were "too broad and
would result in a large number of unintended applications, as well as
tending toward a complete federalization of criminal justice. '78 A
Senator McClellan also said that he saw in S. 1861 "hope" of removing the "profit potential"
from certain kinds of crime, 115 CONG. REC. 9567 (1969), and he observed that the bill was
"based upon the judgment that parties who conduct organizations affecting interstate com-
merce through a pattern of criminal activity are acting contrary to the public interest." Id. at
9568. The purpose of the bill was, however, explicitly said to be "remedial rather than pe-
nal." Id. Compare the action of Judge Ross Sterling dismissing a RICO count in a criminal
indictment, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 20, 1979, at 82 ("RICO was designed to keep racketeers out of
business not to make racketeers out of businessmen"), which was reversed in United States v.
Uni Oil, 646 F.2d 946, 953 (5th Cir. 1981)("primarily enacted to combat organized crime,
[but] nothing in [its legislative] history, or the language of the statute itself, expressly limits
RICO's use to members of organized crime"), with United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298,
306 (7th Cir. 1979) ("If a defendant qualifies as a racketeer able to accomplish the same illegal
goals as organized crime he qualifies for the punishment.") and Basic Concepts, supra note 3, at
1029 n.91 ("There is nothing in RICO that says that if legitimate businessmen act like racke-
teers, they should not be treated like racketeers.").
76 Senate Hearings, supra note 28, at 404-07. S. 1861 recast S. 1623. "Criminal activity"
was termed "racketeering activity." The scope of such activity was expanded to include a
wide range of state offenses as well as certain federal offenses, including the interstate theft-
fraud offenses (18 U.S.C. § 659 (theft from interstate shipments) and §§ 2314-2315 (transpor-
tation of stolen property)). "Person" was broadly defined ("any individual or entity capable
of holding property"). The concept of "enterprise" was introduced; it was also broadly de-
fined as "any individual, corporation, legal entity or other group of individuals." Similarly,
"pattern of racketeering activity" was introduced; it was defined in the legislative history.
115 CONG. REC. 9567 (1969).
77 Senate Hearings, supra note 28, at 404-07. Hence, it is not correct to suggest that the
impact of RICO on federal-state relations was not brought to Congress' attention. Congress,
of course, after making certain modifications, went forward with the legislation. United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586-87 (198 1)("existing law, state and federal, .... not ade-
quate to address the problem, which was of national dimensions").
78 Senate Hearings, supra note 28, at 404-07. It was because "state and federal [law] was
not adequate" that Congress acted. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981). It
hardly sits well now to attempt to circumscribe RICO on a theory that state law is adequate.
Compare Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 746-48 (N.D. Il. 198 1) (RICO
not alternative or cumulative to other remedies), with Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941, 947 (1970) (RICO "shall [not] supersede. . . state.., civil
remedies"). Unless RICO was "alternative" or "cumulative" no reason existed to be con-
cerned about its preemption of other federal or state law. While the Department of Justice
offered amendments, it also supported S. 1861, noting that its "principal utility .. .[might]
well be found . . . in its civil remedies. . . with . . .[their] lesser standard of proof." Senate
Hearings, supra note 28, at 406-07. Not all of the witnesses who appeared in the senate hear-
ings, however, endorsed S. 1861. The American Civil Liberties Union objected to its breadth,
commenting that it would be "applicable in areas far removed from that which we tradition-
ally define as organized crime." Senate Hearings, supra note 28, at 475. It suggested that the
bill be redrafted to "confine its reach to [the] limited aim" of restricting illegitimate invest-
ment. Id. Accordingly, those who now argue in court that an "organized crime" or "racke-
teering" type limitation be read into RICO are merely offering in a judicial forum an
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more circumscribed definition of the predicate offenses was sug-
gested, which would be narrower, but still "broad enough to include
most state statutes customarily invoked against organized crime," 79 a
suggestion that was, at least in part, adopted by the Committee.80
F. The Reporting of the Organized Crime Control Act In the Senate
On December 18, 1969, Senator McClellan reported for the Ju-
diciary Committee S. 30, the Organized Crime Control Act,
amended to incorporate S. 1861 as Title IX.81 The Committee Re-
port described Title IX in language that paralleled the Senator's
March 11th speech, giving special attention to the infiltration of
businesses and the taking over of unions.82 The report noted, for
example, that the stock exchange had been subjected to thefts, busi-
amendment that elected representatives declined to adopt in the legislative forum. On the
"civil liberties" implications of this "civil liberties" objection, see text accompanying note 113
inra. The Supreme Court in United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 373-74 (1978) reversed
the Sixth Circuit's effort to read a "racketeering" limitation into the text of 18 U.S.C. § 1951.
It noted the absence of the limitation in the text of the statute and the vagueness problems
that reading an undefined concept into the statute would pose "impel[led] the conclusion that
Congress intended to make criminal all conduct within the reach of the statutory language."
435 U.S. at 380 (emphasis added).
79 Senate Hearings, supra note 28, at 405.
80 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1) (1976 & Supp. 1980). The generic incorporation of state
offenses was eliminated and a specific list of state offenses was included. The list of federal
offenses, however, was expanded, principally by including fraud type offenses. See text ac-
companying notes 90-95 infra.
81 S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 83 (1969). The Organized Crime Control Act in
general and RICO in particular have been criticized as poorly drafted and ill-considered. See
note 120 infra. On reporting the bill, Senator McClellan observed:
[This debate on the Organized Crime Control Act] is the culmination of a year of
detailed study, hearings, and consultations, and a result of one of the most thor-
oughly gratifying bipartisan efforts in which I have participated since coming to the
Senate.
116 CONG. REc. 585 (1970). The Senator then listed the groups whose opinions had been
consulted and whose ideas and suggestions had been embodied in the bill, including.
[T]he President's Crime Commission, [T]he National Commission on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws, [T]he American Bar Association Project on Minimum
Standards of Criminal Justice, [T]he Model Penal Code of the American Law Insti-
tute, [Tihe Model Sentencing Act [of the]. . .National Council on Crime and De-
linquency, [T]he Association of Federal Investigators, [Tjhe New York County
Lawyers Association, [T]he American Civil Liberties Union, . . . [T]he National
Association of Counties and [T]he New York State Bar Association. . . . The Na-
tional Chamber of Commerce and the International Association of Chiefs of Police.
Id. The Supreme Court termed the Act in Iannelli v. United States, 420 LC.S. 770, 789 (1975),
a "carefully crafted piece of legislation."
82 S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76-78 (1969). The report quoted with approval
the findings of a special committee of the American Bar Association which recognized "the
depth of the penetration of the forces of organized crime into the fabric of our society and our
commercial life." Id. at 76.
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nesses had been liquidated by arsonists to collect insurance, bank-
ruptcy fraud techniques had been employed, premium prices had
been extracted from customers, and competitors had been elimi-
nated. 3 Unions, the report continued, had been victimized by theft
and used to extort, while profit had been gained by the manipula-
tions of welfare and pension funds and insurance contracts.84 Present
laws were termed "inadequate to remove criminal influences from
legitimate endeavors. ' '85 The Committee Report called for "[n]ew
approaches that. . .[dealt] not only with individuals, but also with
the economic base through which those individuals constitute[d] a
serious threat to the economic well-being of the Nation, '8 6 including
"a civil law approach of equitable relief broad enough to do all that
is necessary to free the channels of commerce from all illicit activ-
ity."'8 7 While "it is necessary," the Report noted, "to free the chan-
nels of commerce from predatory activities,. . . there [was] no intent
to visit punishment on any individual: the purpose [was] civil. Pun-
ishment as such [was] limited to the criminal remedies .... 88 Ti-
83 Id. at 77. Here it is also clear that direct victims are included within the class to be
protected by RICO.
84 Id. at 78.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 79. The committee report repeated Senator McClellan's earlier statement. See
note 75 supra. Title IX, the report noted, was "based upon the judgment that parties who
conduct organizations affecting interstate commerce through a pattern of criminal activity
are acting contrary to the public interest." S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., ist Sess. 82. The
report also quoted the Department of Justice's comments on the value of the civil aspects of
Title IX. The Department of Justice noted that Title IX's civil provisions would allow the
government to intervene in situations which were "not susceptible to proof of a criminal
violation." The Department also cited the "lesser standard of proof" required, the "greater
potential than penal sanctions for actually removing the criminal figure from [the] organiza-
tion," flexibility, and the fact that the civil remedies could be "effectively monitored by the
court" as redeeming qualities of Title IX's civil provisions. Id.
87 S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., ist Sess. 79 (1969). The report also commented on 18
U.S.C. § 1964, noting that it "contain[ed] broad remedial provisions for reform. . . . Al-
though certain remedies are set out, the list is not exhaustive, and the only limit on remedies
is that they accomplish the aim set out of removing the corrupting influence and make due
provision for the rights of innocent persons." Id. at 160. The report also noted that § 1964
was "remedial, not punitive." Id. This technical commentary that includes no words of limi-
tation, but in fact expresses an intent not to limit the scope of § 1964, is of great weight in
interpreting the section. See S & E Contractors v. United States, 406 U.S. 1, 13 n.9 (1972)
("In construing laws we have been extremely wary of testimony before committee hearings
and of debates on the floor of Congress save for precise analysis of statutory phrases by spon-
sors of the proposed law."). It goes without saying that the Committee on the Judiciary's
Report submitted by Senator McClellan is an example of such precise analysis of § 1964.
88 S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1969). The Court in United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 593 (1981) termed RICO "both preventive and remedial." Tradi-
tionally, of course, where a statute is both remedial and penal, there is no valid objection to
giving it a liberal construction. See, e.g., Farmers' and Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v. Dearing, 91
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tle IX, "it [was] . . . emphasized, [was] remedial rather than
penal." 89
U.S. 29, 35 (1875) (statutory forfeiture of interest where usurious rate charged). Accordingly,
the Criminal Justice Section of the American Bar Association's citation to FCC v. American
Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284, 296 (1954) for the proposition that when a statute carries
civil and criminal sanctions strict construction must obtain, ABA, supra note 25, at 14 n.5, is
misleading. The Section failed to note the traditional rule of Farmers' and those other cases
prior to American Broadcasting that were inconsistent with the Court's sweeping dicta. See, e.g.,
SEC v. Joiner Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943) (majority position of liberal construction of
state Blue Sky laws having criminal and civil sanctions noted, but scope of "security" resolved
by plain meaning rule; strict construction not adopted). Nor did it note that American Broad-
casting is of questionable authority today on the additional ground that the Court declined to
follow it in Mourning v. Family Publications Serv. Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 374-75 (1973) (plain
meaning, not strict construction applied, even though statute imposed criminal and civil pen-
alties). The Section's unfortunate lack of candor in its use of precedent is lamentable. See
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-23 (1975)("directly adverse author-
ity" should be brought to the attention of "the tribunal"). It undermines the ABA's current
position on RICO. See notes 25 supra and 150 infra.
89 S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 82 (1969). See note 25 supra. When Congress
clearly classifies a remedy as not "penal," courts will not lightly reexamine the question.
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-51 (1980)(civil penalty classified as such for all
purposes, including self-incrimination). In addition, that classification overrides federal com-
mon law that may have pointed in the other direction. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and
Michigan, 451 U.S. 204, 312-15 (1981) (statute controls over federal common law). Accord-
ingly, RICO has been appropriately classified by the courts as "remedial," not penal. United
States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 681, 683-85 (N.D. Ind. 1982)
(RICO remedial for survivorship and statute of limitations in private treble damage action).
These holdings reflect, too, the judgment of Congress since 1970. In reporting out S. 1630, the
criminal code bill, the Senate Judiciary Committee described RICO in these terms:
[I]t is hoped the knowledge that a person will be subject to substantial civil dam-
ages will serve as an effective deterrent to the commission of. . .[a RICO] offense.
[However,] [t]he purpose of the [treble damage civil recovery]. . .is remedial, not
penal; adequate relief or compensation is the main goal.
S. REP. No. 307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1273 (1981). Here, the Committee cited United States
v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 313-16 (1976), which articulated a theory of multiple compensa-
tion recovery under the False Claims Act. 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-233, 235 (1976). See also Brady v.
Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 154-58 (1899)("certain sum" damages not "penal" or "penalty or forfei-
ture provision," theory of "full compensation" adopted; "remedial" provision; discussion of
analogous multiple damage statutes as "remedial"); James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v.
Harry, 273 U.S. 119, 125-26 (1927) (exemplary damages not penal for rule that penal provi-
sion not enforced by another jurisdiction); Sicolo v. Prudential Savings Bank of Brooklyn, 5
N.Y.2d 254, 157 N.E.2d 284, 184 N.Y.S.2d 100 (1959) (treble damage-not penalty or forfei-
ture for immunity statute). See United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 914 (1972); Manning Engineering Inc. v. Hudson County Park Comm'n, 74 N.J.
113, 376 A.2d 1194 (1977).
It has been suggested that the opinion in Cappetto is "unable to withstand careful scru-
tiny." United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 1976) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissent-
ing). In making his criticism of Cappelto, Judge Van Graafeiland, however, relied on a
student work, Note, Organized Crime and the Infiltration of Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies for
Criminal Activity, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 192, 202-03 (1975), which argued that it was improper
for Cappetto, 502 F.2d at 1358, to rely on a portion of the senate report that discussed Title
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The text of S. 30 as reported expanded its statement of findings
and purpose, a blend of S. 30 and S. 1861, to note, inler a/ia, "fraud"
as one of the activities of "organized crime";90 the original findings of
S. 1861 had included "harm[ing] innocent investors and competing
organizations" without relating the harm to "fraud."9' In addition,
the list of "racketeering activities" in Title IX was narrowed as the
Department of Justice suggested, but it was also expanded to include
mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341), wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343) and
securities fraud. These fraud offenses complemented bankruptcy
fraud, which was in S. 1623, and theft from interstate shipments (18
U.S.C. § 659) and transportation of property taken by theft or fraud
(18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315), which were in S. 1861. Offenses relating to
union corruption included embezzlement (18 U.S.C. § 664; 29
U.S.C. § 501(c)), corrupt welfare fund payments (18 U.S.C. § 1954),
and the Taft-Hartley Act (29 U.S.C. § 186). Government corruption
was attacked, in/er alia, by the state offenses92 of bribery and extortion
and the federal offenses, not only of fraud, but also of bribery (18
U.S.C. § 201), obstruction of justice (18 U.S.C. § 1510), and extor-
tion (18 U.S.C. § 1951). 93 While the Judiciary Committee favorably
VII, rather than Title IX, of the Organized Crime Control Act. In fact, it was proper, be-
cause 18 U.S.C. § 1955, which was enacted in Title VII, was incorporated into Title IX as a
predicate offense. Cappetto was, moreover, not only correct when decided, but it has since
been vindicated in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981). Compare the remarks of
Senator Hruska on Title IX, found in 116 CONG. REc. 602 (1970), in which he recognized the
relation between Title IX's "antitrust provision" and a "concentrated effort to strangle the
narcotics traffic. . . [and] raid. . . the cartels of gambling." It is the student's work and not
the opinion in Cappetlo that is "unable to withstand careful scrutiny." Professor Bradley fell
into the same error as the student. Bradley, supra note 25, at 851-58.
90 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 921-22 (1970).
91 See 115 CONG. REC. 9568 (1969).
92 Title IX also now included a section making it explicit that it was intended to supple-
ment, not supplant, existing criminal and civil remedies. See Organized Crime Control Act of
1970, § 904(b), Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 947 (1970). In United States v. Turkette, 452
U.S. 576, 586 n.9 (1981), the Supreme Court responded to objections that RICO invaded
local law enforcement by noting that it "imposes no restriction upon the criminal justice
systems of the states. . . . That some of. . .[its predicate] crimes may also constitute...
acts of racketeering under RICO is no restriction on the separate administration of criminal
justice by the States." Similarly, that an action for common law fraud could be brought in a
state court ought not be a ground for restricting the scope of civil RICO out of a professed
concern for federalism. Accordingly, cases like Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F.
Supp. 736, 746-48 (N.D. Ill. 1981) are wrongly decided.
93 RICO's attacks on governmental corruption have provoked controversy, which has
centered around extending the concept "enterprise" to governmental units. Until United
States v. Thompson, 669 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir.), reversed en banc, 685 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1982)
(plain meaning of "enterprise" includes governmental units), the courts of appeal were unani-
mous in holding that governmental units could be "enterprises." United States v. Angelilli,
660 F.2d 23, 30-35 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Grant, 622 F.2d 308, 313 (8th Cir. 1980);
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reported S. 30, Senators Philip A. Hart and Edward M. Kennedy
United States v. Baker, 617 F.2d 1060, 1061 (4th Cir. 1980) (rejecting United States v.
Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1022 (D. Md. 1976)); United States v. Bacheler, 611 F.2d 443, 450
(3d Cir: 1979); United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 685-87 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 935 (1980); United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1089-92 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978); United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 415-16 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978); United States v. Ohlson, 552 F.2d 1347, 1348 (9th Cir. 1977)
(sub silentio). Dissenting voices, however, were heard. Angelilli, 660 F.2d at 43 (Friendly, J.,
concurring); Grzywacz, 603 F.2d at 690 (Swygert, J., dissenting); Bradley, supra note 25, at
858-61; Tarlow, supra note 25, at 205-08. Butsee United States v. Lee Staller Enters., 652 F.2d
1313, 1316-19, 1322 (7th Cir. 1981) (en banc approval of Grzywacz) (Swygert, J., recanting
dissent in light of Turkette), cerl. denied, 102 S. Ct. 636 (1981). Their argument was that the
absence of explicit legislative history and the assumed inapplicability of the civil remedies to
governmental units precluded governmental units from being "enterprises." But see United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 585 (1981) ("Even if one or more of the civil remedies might
be inapplicable to a particular illegitimate enterprise, this fact would not serve to limit the
enterprise concept."); Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 341 (1981)("Congress cannot
be expected to specifically address each issue of statutory construction that might arise."). In
addition, the concerns expressed about the inapplicability of the civil remedies were rooted in
constitutional considerations. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842-52
(1976)(commerce clause does not authorize Congress to force upon states essential choices
regarding integral governmental functions); Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66,
107-08 (1860)(Congress cannot force state to return fugitive under Art. IV, § 2). But see Ho-
del v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1201 (1976) upheld under commerce clause
against tenth amendment considerations). Detailed comment on the absence of legislative
history is unnecessary. "[I]t is only the words of the bill that have presidential approval."
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396 (195 1) (Jackson, J., concurring). "The
language of the statute. . .[i]s the most reliable evidence of its intent." Turkette, 453 U.S. at
593. The application of the plain meaning rule ought to resolve the governmental-unit-as-
enterprise issue, and it has. See note 150 infra. The other concerns, too, seem misplaced.
Antitrust statutes apply to municipalities and state-owned corporations. Community Com"
mun. Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982); City of LaFayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978). There, the Court has recognized "that remedies appropriate
to redress violations by private corporations [might not]. . .be equally appropriate for mu-
nicipalities." LaFayette, 435 U.S. at 401. Moreover, civil remedies, including injunctions, may
be directed at governmental units, at least where constitutional rights are at stake. See, e.g. ,
Monelli v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978) (pregnant employee
leave policy). Those governmental units may also include state legislatures, the seat of state
sovereignty in a democratic society. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (reapportion-
ment of legislature). Here, corruption is at stake. While the Congress did not explicitly prem-
ise the corruption aspects of the Organized Crime Control Act on the guaranty clause (Art.
10, § 4: "The United States shall guarantee to every state. . . a Republican Form of Govern-
ment.'), it followed the "tested and proven" path, as "there. . .[was] a lack of precedent. ..
to indicate whether legislation. . .[could] be predicated upon it," House Hearings, supra note
25, at 676 (letter of Assistant Attorney General Wilson), Congress may well have had that
option. STUDY DRAFT OF NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE, THE NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAw 133 (1970) ("Broad federal jurisdiction in. . .[the
area of local and state corruption] might be rested on. . .[the clause]." The guaranty clause
could be construed as a power to preserve these states from "any intrusion of nonpolitical
pecuniary influences into government.') See generaly The Constitution of the United States of
America: Analjsis and Interpretation, S. Doc. No. 82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 851-52 (1973)("[T]he
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filed individual views expressing concern that "the reach of [the] . . .
bill . . . [went] beyond organized criminal activity. ' 94 Reflecting
the view of the American Civil Liberties Union, they thought that if
it were amended "to restrict its scope solely to organized criminal
activity," it would contribute "important and useful means of eradi-
cating organized crime."95
G. Senate Debate on the Organized Crime Control Act
On January 20, 1970, Senator McClellan called up S. 30, as re-
ported.96 Noting that the bill "incorporated," inter alia, the recom-
mendations of the ABA, he reviewed for the Senate, as he had done
on March 11, the scope and impact of organized crime in the United
States97 and discussed the various titles of the bill, concentrating on
Title IX, now entitled "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions (RICO)," on the infiltration of businesses and unions, and spe-
cifically noting such activities as bankruptcy fraud, the theft of
securities and their fraudulent pledging, and the counterfeiting of hit
records.98 The legitimate endeavors in which organized crime had
been active were noted; the list included "accounting, banking, char-
ities, construction, insurance, real estate, and stock and bonds." 99
object of the clause seems clearly to have been more than an authorization . . . to protect
• . . against foreign invasion or internal insurrection. . . . [T]he authority contained within
. . . the clause has been largely unexplored."); W. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (1972). Questions under it are matters for "Congress to decide."
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849). Cf. J.E. Riley Co. v. Commissioner, 311
U.S. 55, 59 (1940) (affirmed even if wrong reason given below). No court ought now hold
that it is beyond the power of Congress directly to attack corruption wherever it finds it, for
where the government itself is tainted, no other rights may be said to exist.
94 S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 215 (1969).
95 Id. Accordingly, Congress' intent to protect more than legitimate business from infil-
tration and unlawful competition by "organized crime" or "racketeers" in the popular sense
seems clear, not only from the words of the statute, but also the comments of senators who did
not fully support the bill. Cases like Barr v. WUI/TAS Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(failure to allege "organized crime" fatal to civil suit) have been, therefore, wrongly decided.
See note 130 infia. Note, too, that this expansion of the list of predicate offenses took place
into the teeth of the objections of the Department of Justice that the statute was "too broad"
and would tend "to federalize" matters of state concern. See text accompanying notes 76-80
supra. This concern was responded to by the addition of § 904(b). See note 92 supra.
96 116 CONG. REC. 585 (1970).
97 Id. The use of the March I 1 speech to understand the intended scope of Title IX, not
then drafted, is therefore appropriate.
98 Id. at 591-92. Here, too, the class to be protected by the bill is hardly limited to
competitors; direct victims are clearly contemplated. Senator McClellan also included in the
Congressional Record a list of businesses and industries corrupted; it included accounting,
banking, insurance, and stocks and bonds. Id. at 92.
99 Id. See note 56 supra.
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Senator Hruska also spoke on the importance of Title IX, calling it
"rather novel" and "a most promising and ingenious proposal"100
and repeating that its "principal value . . .may well be found to
exist in its civil provisions."''1 1 Senator Robert C. Byrd, too, spoke in
favor of Title IX, noting how "arson" had been used by organized
crime to put pressure on the A & P to purchase mob-manufactured
detergent.102 S. 30 was passed by the Senate, almost unanimously,
on January 23, 1970.103
H. House Consideration of the Organized Crime Control Act
In the House, S. 30 was referred to the Committee on the Judici-
ary on January 26, 1970.104 On March 10, 1970, Congressman
Poff'0 5 took the House floor to comment on it, and in particular on
Title IX. He brought to the attention of the floor a "thoughtful and
accurate" analysis of S. 30 prepared by the United States Chamber
of Commerce, which included "several specific hypothetical exam-
ples, which aid[ed] the reader in understanding concretely the provi-
sions of S. 30."106 The Chamber of Commerce report included a
100 116 CoNG. REC. at 602.
101 Id. Senator Hruska described Title IX as prohibiting "anyperson employed by or asso-
ciated with [an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce]. . . from conducting the enter-
prise's affairs by a pattern of racketeering activity." Id. (emphasis added). Here, too, note the
absence of words of limitation. Not all senators, however, shared Senator Hruska's support
for Title IX. Senator Stephen M. Young, reflecting the ACLU position, objected that the
bill's provisions "do not restrict themselves solely to organized criminal activities." Id. at 852.
The ACLU statement, which Senator Young inserted in the Congressional Record, also ob-
jected to the possible scope of Title IX as it incorporated "bankruptcy fraud" and "mail
fraud." Id. The statement was also the subject of testimony in the House hearings, House
Hearings, supra note 25, at 490, and was inserted in the record of the committee. Id. at 499.
102 116 CONG. REc. at 607. This illustration, also noted by Senator McClellan, id. at 592,
brings out the incongruity of the "competitive" injury limitation. It is, of course, clear that
other detergent companies ought to be able to sue the mob-dominated company for the inju-
ries to their "businesses." But what of the "property" injuries to A & P and its insurance
company? Other food stores-the competitors of A & P-are in fact heoed by the arson. A &
P and its insurance company are injured. Should RICO relief be denied to them?
103 The vote was 73 to 1. 116 CONG. REc. 972 (1970). Subsequently, twenty-two addi-
tional senators, not voting on final passage, announced that if present they would have voted
for the bill. 116 CONG. REC. 25,192 (1970).
104 116 CONG. Ric. 1103 (1970).
105 In light of Congressman Poff's relation with Senators McClellan and Hruska, see notes
50 and 69 supra, it is appropriate to consider him one of RICO's sponsors. The Supreme
Court in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 593 (1981) recognized his status, terming
him "a manager of the bill." As such, his comments are entitled to "weight." Lewis v.
United States, 445 U.S. 55, 63 (1980). When a sponsor inserts a memorandum in the Con-
gressional Record under these conditions, it becomes a "weighty gloss" on the statute. Gal-
van v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 527 (1954).
106 116 CONG. REC. 6708 (1970).
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detailed analysis of how the Senate bill would operate to attack a
Mafia boss's takeover of a juke box corporation.10 7 Congressman
Poff also inserted in the House hearings a copy of the ABA Report.' 08
The House hearings began on May 20, 1970. The Association of
the Bar of the City of New York appeared on June 10, 1970, repre-
sented by Sheldon H. Elsen. 0 9 The Association's written statement
suggested that Title IX went much too far,"10 as its reach extended
beyond organized crime. In particular, the Association criticized the
scope of "racketeering activity.""' The point was repeated in oral
107 The report commented:
A Mafia boss accepts all the shares in ajuke box corporation in payment for an
illegal gambling debt. Then he expands the number of cafes in which his machines
are placed by having the cafe owners threatened and beaten. Soon, he dominates
the music machine business in his city, has ruined his competitors, and raises the
share of the machine income which he demands that the cafes pay him.
Under present law, the government may be able to obtain a criminal convic-
tion, imprisonment and fine.
The trouble is that while the Mafia boss serves his prison term, other members
of the syndicate run the business for him, and upon his release he resumes his brutal
and monopolistic methods.
Thus, in the illustration used above, a criminal prosecution (under Title IX as
passed in the Senate) of the Mafia boss could also result in forfeiture to the govern-
ment of his interest in the business, or a civil proceeding that could result in an
order that he divest himself of the business and refrain from re-entering that line
directly or indirectly. In either case, the court could supervise the sale of the busi-
ness to see that it wound up in clean hands. A legitimate industry could be re-
turned to lawful operation in a free enterprise system.
Id. at 6709-10. Here, too, it is appropriate to ask who should be able to sue. Only the other
juke box companies? Why not the company taken over? Why not the cafe owners? The
expansion of Title IX to include treble damage relief in the House, see text accompanying
notes 114-15 infra, must be understood to have contemplated relief for all victims.
108 Housie Hearings, supra note 25, at 147-49 (letter from Frederick M. Rowe, Chairman,
Section of Antitrust Law, American Bar Association, to Congressman Poff, containing Ameri-
can Bar Association-Report No. 2 of the Section of Antitrust Law).
109 Id. at 369.
110 Id. at 294 ("sweep far beyond the field of organized crime").
111 Id. at 329. The report stated:
[T]he crimes listed as "racketeering activity" include several categories which are
plainly beyond the intention of the Senate Committee, as expressed in the Report,
and which should not, in our view, be subjected to the severe penalties of Title IX.
The Senate Report states: " 'Racketeering activity' is defined in terms of specific
State and Federal criminal statutes now characteristically violated by members of
organized crime." Senate Report 34. This statement is not supported, however, by
the language of the statute, which includes as racketeering activity such things as
theft from an interstate shipment regardless of the value of the property stolen (18
U.S.C. § 659), unlawful use of a stolen telephone credit card (18 U.S.C. § 1343), the
"mom and pop" variety of illegal gambling business which, as we point out above,




testimony. '12 It provoked a detailed response from Senator McClel-
lan on the Senate floor, the thrust of which was that the statute may
well have been drafted in response to organized crime, but that as a
legislature, Congress had a duty to enact comprehensive programs
that need not be so circumscribed. Accordingly, it was not a valid
objection to point out that the bill's scope was not limited to the
problem that gave rise to it. In addition, he made a telling rejoinder
to the ACLU's complaints about the scope of the bill beyond organ-
ized crime. There ought not be, he said, a double standard of civil
liberties. Organized crime members, too, had rights, and if the bill
was not objectionable as applied to them, it was not objectionable
applied beyond them." 3
Id (citations omitted).
112 Id. at 370. It is not, therefore, merely written testimony "less likely to have been seen
by or to have had impact on committee members." Guessefeldt v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 308,
317 (1952). Indeed, Congressman Celler, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee,
engaged in this dialogue with Mr. Elsen about Title X of S. 30:
The CHAIRMAN: In other words, this section 10, title X, applies to all crimes?
Mr. ELSEN. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. It is not limited to so-called organized crime offenders?
Mr. ELSEN. That is right. The underlying, triggering offense is not by any means
limited to organized crime cases.
House Hearings, supra note 25, at 371.
Subsequently, Chairman Cellar had another dialogue with the Attorney General, who
appeared and spoke in behalf of S. 30:
The CHAIRMAN:. .. I would like to turn to title X. .... My question is this: Is
this special sentencing provision limited to so-called "organized crime" offenders
• ?
ATTORNEY GENERAL MITCHELL. It is not so limited, Mr. Chairman. ....
The CHAIRMAN. Of course, S. 30 is called the "organized crime" bill ....
Maybe we should call it something else. I think it probably gives a
misapprehension.
Id. at 185. See United States v. Schell, 692 F.2d 672, 674 (10th Cir. 1982) (not limited to
organized crime). The scope of S. 30 beyond "organized crime" was, therefore, well-known to
the Judiciary Committee in the House. Its application to commercial fraud, too, was not
inadvertant. See House Hearings, supra note 25, at 401 (Report of the New York County Law-
yer Association) (Since "fraud in sale of securities" would include "underwriters" in rule
10(b)(5) litigation, Title IX was thought to go beyond "its stated objective."). The Associa-
tion observed: "Fraud in the sale of securities is simply not synonymous with racketeering."
Id Despite this testimony, Title IX was not only reported out, but the treble damage clause
was added. Accordingly, those who seek to have the courts restrict the scope of the statute to
curtail its application to fraud are refighting in the judicial forum a battle they lost in the
legislative arena; they have sometimes won, where a court misreads the text and legislative
history of RICO. See, e.g., Harper v. New Japan Sec., 545 F. Supp. 1002 (D.C. Cal. 1982).
Harper was wrongly decided. See note 134 infia.
113 Senator McClellan observed:
[T]he curious objection has been raised to S. 30 as a whole, and to several of its
provisions in particular, that they are not somehow limited to organized crime itself
• . . as if organized crime were a precise and operative legal concept, like murder,
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While S. 30 was pending in the House, the ABA formally en-
rape, or robbery. Actually, of course, it is a functional concept like white collar
crime, serving simply as a shorthand method of referring to a large and varying
group of criminal offenses committed in diverse circumstances. The danger posed
by organized crime-type offenses to our society has, of course, provided the occasion
for our examination of the working of our system of criminal justice. But should it
follow, as the [ACLU] and the New York City bar committee suggest, that any
proposals for action stemming from that examination be limited to organized
crime?
Mr. President, this line of analysis has a certain superficial plausibility, yet on
closer examination we see that it is seriously defective in several regards. Initially, it
confuses the occasion for reexamining an aspect of our system of criminal justice
with the proper scope of any new principle or lesson derived from that reexamina-
tion. For example, our examination of how organized crime figures have achieved
immunity from legal accountability led us to examine the sentencing practices and
powers of our Federal courts [ultimately dealt with in Title X]. There we found
that now our Federal judges, unlike many State judges, have no statutory power to
deal with organized crime leaders as habitual offenders and give them extended
prison terms. Having noted the lack of habitual offender provisions by considering
one class of cases, we obviously learned that it was lacking in other classes, too. Is
there any good reason why we should not move to meet that need across the board?
In addition, the objection confuses the role of the Congress with the role of a
court. Out of a proper sense of their limited lawmaking function, courts ought to
confine their judgments to the facts of the cases before them. But the Congress in
fulfilling its proper legislative role must examine not only individual instances, but
whole problems. In that connection, it has a duty not to engage in piecemeal legis-
lation. Whatever the limited occasion for the identification of a problem, the Con-
gress has the duty of enacting a principled solution to the entire problem.
Comprehensive solutions to identified problems must be translated into well inte-
grated legislative programs.
116 CONG. REc. 18,913-14 (1970). Senator McClellan later observed:
Nevertheless, the city bar committee attacks title IX and the statement in the
Senate Report-at 34-that the list of crimes the commission of which constitute
one element of the prohibitions in title IX is a list of "specific State and Federal
criminal statutes now characteristically violated by members of organized crime"-
ABCNY at 41. The bar committee complains that the list is too inclusive, since it
includes offenses which often are committed by persons not engaged in organized
crime. The Senate report does not claim, however, that the listed offenses are com-
mitted primarily by members of organized crime, only that those offenses are char-
acteristic of organized crime. The listed offenses lend themselves to organized
commercial exploitation, unlike some other offenses such as rape, and experience
has shown that they commonly are committed by participants in organized crime.
That is all the title IX list of offenses purports to be, that is all the Senate report
claims it to be, and that is all it should be.
Members of La Cosa Nostra and smaller organized crime groups are suffi-
ciently resourceful and enterprising that one constantly is surprised by the variety
of offenses that they commit. It is impossible to draw an effective statute which
reaches most of the commercial activities of organized crime, yet does not include
offenses commonly committed by persons outside organized crime as well.
Id at 18,940. The point that S. 30's scope went beyond "organized crime" was also noted in
the statement of Lawrence Speiser for the American Civil Liberties Union: "The offenses
[December 1982]
RICO CIVIL ACTIONS
dorsed it on July 15, 1970, although several amendments, including a
private treble damage action, were suggested. Senator McClellan
commented on the endorsement on the Senate floor, noting that the
ABA's suggestion for the addition of treble damage relief was a "con-
structive contribution."'"1 4 On July 23, 1970, Edward L. Wright, the
President-elect of the ABA, testified before the House on S. 30, and
presented to it the suggestion for the treble damage action
amendment."15
On September 30, 1970, S. 30 was favorably reported from the
House Judiciary Committee. ' 6 When the bill was brought up for
included [in 'racketeering activity'] go well beyond those associated with racketeering." House
Hearings, supra note 25, at 499. It is, of course, a familiar rule that remarks "made in the
course of legislative debate or hearings other than by persons responsible for the preparation
or the drafting of a bill are entitled to little weight .... This is especially so with regard to
the statements of legislative opponents who '(i)n their zeal to defeat a bill ... understanda-
bly tend to overstate its reach.'" Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203-04 n.24
(1976) (citations omitted). Here, however, the point at issue was conceded to be correct, and
it was defended as proper by the bill's principal sponsor.
114 Senator McClellan observed:
In recommending the passage of S. 30, the bar association also urged that the Con-
gress give prompt consideration to seven specific amendments to the bill as it passed
the Senate. In the main, I find these amendments generally acceptable. Indeed,
they may be characterized as constructive contributions to the legislative process.
For example, amendment No. 6 suggests that title IX of S. 30, dealing with racket-
eer-influenced and corrupt organizations, be amended to authorize private civil
damage suits ....
116 CONG. REc. 25,190 (1970). If the treble damage amendment was to be "constructive,"
how could it be read to be more narrow than the equitable action already in the bill?
115 His prepared statement observed:
In the portion seeking to add a proposed Section 1964, "Civil Remedies," we would
recommend an amendment to include the additional civil remedy of authorizing
private damage suits based upon the concept of Section 4 of the Clayton Act. Sec-
tion 4 provides as follows:
Suits bypersons injured amount of recovery.-Any person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reasons of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the district in
which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the
amount of controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sus-
tained, and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
HoueHeardngs,supra note 25, at 543-44 (emphasis added). As underscored, President Wright's
statement reflects a belief that private equitable suits were already contemplated by the bill.
116 H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). The report commented on § 1964:
Subsection (a) contains broad provision to allow for reform of corrupted organiza-
tions. Although certain remedies are set out, the list is not meant to be exhaustive,
and the only limit on remedies is that they accomplish the aim set out of removing
the corrupting influence and make due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
Subsection (c) provides for the recovery of treble damages by any person injured in
his business or property by reason of the violation of section 1962.
Id at 57-58. Note here, as in the Senate, see note 87 supra, no words of limitation were in-
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consideration, Judiciary Committee Chairman Emanuel Celler-
without expressing any words of limitation-described Title IX as,
inter alia, authorizing "treble damage suits on the part of private par-
ties who are injured."' 1 7 During the debate, however, Congressman
Abner J. Mikva, an opponent of the bill, objected, as he had in the
Committee Report, to the reach of S. 30 beyond organized crime: "I
ask my colleague from Virginia (Mr. Poff) this rhetorical question:
where in the bill does one find a definition of organized crime?"" 8
Congressman Poff responded that there was none, but that Congress-
man Mikva himself would probably have been among the first to
object if the bill had been status-based legislation.1 19 In addition,
cluded to restrict either equitable relief or treble damage suits in any fashion. In fact, as in the
Senate, the language is expressly not restrictive. Note, however, that Congressmen William F.
Ryan, John Conyers, Jr., and Abner J. Mikva, like Senators Hart and Kennedy, objected to
the bill as it was "a tool to be employed for all." H. R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
187 (1970). It did not, they noted, "make [a] discrete segregation of mobsters." Id. In addi-
tion, they noted that the treble damage action "provide[d] invitation for disgruntled and
malicious competitors to harass innocent businessmen engaged in interstate commerce." Id.
They also raised, quoting Chief Justice Burger, the "burden the courts face" in terms "of case
loads." Id. Their plea that Title IX "should not be adopted," id. at 189, was not accepted.
Similar fears expressed now in a judicial forum should similarly be found wanting. See note
172 infia.
117 116 CONG. REc. 35,196 (1970). Chairman Celler observed:
Title IX is designed to inhibit the infiltration of legitimate business by organized
crime. In addition to creating new Federal offenses punishable by traditional crim-
inal sanctions of a fine of not more than $25,000 or a prison term up to 20 years, or
both, title IX also creates civil remedies modeled on those found in the antitrust
field. These include orders of divestment, prohibition against business activity and
orders of dissolution or reorganization, and treble damage suits on the part of pri-
vate parties who are injured. The title also authorizes forfeiture of any interest
which has been attained in violation of the criminal provision.
Id
118 Id. at 35,204. See note 113 supra.
119 Congressman Poff observed:
The gentleman inquired rhetorically as to why no effort was made to define organ-
ized crime in this bill. It is true that there is no organized crime definition in many
parts of the bill. This is, in part, because it is probably impossible precisely and
definitively to define organized crime. But if it were possible, I ask my friend,
would he not be the first to object that in criminal law we establish procedures
which would be applicable only to a certain type of defendant? Would he not be
the first to object to such a system?
116 CONG. REC. 35,204 (1970). Congressman Poff had earlier described the classes of victims
for whom Title IX was drafted, focusing on the infiltration of legitimate business by organ-
ized crime:
Whether the technique of infiltration is intimidation and violence or simply public
purchase, the consequences of mob ownership of business concerns are always evil.
Business competitors suffer unfair competition. Workers are victims of sweetheart
labor contracts. And consumers are victims of inferior products and services, price
fixing and most of the predatory practices of monopolies. Title IX mobilizes both
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RICO CIVIL ACTIONS
Congressman Mikva objected to the scope of "racketeering activity"
on the ground of federalism, but his plea to narrow the scope of Title
IX came to no avail.'
20
the criminal and civil mechanisms of the Sherman Act and other antitrust statutes
against the barons of organized crime.
116 CONG. REc. 35,201 (1970). A "competitive" or "commercial" injury limitation would
limit recovery to "business competitors." Ignored would be Congressman Pofs "workers"
and "consumers." Accordingly, such a limitation can hardly be squared with the language of
Title IX or the expressed intent of one of its principal sponsors.
Congressman Poff had earlier responded to the critics of the bill, who suggested it was ill-
drafted or thought-out, when he observed that in his
experience, no single measure [had] received more thorough consideration by a leg-
islative committee than this bill. On numerous occasions, it required lengthy dis-
cussions in order to arrive at a consensus or corripromise . . . . Precedents as
contained in numerous court decisions were reviewed and weighed--and every ef-
fort was made to produce a strong and effective tool with which to combat organ-
ized crime-and at the same time deal fairly with all who might be affected by this
legislation-whether part of the crime syndicate or not.
Id at 35,204 (emphasis added). Accordingly, no court ought now reweigh the "balance"
between "opposing policy arguments," Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 623
(1978), strike a new "compromise," Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980) or
make an effort to rewrite this "carefully crafted piece of legislation," Iannelli v. United States,
420 U.S. 770, 789 (1975). Congress has "announce[d its]. . . considered judgment." City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304,315 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S.
618, 625 (1978)). That ought to end the matter, absent constitutional considerations, which
are not implicated. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981) ("There is no argu-
ment that Congress acted beyond its power. . . .That being the case, the courts are without
authority tq restrict the application of the statute.").
120 Congressman Mikva observed:
I would point out to my colleagues a definition of racketeering activities, which
brings into play the whole title IX and all kinds of things we have not yet talked
about. This definition states that "any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping,
gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other danger-
ous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment
for more than one year" becomes an act of racketeering under this statute. What
we have done in one fell swoop-and the States-righters who may be in this room
should listen-is to incorporate as a part of the Federal law all of the offenses which
heretofore have traditionally been treated as under State and local jurisdictions.
116 CONG. REC. 35,205 (1970). Here, too, the scope of RICO, as touching on state jurispru-
dence, was expressly recognized. In addition, fearing that treble damage suits might be used
to injure legitimate businessmen, Congressman Mikva proposed an amendment establishing
penalties for their "malicious" use. It failed. 116 CONG. REc. 35,332 (1970).
Remedies for malicious suits were left to the normal rules and procedures. St, e.g., FED.
R. Civ. P. 9(b) (fraud must be pleaded with particularity); FED. R. Civ. P. 12(0 (court may
strike scandalous matter); FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a) (b) (directed verdict and judgments not with-
standing the verdicts); FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (summary judgment). Se Christianburg Garment
Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 419 (1978) (award of fees to defendant permitted for actions
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation). Discovery, too, may be regulated in light of
the nature of the complaint. Other remedies for abuse would include ethical standards, see
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-4 (1980) ("a lawyer is not justified in
asserting a position in litigation that is frivilous'); or traditional tort law, see W. PROSSER,
TORTS §§ 119-21 (4th ed. 1971) (dealing with malicious prosecution, wrongful civil proceed-
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On October 7, 1970, the House returned to S. 30. Congressman
Poff, as had Congressman Celler, used no words of limitation in out-
lining the broad equitable powers given the courts by Title IX and
the scope of the new treble damage relief.'2' Debate, however, again
ing, abuse of process). These normal rules of practice and procedure, as well as state and local
remedies, at least, were thought adequate to guard against unwarranted RICO claims. See
note 199 infra for a discussion of Reiter v. Sonotone, 442 U.S. 330 (1979), where similar fears
were raised, but not thought of as sufficient to affect the outcome in the face of the plain
language of a statute. They also speak to the "floodgate" concern that RICO fraud actions,
frivolous or otherwise, might overwhelm the federal courts.
Indeed, the Boston Bar Association and the Massachusetts Association of Criminal De-
fense Lawyers argued to the Supreme Court as amici in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S.
576 (1981), that "routine securities cases [can be] painted with the RICO brush,. . . the pred-
icate acts being securities fraud, mail fraud or wire fraud." Civil RICO, supra note 52, at 673
n.137. The Government accepted "amici's illustration," but found such a construction of
RICO "eminently reasonable." Id. In addition, the amici posited the fear that "the federal
judicial system [would]. . .be faced with an invasion of garden variety commercial disputes
masquerading as civil RICO claims. . . .The reputations of companies and individuals hav-
ing no conceivable connection to organized crime. . .[would] be sullied." Id at 673. The
Supreme Court was unmoved. Accordingly, arguments to a court that RICO should be re-
written judicially fly in the face not only of the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, but also
of our society's deepest traditions of the separation of powers and the primacy of legislative
law making. See 452 U.S. at 587 ("In the face of. . .objections [dealing with federal and
state relations] Congress nonetheless proceeded to enact [Title IX] . . . . There is no argu-
ment that Congress acted beyond its power in doing so. That being the case, the Courts are
without authority to restrict the application of the statute."). It may be observed, too, that
the protestations of the Bar Associations against litigation are a bit much. See THE FEDERAL-
IST No. 1. at 35 (A. Hamilton) (W. Kendall and G. Carey edition) (". . . a dangerous ambi-
tion more often lurks behind the specious mark of zeal for the rights of the people than under
the forbidding appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of goverment."); G. HEGEL,
PHILOSPHY OF HISTORY, Part IV, § 3, ch. 2, at 537 (American Dome Library 1902) ("when
liberty is mentioned, we must always be careful to observe whether it is not really the asser-
tion of private interest which is clearly designated."). See note 172 infra.
121 Congressman Poff observed:
Title IX represents, in large measure, an adaptation of the machinery used in
the antitrust field to redress violations of the Sherman Act and other antitrust legis-
lation. I would not attempt to say who was first to suggest the re-tooling of the
antitrust machinery to combat organized crime, but one of the earliest and stoutest
proponents of such an approach was the American Bar Association. The Depart-
ment of Justice has been consulted, of course, in drafting the legislation and fully
supports Title IX.
Courts are given broad powers under the title to proceed civilly, using essen-
tially their equitable powers, to reform corrupted organizations, for example, by
prohibiting the racketeers to participate any longer in the enterprise, by ordering
divestitures, and even by ordering dissolution or reorganization of the enterprise.
In addition, at the suggestion of the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Steiger) and
also the American Bar Association and others, the committee has provided that
private persons injured by reason of a violation of the title may recover treble dam-
ages in Federal courts--another example of the antitrust remedy being adapted for
use against organized criminality.
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focused on "organized crime." Congressman Mario Biaggi offered
an amendment that would have explicitly prohibited membership in
the Mafia. 22 Congressman Poff argued against it on constitutional
grounds,' 23 noting in language virtually identical to Senator McClel-
lan's 24 that there was no need to try to confine S. 30 to "organized
crime," as it might properly be applied to others as well. Eventually,
the House passed the bill by a vote of 431 to 26.125
I. Senate Consideration of the House-Amended Bill
The Senate took up the House-amenddd bill on October 12,
116 CONG. REC. 35,295 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Pofi). Congressman Sam Steiger, neither a
member of the Judiciary Committee nor a lawyer, had previously suggested that the Commit-
tee adopt a number of amendments to strengthen Title IX. See House Hearings, supra note 25,
at 518. Congressman Steiger's statement applauded the "innovative. . .civil procedures and
remedies [of Title IX, with their proof] by a preponderance of the evidence." Id at 519-20.
He called them "far more effective than existing" law. Id. He also called for the adoption of
a private treble damage suit. Id. Following the ABA recommendations, Congressman Steiger
announced his intention to offer a floor amendment to S. 30 to implement his suggestions.
116 CoNG. REc. 35,227-28 (1970). At that time, he expressed his view that Title IX, as
reported, did not authorize private equitable relief, despite its plain language ("to sue...
and shall recover"). As he was not in charge of the bill, his opinion is "without weight in the
interpretation of" the bill. McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U.S. 488, 494 (1931).
In any event, he later conceded that the Committee version might well have been properly
drafted. When he offered his amendment on the floor, he noted that he felt "presumptuous."
116 CONG. REC. 35,346 (1970). Chairman Celler, moreover, had just made a point of order,
which was rejected, that the Committee members had not been served with a copy of the
amendment. Id Congressman Steiger conceded that he did "not claim specific expertise."
Id Congressman Poff then suggested that the amendment be withdrawn. Id Congressman
Steiger observed that he did "not have to be run over by a tank to get the word." Id He
added that under "the bill as it now stands. . . [innocent victims] may have. . . [the] option"
to obtain "proper redress" (emphasis added). Id. Rather than "risk. . .defeat in the heat of
parochial pride as regards. . . authorship," he withdrew the amendment. Id Even had it
been defeated, it would not have affected the plain language of the statute. See, e.g., Bryant v.
Yetter, 447 U.S. 352, 376 (1980) ("failure to enact suggested amendment. . . not. . . most
reliable indication of congressional intention"); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 382 n.l1 (1969); Fogarty v. United States, 340 U.S. 8, 13-14 (1950); United States v.
UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 277 (1947). In addition, subsequent efforts to clarify the confusion
created by Congressman Steiger's floor comments about private equitable relief cannot
change the meaning of what was in fact passed. See Basic Concepts,supra note 3, at 1020 n. 67;
United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962) ("[S]tatutes are construed by the courts with
reference to the circumstances existing at the time of passage." Subsequent efforts at amend-
ment are of "no persuasive significance.'.
122 116 CONG. REG. 35,343 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Biaggi). Congressman Biaggi's com-
mittment to organized crime control efforts is not unalloyed. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1982, at
11, col. 1 (petition by congressman to court to suspend sentence resulting from a RICO
conviction).
123 116 CONG. REc. 35,344 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Pofi).
124 See note 113 supra.
125 116 CONG. REC. 35,363 (1970).
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1970.126 Senator McClellan regarded most of the House amend-
ments as largely minor changes or of "clarifying and strengthen-
ing" 127 effect. He suggested that a conference was not necessary.
Senator Hruska, too, noted that the House changes "were not of ma-
jor significance," and he agreed that a conference was not required.
The Senate agreed to the motion to accept the House amendments
by a voice vote.
128
The President signed the legislation on October 15, 1970.129
J. Analysis of Legislative Histogy
This review of the legislative history of S. 30 in general, and
Title IX in particular, establishes the following points beyond serious
question:
(1) Congress fully intended, after specific debate, to have RICO
apply beyond any limiting concept like "organized crime" or
"racketeering";
(2) Congress deliberately redrafted RICO outside of the anti-
trust statutes, so that it would not be limited by antitrust concepts like
"competitive," "commercial," or "direct or indirect" injury;
(3) Both immediate victims of racketeering activity and compet-
ing organizations were contemplated as civil plaintiffs for injunction,
damage, and other relief;
(4) Over specific objections raising issues of federal-state rela-
tions and crowded court dockets, Congress deliberately extended
RICO to the general field of commercial and other fraud; and
(5) Congress was well aware that it was creating important new
federal criminal and civil remedies in a field traditionally occupied
by common law fraud.
Accordingly, neither the text nor the legislative history of RICO
stood in the way of recovery by the plaintiffs in Bennett. It is appro-
priate, therefore, to turn to the jurisprudence under the statute.
V. The Jurisprudence Under RICO
Only a handful of civil actions have been brought under RICO.
As such, its jurisprudence could hardly be said to have been authori-
126 116 CONG. REc. 36,280 (1970).
127 Id at 36,293.
128 Id at 36,296.
129 Id at 37,264. The President had indicated his support for civil remedies, including
treble damage actions, when he originally endorsed S. 30 in his message on organized crime.
See Senate Hearings, supra note 28, at 449-50.
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tatively determined before Bennett. Several actions had in fact been
dismissed on a variety of grounds, including a failure to allege an
"organized crime" or a "racketeering" connection, 30 the failure to
allege a predicate offense,' 3' the novel character of the theory of the
violation of the predicate offense alleged,' 3 2 the failure to allege a
"pattern" of racketeering activity, 33 the failure to allege a "competi-
tive" or "racketeering enterprise" injury, t34 and the failure to distin-
130 Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (failure to allege "organized
crime"). Barr had been followed in other cases. See Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Avondale Ship-
yards, 527 F. Supp. 256, 260 (E.D. La. 1981) (organized crime "not alternative or cumulative
to other remedies"). Adair v. Hunt Intern Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 746-48 (N.D.
Ill. 1981). See also Noonan v. Granville-Smith, 537 F. Supp. 23, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (dismissal
unless "organized crime control over business"); Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. LeBlanc, No. 80-
15,835, slip op. (D.S.C. 1982) ("association with organized crime" essential element - Barr
"better reasoned"); City of Atlanta v. Ashland Warren, 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,527
(N.D. Ga., Aug. 20, 1982) (Barr followed in civil suits, even though limitation rejected in
criminal prosecutions). See also Johnsen v. Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281, 284-86 (D.C. Cal. 1982)
(not additional remedy---"racketeering enterprise injuiy" required); Salisbury v. Chapman,
527 F. Supp. 577, 580-81 nn.4 & 6 (N.D. Ill. 1981). But see Note, Judicial Restrictions, supra
note 52, at 1106-09.
131 Grayson v. Wooden, No. 80-5460, slip. op. (6th Cir. 1982) ("bribery" under Ky. REV.
STAT. § 521.020(1)(2), "extortion" under 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and "mail fraud" under 18
U.S.C. § 1341 in efforts by board of education to remove superintendent of schools).
132 Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 526 F. Supp. 1019 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (artificially
high prime rate not recognized form of criminal conduct under 18 U.S.C. § 1341). But see
Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 391 (1960) ("reported decision involving similar factual
circumstances or legal theories is not determinative"). Kleiner was wrongly decided.
133 Teleprompter v. City of Erie, No. 81-17, slip op. (W.D. Pa. 1981).
134 Landmark Say. & Loan v. Rhoades, 527 F. Supp. 206, 208 (E.D. Mich. 1981) ("racke-
teering enterprise injury" required); North Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp.
207, 210-11 (N.D. Ill. 1980) ("competitive injury" required). See aso Johnsen v. Rogers, 551
F. Supp. 281, 284-86 (D.C. Cal. 1982) (not additional remedy---"racketeering enterprise in-
jury" required); Harper v. New Japan Sec., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 1982) ("not
only . . . predicate. . .', but injury of the type RICO was intended to prevent"); Alton v.
Alton, No. 82 Civ. 0795 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)(racketeering enterprise limitation); Erlbaum v.
Erlbaum, [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,772 (E.D. Pa. July 13,
1982). A variation of the "competitive" injury limitation was adopted in Van Schaick v.
Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1137 (D. Mass. 1982) (injury must be "commer-
cial'). Van Schaick is carefully analyzed and rejected in Civil RICO, supra note 52, at 705-07.
See note 147 inJfa for a discussion of Van Schaick. Rejected, too, is the "competitive" injury
limitation. Civil RICO, supra note 52, at 705-07; Note,Juicial Restriction, supra note 52, at
1109-14. But see Bays v. Hunter Say. Ass'n, 539 F. Supp. 1020 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (fraud in
failure to disclose financing option).
The "racketeering enterprise" limitation is questioned in Note,Juaicial Restriction, supra
note 52, at 1110 n.51 (undefined-hard to distinguish from competitive). See also Meinkeke
Discount Muffler Shops v. Noto, 548 F. Supp. 352, 354 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (organized crime and
racketeering enterprise injury rejected) (Basic Concepts, supra note 3, followed); Crocker Nat'l
Bank v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., No. C-81-4099 SC (N.D. Cal. 1982)("misconduct typical of
organized crime," "injury distinct from predicate act, "anti-competitive injury" limitations
rejected as inconsistent with statute and "unworkable"); Lode v. Leonardo, No. 82 C 4122
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 1982) ("Congress may not have envisioned that the civil remedies . . .
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guish in the complaint between the "person" and the "enterprise. 1' 35
On the other hand, a majority of civil cases under RICO had either
expressly 36 or impliedly 37 rejected a number of these contentions or
would find. . . widespread use. . . . And such use. . . may well be somewhat undesirable.
But. . .it is not the function of. . .[a] court to reject [a] claim on the ground that Congress
must have meant something other than what it said."). The "racketeering enterprise" limita-
tion, too, confuses criminal and civil responsibility. The concept "enterprise" is, of course,
related to, but not identical with, the concept of "conspiracy." United States v. Griffin, 660
F.2d 996, 1000 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1029 (1982). Accordingly, while the
"gist" of crn'inal responsibility is "conspiracy," Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777
(1975), it is an act performed in furtherance of the conspiracy from which damages flow that
forms the basis for civil responsibility. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 401 U.S.
321, 338 (1971); Blackwelder v. Millman, 522 F.2d 766, 776 n.31 (4th Cir. 1975) (conspiracy
to defraud not actionable until act results in damage). An "enterprise," as such, does not,
therefore, give rise to civil liability under RICO; it is a "racketeering act" committed by an
enterprise subsequently causing damage that constitutes the basis of civil responsibility. De-
fining a "racketeering enterprise injury" is, therefore, difficult. Similar comments may be
made about the "by reason of" limitation. See Harper v. New Japan Sec., 545 F. Supp. 1002,
1007-08 (C.D. Cal. 1982). Accordingly, they should be rejected.
In addition, district courts have dismissed or limited RICO claims simply because they
"were not contemplated" by Congress or the injury was not "imminent infiltration." See, e.g.,
Noonan v. Granville-Smith, 537 F. Supp. 23, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (complaint in securities
fraud act action involving coal leasing investments fell outside RICO's express purpose "to
deal with organized crime's control over business enterprises"); Spencer Cos. v. Agency Rent-
A-Car, [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,361 (D. Mass. Nov. 17,
1981). Spencer is rejected in Note,Judicial Restriction, supra note 52, at 1114. See also Hanna
Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources, [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 98,742 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982) (no "organized crime," "racketeering," "competi-
tive" injury, or "imminent infiltration" showing required). Finally, one district court threw
out a RICO count because it was a cloning of a prior suit on which a summary judgment had
been granted. Kirtz v. Wiggin, 538 F. Supp. 1218, 1220 (E.D. Mo. 1982). See also Gordon v.
Terry, 684 F.2d 736, 739 (11th Cir. 1982) (late RICO amendment denied since unduly
delayed and in bad faith).
135 Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 23-24 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Bays v.
Hunter Say. Ass'n, 539 F. Supp. 1020, 1023-24 (S.D. Ohio 1982); Fields v. National Bank,
546 F. Supp. 123 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
136 The "organized crime" or "racketeering" limitation had been rejected in the following
civil cases: Spencer Cos. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,361 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981); Landmark Say. & Loan v. Rhoades, 527 F. Supp.
206, 209 (E.D. Mich. 1981) ("racketeering enterprise injury" required; the court adding that
not "only victims of organized crime, as that phrase is used in the colloquial sense, have
RICO civil claims"); Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. O'Hearn, 523 F. Supp. 244,247 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
EngI v. Berg, 511 F. Supp. 1146, 1155 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. Mc-
Carty, 513 F. Supp. 311, 313 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 487 F.
Supp. 645, 646 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Hoopingarner v. B.F. Saul Real Estate Inv. Trust, No. 79-
827-A (E.D. Va. 1980); Hernsarling v. Conti Commodities, Inc., No. 79 C 312 (N.D. Ill.
1979). For subsequent cases rejecting the organized crime limitation, see Gunther v. Dinger,
547 F. Supp. 25, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 546 F.
Supp. 391, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., No. C-81-4099
SC (N.D. Cal. 1982); Lode v. Leonardo, No. 82 C 4122 (N.D. Ill. 1982). The organized crime
limitation on RICO has also been rejected by the following circuits in criminal prosecutions:
United States v. Thordarson, 646 F.2d 1323, 1328-29 n.10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 601
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were easily distinguishable.' a3  The court in Bennell, therefore, 'rote
on a relatively clean slate, where it was free to reason on the merits
and not unduly bound by precedent. 3 9
(1981); United States v. Union Oil, Inc., 646 F.2d 946, 953 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102
S.Ct. 1254 (1982); United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1030 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S.
Ct. 98 (1980); United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 303-04 (7th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 445
U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1136 (3rd Cir. 1977). An "organ-
ized crime" limitation had been rejected by the Ninth Circuit under 18 U.S.C. § 1952.
United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 885 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971).
The "racketeering" limitation had also been rejected in prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 1951,
a statute that had a legislative history similar to RICO. See United States v. Culbert, 436
U.S. 371 (1978). See also Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 49 (1979) (narrow construction
of "bribery" under § 1952 rejected); United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 292-93 (1969)
(narrow construction of "extortion" under § 1952 rejected).
137 In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 676-77 (N.D.
Ind. 1982) (arson fraud); Maryland v. Buzz Berg Wrecking Co., 496 F. Supp. 245, 247-48 (D.
Md. 1980) (fraud on government involving defendant in United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d
1026 (4th Cir. 1980)); Farmers Bank v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1281-82 (D.
Del. 1978) (fraud on private party); and City of Milwaukee v. Hanson, No. 77-C-246 (E.D.
Wis. 1981) (injury from arson on city fire department), no showing of "organized crime,"
"competitive," "by reason of," or other special injury was alleged or required.
138 As there is little question that mail fraud is a "racketeering activity," or that it can go
to make up a "pattern," no further discussion will be made of Grayson v. Wooden, K/einer a. First
Nat'l Bank, or Teleprompter of Erie v. City of Erie.
139 A more extended discussion of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Cenco Inc. v. Seidman
& Seidman, 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 177 (1982) is warranted, although it
was in fact not inconsistent with the Bennett plaintiffs' basic RICO claim. Cenco involved
litigation between the successor management of Cenco and an accounting firm, Seidman and
Seidman, over Seidman's alleged failure to detect fraud in the operation of the corporation by
the prior management. The successor management sued the firm; the firm counterclaimed
under RICO, as a victim of the fraudulent scheme by which the corporation was previously
managed. Writing for the court, Judge Posner observed:
Seidman alleges that Cenco's corporate acquisitions with stock whose price had
been inflated through violations of various federal criminal securities statutes vio-
lated RICO. The District Court dismissed Seidman's RICO claim, without reach-
ing the merits, on the ground that Seidman lacked standing to maintain it.
The question whether Congress intended to grant a treble-damages remedy to
people or firms injured in the way Seidman was injured, that is, as a consequence of
being used as a tool of the criminal enterprise, is apparently one of first impression.
The language of section 1964(c) provides no answer, analogies to section 4 of the
Clayton Act are forced, and there is no useful legislative history relating to the
provision. We therefore ask whether a treble-damages action by auditors of crimi-
nal enterprises would contribute to the compensatory and deterrent objectives of
RICO. We think it would not, though not because the draftsmen of RICO were
concerned with the penetration of lawful enterprises by "organized crime," a eu-
phemism for what used to be called the Mafia, and there was nothing of that sort
here. This Court has interpreted the RICO statute, in light of the long list of crimi-
nal offenses in section 1962, to forbid penetration of business enterprises by any
"pattern of racketeering activity" embraced by that section, whether or not "organ-
ized crime" is involved. . . . What is critical here, rather, is that "the primary
purpose of RICO is to cope with the infiltration of legitimate businesses.". . . It is
presumably on behalf of the owners, perhaps also the customers and competitors, of
[Vol. 58:237]
THE NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
VI. The Opinion in Bennett v. Berg
A. The Question of Organized Crime
The court in Bennett did not devote much time to the challenge
to the complaint on the ground that no allegation had been made of
a connection between organized crime and the defendants. Writing
for the court, Judge Henley noted that the contention had "some
degree of support" from courts "swayed by Congress's evident con-
cern with organized crime in the passage of RICO."1 40 Nevertheless,
the court was, Judge Henley wrote, "convinced that the better rea-
soned approach" rejected any attempt "to interpret RICO as creat-
ing a status offense."' 141 The court relied on the legislative history of
such businesses that the civil damages remedy was created, and not on behalf of the
people who supply office equipment or financial or legal services to criminal enter-
prises that may be violating RICO. It is unlikely that Congress if it had adverted to
the issue would have chosen to create in the wake of every RICO violation waves of
treble-damage suits by all who may have suffered indirectly from the violation,
especially when many of these would inevitably be, as here, the witting or unwit-
ting tools of the violator. The RICO claim was correctly dismissed.
686 F.2d at 457 (citations omitted).
First, it is difficult to accept Judge Posner's comment that the language of RICO pro-
vided no answer. RICO says, after all, that "any person injured" may sue. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964(c). In fact, the language of the statute contains no limitation. Second, it was appropri-
ate to comment that "analogies to section 4" are "forced," but it would have been more
appropriate to note the "direct-indirect" type limitation followed under § 4 was speciftaly
rejected by the Congress in adopting RICO. Third, Judge Posner's comment that there was
no "useful" legislative history is mistaken, as the legislative history shows. See notes 34-139
supra and accompanying text. Fourth, it is difficult to accept Judge Posner's comment that
no "compensatory" or "deterrent" objective of RICO would be served by a finding of liabil-
ity. If Seidman was in fact "injured" in its "business" or "property," it was entitled to "com-
pensation." Why else would Congress have drafted RICO? See text accompanying notes 197-
206 in/ra. For another view of the matter by Judge (then Professor) Posner, see note 246 in/ra.
The knowledge that RICO promised damage recovery to injured persons like Seidman would
also constitute "an ever-present threat to ... anyone contemplating. . . behavior in viola-
tion" of it. Perma Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968) (apropos of
§ 4 of the Clayton Act). Finally, however, it is sufficient for present purposes to note that
Cenco explicitly rejected an "organized crime" or "racketeering" type limitation, while it held
that only those indirect y injured by fraud were excluded from RICO's coverage. In Bennett, of
course, the plaintiffs had alleged a direct injury. Consequently, even under Cenco's parsimoni-
ous reading of the statute-a clear violation of the liberal construction directive-plaintiffs
should have been able to claim full relief under RICO. See notes 25 supra and 150 in/a. That
Cenco was correctly decided-considered on its own merits-can hardly be seriously main-
tained, and the other circuit courts of appeal should not follow it.
140 685 F.2d 1053, 1063 (8th Cir. 1982).
141 The court observed:
We are convinced that the better reasoned approach . . . rejects any attempt
to interpret [civil] RICO as creating a status offense aimed only at organized crime
in any colloquial sense of that phrase. . . .We join an increasing number of courts
and commentators in concluding that RICO suits are not limited to contexts in
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the statute, the opinions of its sister circuits in the criminal area, the
majority trend in lower court opinions in the civil area, and the
unanimous opinion of the commentators. Recognizing that its con-
clusion might, however, "tend to extend the net of the RICO Act to
situations which otherwise might find a remedy only in the state
courts," the court noted that "some federalization of state claims was
not unanticipated by Congress."1 42 As such, under the prevailing ju-
risprudence of the Supreme Court, Judge Henley observed, the court
lacked "authority to restrict the reach of the statute."' 43 Nor did the
court see an opening of "the flood gates for federal adjudication of
every common law fraud claim," for RICO claims had to involve "an
enterprise which engages in or affects interstate commerce.''44
The court spent little time with the organized crime challenge.
Similarly, little comment is warranted on its reasoning. No serious
exception can be--or ought to be-raised to it. Indeed, it is difficult
to see how the challenge could have been taken so seriously by the
lower courts, not only in light of the text of the statute itself, but also
its explicit legislative history. The blunt truth is that some lower
courts have been more intent on redrafting than reading RICO.
145
which a tie to organized crime is alleged. . . . We recognize that this conclusion
may tend to extend the net of the RICO Act to situations which otherwise might
find a remedy only in the state courts. In the present context, for example, appel-
lants are able to avail themselves of a federal cause of action for treble damages
under RICO where common law fraud is an alternative claim. However, at least
some federalization of state claims was not unanticipated by Congress. . . Inso-
far as the door of the federal courthouse is... opened by RICO in a civil context,
we are cautioned by the Supreme Court that broad Congressional action should not
be restricted by the courts in the name of federalism. . . . It is beyond our author-
ity to restrict the reach of the statute.




145 The defendants in Bennett, in effect, asked the court to redraft § 1964(c) as follows:
Any person [injuredby organizedcrime] in his business or property. . may sue there-
fore ....
The italicized words, of course, do not appear in the statute as drafted by the Congress.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976). Mr. Justice Frankfurter aptly wrote on the proper role of
"statutory interpretation":
A judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract it. Whatever
temptations the statesmanship of policy making might wisely suggest, construction
must eschew interpolation and evisceration. He must not read in by way of crea-
tion. He must read out except to avoid patent nonsense or internal contradic-
tion. - . . [T]he only sure safeguard against crossing the line between adjudication
and legislation is an alert recognition of the necessity not to cross it and instinctive,
as well as trained, reluctance to do so.
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 533, 535 (1947).
[Vol. 58:237]
THE NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
B. The Question of Culpable "Person" Separate From the Charged
'Enterprise "
Although here, too, the court devoted little time to the issue, the
distinct person-enterprise challenge presented a far more complex
question. Count I of the complaint sought treble damage relief from
all defendants, except John Knox Village, leaving the Village in the
role of the "enterprise" operated by the other defendants' allegedly
illegal acts. Count II of the complaint, however, sought equitable
relief from the Village, so it cast the Village in the role of "person."
The court thought this made the "residential community"--viewed
as an association in fact-the "enterprise." Prudential argued, there-
fore, that no "enterprise . . .[had been] alleged apart from the 'per-
son' who 'associated with' an enterprise for purpose of
racketeering."' 146 Because the complaint had not "clearly set forth"
its theories in separate counts, shifting the role of the Village from
Count I (person) to Count II (enterprise), the court held that the
RICO claim against the Village in Count II could not stand. 147 Nev-
See L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 164 (Irving Dillard Vintage ed. 1959). Judge Hand
writes:
Let the judge go as far afield as he will, in seeking the meaning of an enactment, if
he is honest, he will never substitute his personal appraisal of the interest at stake,
or his personal preference between them. . . .He must hesitate long before cutting
down [a law's]. . . literal effect, remembering that the authors presumably said no
more than they wanted.
146 685 F.2d at 1061.
147 Id The Bennett court relied on Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp.
1125 (D. Mass. 1982), a bizarre case, in which a woman sued the Church of Scientology under
a RICO fraud theory. Offering no analysis, reasons, or citation of authority, the Van Schaick
court held that the church could "not, at once, be both the associated person and the enter-
prise." 535 F. Supp. at 1136. In addition, the court expressed reservations about recognizing
as a federal cause of action a matter that had traditionally been left to the states, and it then
imposed a "commercial" injury limitation on RICO civil suits, id at 1136-37, a result not
only inconsistent with the court of appeals decision in Bennett, but also the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence under § 4 of the Clayton Act. Apparently, the Van Schaick court was unaware
of this jurisprudence, because while it recognized the parallel statutory interpretation
problems, id at 1137 ("injured in his business or property"), it resolved the issue contrary to
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979) (the Court read "business or property" disjunc-
tively and required no commercial-type injury). See note 199 infra for a detailed discussion
of Reiter. Van Schaick is, in short, hardly a persuasive authority on the interpretation of RICO.
The Bennett court, moreover, was either unaware of or chose not to rely on Bays v.
Hunter Say. Ass'n, 539 F. Supp. 1020 (S.D. Ohio 1982); Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, 548
F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Il1. 1982); or Fields v. National Republic Bank of Chicago, 546 F. Supp.
123 (N.D. Ill. 1982). In Bays, the court noted that it had "found" no cases in which the
"person" and "enterprise" had been identical; the Bays court, therefore, denied a motion of
the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to add a RICO count charging a savings association
as both "person" and "enterprise" in a suit basically rooted in consumer fraud. The court
apparently did not consider the alternative approved in Bennett of pleading the basic allega-
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ertheless, the court suggested that on remand the plaintiffs be permit-
ted to amend their complaint so that "justice" might be done and a
decision reached on the merits, not merely the pleadings.
To be sure, the text of RICO requires the showing of two sepa-
rate elements: "person" and "enterprise." But nothing in the statute
tion in two counts. Nor did the Bays court evidently "find" those RICO prosecutions where
individuals were charged as "persons," "but collectively as an "enterprise" under the authori-
tatively established association in fact theory. See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S.
576, 578-84 (1981); United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1124-25 (1st Cir. 1981); United
States v. Griffin, 660 F.2d 996, 997 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1029 (1982); United
States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 898 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978). See also United
States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 625-26 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 3489 (1982) (corpora-
tion and individuals convicted as "persons" where "enterprise" was an "association in fact"
composed of them). In these cases, the "persons" involved constituted the "enterprise," even
though "each" was a "separate element," which had to be independently proven. See United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 576 (1981). See also United States v. Uni Oil Inc., 646 F.2d
946, 948 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1254 (1982) (corporation and individuals in-
dicted as "persons" for operation of corporations as "enterprise" by pattern of fraud); United
States v. Marubeni America Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 764 (9th Cir. 1980) (two corporations and
their employees charged as "persons" in operation of "enterprise's" affairs by fraud); Hellenic
Lines Ltd. v. O'Hearn, 523 F. Supp. 245, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("Under clear language of the
statute" corporation may be "person" responsible for kickbacks paid by president in opera-
tion of corporations as "enterprise"); Eng v. Berg, 511 F. Supp. 1146, 1154-55 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(limited partnerships and corporations may be "persons" responsible for fraudulent transac-
tions consummated by officer in operation of partnership and corporations as "enterprise").
Bays, too, would hardly seem persuasive precedent for interpreting RICO.
In Pames, the court dismissed a complaint filed under RICO against a commodities
brokerage firm for the allegedly fraudulent conduct of two of its employee brokers concededly
"conducting themselves within the scope of their authority for common-law purposes." 539
F. Supp. at 202. Noting that its "text analysis owe[d] nothing to the litigants," and reflecting
"intuitive unease" at the "unanticipated" application of RICO to a "garden-variety fraud,"
the court held that "the civil plaintiff can sue only the 'person' and not the 'enterprise' for
damages suffered from. . . 'racketeering activity.'" 548 F. Supp. at 223-24. The court ap-
parently did not have the benefit of a full briefing on the legislative history of RICO, which
stands squarely against the court's judgment. Nor is its textual analysis compelling; RICO
does not say that "person" and "enterprise" are mutually exclusive; it only separately defines
them. See note 181 infra. On the "garden-variety" character of commodity fraud, see text
accompanying notes 230-31 infia. Pames, like Bays, is hardly a persuasive authority for inter-
preting RICO.
Finally, in Fields, the court faced a motion to dismiss a RICO claim brought against a
bank for the fraudulent handling of a note; the court followed Pames and dismissed the claim
because no "person" separate from the "enterprise" had been identified. The court also dis-
tinguished United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961 (1 lth Cir. 1982) as a criminal prosecution.
Similarly, the court in Bennett noted that Harley had reached "a some-what different result in
[a] unique context in a criminal case." 685 F.2d at 1062. See note 181 infra. Fields, too, is a
better example of a decision by a "result-oriented" "hostile judiciary" than a court faithfully
following congressional will. See Tarlow, Using the RICO Statute in Civil Litigation, The Na-
tional Law Journal, May 24, 1982, at 1, col. 4. See aLso Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S.
513 (1981) ("We are not at liberty to imply a condition which is opposed to the explicit terms
of the statute. . . . To [so] hold. . . is not to construe the Act but to amend it.") ( quoting
Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21, 38 (1934)).
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compels the conclusion that the elements are mutually exclusive. 48
Nothing on the face of the statute, on the other hand, compels the
conclusion that they are not mutually exclusive. Either reading of the
statute would be consistent with its unadorned text. The resolution
of the issue, however, ought to turn on which statutory construction
is most consistent with Congress' expressed purpose to provide "en-
hanced sanctions and new remedies."' 49 Obviously, too, Congress'
characterization of RICO as "remedial" and its directive that RICO
be "liberally construed" to implement that characterization ought to
be brought into play. 150 Following that approach, the proper result
148 The notion that individual elements in RICO are mutually exclusive stems from the
now discredited Sutton, Anderson, Turkette line of decisions in the courts of appeals. United
States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979), vacated on rehearing, 642 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 912 (1981); United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1980),
reu'd, 452 U.S. 570 (1981). In Sutton, Judge Merritt argued, inter alia, that "enterprise" could
not include "illicit associations," since then the concept of "pattern of racketeering" would
merge with "enterprise." 605 F.2d at 266. Similar reasoning was followed in Anderson, 626
F.2d at 1365, and Turkette, 632 F.2d at 899; it was also advanced by Tarlow, supra note 3, at
191-99 ("more soundly reasoned") and Bradley, supra note 25, at 851-58 ("beyond Congres-
sional intent"). In Turkette, the Supreme Court flatly rejected that type of reasoning. "While
the proof used to establish these separate elements may in particular cases coalesce, proof of
one does not necessarily establish the other." 452 U.S. at 583. As long as each element "re-
main[ed] a separate element which must be proved," RICO was satisfied. Id The Court
found its judgment supported by the unambiguous langauge of the statute and its legislative
history. 452 U.S. at 587 n. 10, 589-93. For a detailed look at Sutton, Anderson, and Turkette that
preceded the Supreme Court's opinion, but anticipated its result, see Basic Concepts, supra note
3, at 1025 n.91. See also United States v. Jacobson, 691 F.2d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 1982) ("inter-
est" and "property right" not mutually exclusive in § 1963(a)(2)).
149 Organized Crime Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 923 (1970).
But see United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982). See note
181 infra for a discussion of Computer Sciences.
150 Chief Justice Marshall, in The Paulina v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 52, 60
(1812), stated the basic rule for statutory interpretation: "[T]he duty of the court [is] to effect
the intention of the legislature .. . [which is] to be searched for in the words which the
legislature has employed." See Brown v. Barry 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 365, 367 (1797). The legisla-
ture's words must be "taken in their natural and usual sense, [and where] the meaning of the
legislature be plain,. . . it must be obeyed." United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358,
385-86 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.). Mr. Justice Story wrote in 1831: "The fundamental maxim
of the common law, in the interpretation of statutes, or positive laws, is, that the intention of
the legislature is to be followed. This intention is to be gathered from the words, the context,
the subject matter, the effects and consequences, and the spirit or reason of the laws. But the
spirit and reason are to be ascertained not from vague conjection, but from the motives and
the language apparent on the face of the law." Law, Legislation and Codes, VII ENCYCLOPEDIA
AMERICANA App. 357 (1831), reprinted in J. MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 360-62 (1971). While he noted that a rule of strict construction applied to
certain statutes (but not "to be construed so as to evade ... fair operation"), he also com-
mented that in "the nature of things, there is not any indispensable reason why the same rule
[of construction] should be uniformly applied in the interpretation of all . . . sorts of laws."
Id The approach of Marshall and Story obtains today. See United States v. Turkette, 452
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should depend on the particular relationship between the "person,"
U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (unambiguous statutory language must ordinarily be regarded as conclu-
sive) (quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980)).
A statute so vague "that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its mean-
ing" is unconstitutional. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). No
statute is valid where it is "impossib[le]. . . to ascertain. . . by any reasonable test, that the
legislature meant one thing rather than another." Id at 394. Vague statutes, in short, are
void, because legislative intent cannot be ascertained. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214,
221 (1875) ("The courts enforce the legislative will when ascertained [but to enforce a vague
statute] would be to make a new law, not to enforce an old one."); James v. Bowman, 190
U.S. 127, 142 (1903) ("courts are not at liberty to take a. . . [vague] statute. . . and change
it to fit [it to apply to a] transaction which Congress might have legislated for if it had seen
fit"). Vagueness may go to the persons within the statute, Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S.
451 (1939), the conduct which is made unlawful, Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948),
or the sanction to be imposed, United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 435 (1948).
Vagueness, however, is a question of degree. "[T]he Constitution does not require im-
possible standards." United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947) (persons in excess of the
"number of employees needed" held not vague); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377
(1931) (Holmes, J.) ("[T]he law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on . . . some
matter of degree."); United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 399 (1933) (Holmes, J.)
("Wherever the law draws a line there will be cases very near each other on opposite sides.
The precise course of the line may be uncertain, but no one can come near it without knowing
that he does so, if he thinks, and if he does so, it is familiar to the criminal law to make him
take the risk.'). Vagueness must also be distinguished from ambiguity. Ambiguity exists
when it is in fact possible to ascertain one or more alternative meanings. Vagueness, there-
fore, means "no meaning," while ambiguity means "more than one meaning." Ambiguities
are, of course, inherent in the use of words. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
304, 374 (1816) ("Language is essentially defective in precision, more so than those are aware
of who are not in the habit of subjecting it to philological analysis."). "No doubt there is no
exact borderline. . . between a statute which is merely ambiguous and. . . which is uncon-
stitutionally vague." W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 10, at 74 (1972). Here, too,
it is a question of degree. Similarly, "there is no errorless test for identifying or recognizing
'plain' or 'unambiguous' language." Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580. Nevertheless, rules of construc-
tion are designed to resolve, not create ambiguities. Id at 587 n.10. "Where there is no
ambiguity. . . , there is no room for construction." United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 76 (1820). Where ambiguities exist, it is appropriate to resort to legislative history.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980). But only "clearly expressed legislative
intent" can set aside clear statutory language. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580. See also Bread Polit-
ical Action Committee v. Federal Election Committee, 50 U.S.L.W. 4291, 4292 (U.S. March
19, 1982) ("plain language" controls "at least in absence of 'clear evidence'. . . of a 'clearly
expressed legislative intent to the contrary.'"). Traditionally, statutes imposing criminal or
penal sanctions have been given a strict construction. See generally Hall, Strict or Liberal Con-
struction of Criminal Statutes, 48 HARV. L. REv 748 (1935) (tracing the history and rationale of
the rule of strictly construing criminal statutes and legislative efforts to modify it); R. POUND,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 143-44 (1930). Nevertheless, the "canon . . . [has never
been] an inexorable command to override common sense and evident statutory purpose ...
Nor does it demand that a statute be given the 'narrowest meaning.'" Turkette, 452 U.S. at
587-88 n.10 (quoting United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 145 (1975) and Brown v. United
States, 333 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1948)). In addition, apart from first amendment considerations,
see, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) ("Because First Amendment freedoms
need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow speci-
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"enterprise," and "pattern of racketeering activity" that is involved
in the violation of each of RICO's basic standards. In some situa-
tions, no objection ought to be raised to attributing to the "enter-
prise" civil liability or criminal responsibility for the conduct of the
"person." In other situations, such an attribution would be perverse.
"Person" may, of course, include "any individual or entity capa-
ble of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property." t 51 The con-
ficity"), the rule of strict construction has never been accorded independent constitutional
status; it has never been described by the Supreme Court as more than a "principle of statu-
tory construction," Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980); United States v.
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 121 (1979), "long-established practice," Dunn v. United States, 442
U.S. 100, 112 (1979), or a "maxim of construction," United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371,
379 (1978). As such, it is "the intention of the law maker [that] must govern in the construc-
tion of penal, as well as other statutes." Wilberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 95. The judicial
creation of crimes by analogy is, of course, beyond the pale. Id. at 96. Due process values are
at stake in the construction of a statute, but they are met when liberal construction is man-
dated by the legislature. See note 25 supra. Thus, the Criminal Justice Section of the Ameri-
can Bar Association is mistaken when it suggests that the strict construction rule is of
constitutional dimension. ABA REPORT, supra note 42, at 13 ("If the liberal construction
clause is applicable to determine the scope of criminal liability. . . the provision is unconsti-
tutional."). Judge Swygert took the view that the strict construction rule was of constitu-
tional dimension in dissent in United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 690 (7th Cir. 1979),
and Judge Murray took it in United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1022 (D. Md. 1976).
Both judges relied on United States v. Rewis, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971), but this reliance was
misplaced because the Rewis court explicitly noted that "no issue of constitutional dimension
[was]. . .presented." Id at 811 n.5. Professor Hall rightly observed:
New categories of crimes and criminals cannot always be accurately defined on
the first attempt. Shall the new machinery be nullified from the start under the
guise of 'strict construction,' or shall it be carried out liberally in the spirit in which
it is conceived? Merely to state the issue is to answer it.
Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Criminal Statutes, 48 HARV. L. REV. 748, 761 (1935).
There is no "conflict," moreover, between the rule of strict construction or the rule of
lenity and the liberal construction clause in RICO. See Trketle, 452 U.S. at 587 n.10; United
States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952, 956 & n.16 (5th Cir. 1982) ("need not resolve the suggested
conflict because we find no ambiguity"), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2006 (1982), cert. granted sub
nom. Russello v. United States, 51 U.S.L.W. 3497 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983). The rule of lenity is a
rule of construction that says that the interpretation more favorable to the defendant ought to
be adopted when the text of the statute or its legislative history cannot be used to resolve an
ambiguity according to congressional intent. See generally Annot., 62 L. Ed.2d 827 (1981).
The liberal construction clause, however, is a rule of statutory construction based on the text
of the statute itself that provides a basis for ascertaining legislative intent. As such, it ought to
govern. See Brown v. Barry, 3 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 367 ("intention of the legislature, when discov-
ered, must prevail [over] any rule of construction"). In RICO, Congress drafted a "carefully
crafted statute." Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 789 (1975). Accordingly, if RICO's
language is plain, it ought to control; if the language is ambiguous, that construction which
would "effectuate its remedial purposes" "by providing enhanced sanctions and new reme-
dies" ought to be adopted. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84
Stat. 923, 927 (1970). Strict construction, therefore, should not play any part in the interpre-
tation of RICO.
151 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1976). Statutory as well as other rules of law secure the interests
of individuals, typically referred to as "persons." IV R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 191 (1959).
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cept of "enterprise" may be divided into four broad categories: (1)
See a/so W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW § 2, at 9-14 (1972); W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS § 3, at 15-16 (4th ed. 1971). "For a long time we thought of these legal units in terms
of individual human beings." R. POUND, supra, at 192. But they need not be so limited.
Today, "legal personality" is also attributed to a wide variety of artificial entities for a wide
variety of purposes. Compare United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny Inc., 382 U.S. 145
(1965)(unincorporated association not "person" for purpose of diversity jurisdiction), with
United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121 (1958)(partnership is a "person" for
imposition of criminal liability). No less than seven theories of juristic personality have been
advanced. R. POUND, supra, at 222, 260-61. Abstract theories, however, are not what is at
stake. Guy v. Donald, 203 U.S. 399, 406 (1906)(Holmes, J.)("[d]ebated in artifical terms,
there is a danger. . . [of] deduc[ing] consequences which have no relation to the grounds on
which the name was applied"); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 226 n. 18 (1960) (Harlan,
J.)("The problems in attributing [liability or responsibility] to an abstract entity rather than
specified individuals, though perhaps difficult theoretically, as a practical matter resolve
themselves into problems of proof."). It makes more sense to look at interests. "Instead of a
single category of legal 'persons,' in principle all of like legal importance, we have to consider
a variety of legal units in a scale from some with but one potential right. . . to others which
by reason of greater social or economic importance have many rights. . . and duties imposed
on them." R. POUND, supra, at 261. Congress sought through RICO to lessen violence, in-
hibit the provision of illicit goods and services, abate corruption in the labor movement and
among public officials, and to curtail commercial and other frauds. See text accompanying
notes 168-72 infra. Through RICO, Congress "strengthen[ed] the legal tools in the evidence
gathering process, . . . establish[ed] new penal prohibitions, and . . . provid[ed] enhanced
sanctions and new remedies." Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84
Star. 923 (1970). To achieve these goals, Congress provided that "individuals" could violate
the standards of § 1962. Individuals, too, were given the right to seek civil relief under
§ 1964. "Entities" may also violate the standards of§ 1962 and seek civil relief under § 1964.
Only one legal attribute need be present for an entity: it must be capable of holding a legal
or beneficial interest in property. That "individuals" and "entities" are "persons" under
RICO, however, does not resolve the question of what circumstances suffice to impose per-
sonal or vicarious civil liability on individuals or entities, and within the class of entities, what
further distinctions must be made between private and public entities on the federal, state,
and local level. Criminal liability under § 1963 must also be considered. See note 20supra for
scope of "whoever" rather than "person."
Civilly, RICO creates a new legal wrong, for which "the closest analogy is to an action in
tort." NSC Intern Corp. v. Ryan, 531 F. Supp. 362, 363 (W.D. Ill. 1981)(legal right to jury
trial). See Pernell v. Southhall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 374-80 (1974). "Tort" is derived from
the Latin "tortus" or "twisted," that is, "not straight" or "wrong." W. PROSSER, SuPra, § 1, at
2. "Broadly speaking, a tort is a civil wrong, other than a breach of contract, for which the
court will provide a remedy in the form of an action for damages[,]. . . an injunction, ...
restitution" or other proper relief. Id "[I]t is not easy to discover any general principle upon
which. . .[the law of torts is] based, unless it is the obvious one that injuries are to be com-
pensated, and anti-social behavior is to be discouraged." Id. at 3. Historically, a number of
factors have played a role in imposing civil responsibility: the concern to maintain peace, an
assessment of the moral aspects of the defendant's conduct, the development of legal history
itself, convenience ofjudicial administration, the capacity to bear loss, and the desire to pre-
vent harm in the future. W. PROSSER, supra, at §§ 4-5. Accordingly, various theories of indi-
vidual liability have been relied upon in the development of the law of torts: intent,
negligence, and strict liability. Id. at § 6. Depending upon the character of the predicate
offense incorporated into RICO's standards establishing unlawful conduct, each of these fac-
tors and theories may be expected to play a role in assessing individual civil liability under
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RICO itself. In addition, the traditional rule is that those who act in concert are jointly and
severally liable. Id. at §§ 46-48; Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111, 132
(1912) ("the common law imposes upon each joint tort-feasor the burden of bearing the entire
loss"); City of Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipeworks, 127 F. 23, 26 (6th Cir. 1903)
(liability under antitrust laws joint and several), aJ'd on other grounds, 203 U.S. 390 (1906);
Wainright v. Kraft Co., 58 F.R.D. 9, 11-12 (N.D. Ga. 1973). See Texas Indus. v. Radcliff
Materials Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (198 1) (antitrust treble damage action analogous to torts, respon-
sibility joint and several, and no right of contribution). That rule should also apply to
RICO.
Beyond acting in concert, it is well established that an employer or principal is liable for
the torts of his employees or agents committed within the scope of their employment or their
actual or apparent authority or those which are, in any event, subsequently ratified. W.
PROSSER, supra, at §§ 69-70. The doctrine is usually referred to as respondeat superior. Id. at
458. Various rationales have been offered for the doctrine, but most are "in accord with the
general common law notion that one who is in a position to exercise some general control over
the situation must exercise it or bear the loss." Id. at 459; Guy v. Donald, 203 U.S. 399, 406
(1906) (Holmes, J.) (not sdect, not control, not discharge, not liable). As such, modern juris-
prudence rests the doctrine of "vicarious liability ... [on] a rule of policy, a deliberate alloca-
tion of a risk." W. PROSSER, supra, § 69, at 459. See also Guy v. Donald, 203 U.S. at 406
("When a man is carrying on business in his private interest and entrusts a part of the work to
another, the world has agreed to make him answer for that other as if he had done the work
himself."). While early decisions did not extend the concept to intentional torts, "modern
theories of allocation of risk . . . recognize . . . that even intentional torts may give rise to
responsibility." W. PROSSER, Supra, § 70, at 464. The doctrine of joint enterprise, too, may
be used to find vicarious liability; it, in turn, rests on an analogy to partnership. Id., § 72, at
475. "It is an undertaking to carry out a small number of acts or objectives, which is entered
into by associates under circumstances that all have an equal voice in directing the conduct of
the enterprise." Id. The relevancy of these rules to determine civil liability under RICO is
manifest.
The legal rules for determining the civil liability of entities parallel those applicable to
individuals. Generally, corporations are liable on the same basis as individuals. "To enable
impersonal beings-mere legal entities, which exist only in contemplation of law-to perform
corporal acts. . . the principle of representation has been adopted." Philadelphia, W. & B.
R.R. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 202, 210 (1858). "[A] necessary correlative . . . is the
recognition of a corporate responsibility for the acts of those representatives." Id. No concept
of "ultra vires" is recognized to avoid tort liability. National Bank v. Graham, 100 U.S. 699,
702 (1879). Apparent, not actual, authority suffices where an agent acts. Merchants' Bank v.
State Bank, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 604, 645 (1870). Where apparent authority is present, liability
is also, even if the agent did not act to benefit the principal. American Soc'y of Mechanical
Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 102 S. Ct. 1935, 1943 (1982)(antitrust). The law in assessing the
liability of partnerships, which are not in corporate form, follows similar rules. "Each partner
• . . [is] the agent and representative of the firm with reference to all business within the
scope of the partnership." Strang v. Bradner, 114 U.S. 555, 561 (1885) (liable for fraud of
partner); Castle v. Bullard, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 172, 188-89 (1859) (fraud by one member
attributable to others, particularly where benefit received). For civil purposes, knowledge of
one partner is imputed to the others. Stockwell v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 531, 545-
46 (1871). A voluntary association, however, has no independent legal status, unless it is
expressly or impliedly confirmed by statute. UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 383-
92 (1922) (joint fraud subject to suit for authorized conduct unlawful under antitrust laws);
Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1928)(implied status under antitrust statutes).
As such, it does not, and cannot, hold any legal or beneficial interest in property. Cf. Trustee
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of the Philadelphia Baptist Ass'n v. Hart's Ex'r, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1 (1819) (Marshall, CJ.);
Kain v. Gibboney, 101 U.S. 362 (1879).
The same conduct may be both "a tort against an individual" and "a crime against the
state." W. PROSSER, supra § 2, at 7. "Frequently the defendant's conduct makes him both
civilly and criminally liable." W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra, § 3, at 13-14. "[S]ince the
interests invaded are not the same, and the objects to be accomplished by the two suits are
different, there may be both a civil tort action and a criminal prosecution for the same"
conduct. W. PROSSER, supra, § 2, at 7. See also United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351,
1354, 1357 (7th Cir. 1974) (RICO provides "both civil and criminal remedies for the enforce-
ment of § 1962. . . .A civil proceeding to enjoin .. .acts [in violation of § 1963] is not
rendered criminal in character by the fact that the acts are also punishable as crimes."), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975). The general rules for finding individual responsibility for a
crime, however, differ from those applied for imposing civil liability. Generally, there must
be a concurrence between a specified state of mind and prohibited conduct, the mens rea and
the actus res. W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, supra, at § 24; Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S.
246, 251 (1952)("an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand"); R. POUND, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN AMERICA 33 (1930)("punishing the vicious will"). The conduct, too, must take
place in the context of defined surrounding circumstances. The conduct requirement is of
constitutional dimension. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) ("status" of being
an addict). There must be at least some "responsible relationship" to the prohibited conduct.
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673-76 (1975). State of mind is a question of legislative
intent. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 402-09 (1980) ("bow to legislative mandates").
State of mind, however, will generally be read into common law, Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250-
63, but not regulatory offenses, United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251-53 (1922). See also
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978) ("an interpretative
presumption that mens rea is required'). But no state of mind is generally required for ele-
ments that are grading or jurisdictional only. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 676 n.9
(1975); Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 847 (1973); United States v. Belt, 516 F.2d 873,
875 (8th Cir. 1975) (value not element of offense); United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 892
(9th Cir. 1970)(mistake as to value no defense). In addition, the same statute may be treated
differently for criminal as opposed to civil purposes on state of mind. UnitedStates Gypsum Co.,
438 U.S. at 436 n. 13 (antitrust state of mind as to anticompetitive effects). Where a result is a
required element of an offense the prohibited conduct must, of course, cause the result. United
States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 436-46; Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 153-54 (1977).
Finally, a narrow class of offenses do not require any state of mind on certain elements; they
impose strict liability. Balint, 258 U.S. at 250. See also United States v. International Miner-
als & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 560-65 (197 1) (knowledge of existence of regulation for acids
not required); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607 (1971) (knowledge of unregistered
character of hand grenades not required). Similarly, responsibility may even be strict and
vicarious. Park, 421 U.S. at 673-76 (public health), United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S.
277, 281-85 (1943)(drugs). No constitutional restrictions have been placed on enacting such
legislation, outside of the area of the first amendment. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-
54 (1959)(obscenity).
Usually, individual responsibility for the conduct of another is determined by the general
rules governing complicity and conspiracy. W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, supra, at §§ 63-66 (com-
plicity), §§ 61-62 (conspiracy). Compare Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases:
Aiding and Abetting, Conspirafy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L.
REv. 597 (1972), with Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 844-46 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (scienter for cen-
sure of broker), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3373 (U.S. Nov. 15, 1982). The conduct require-
ment for complicity is facilitation of the conduct of another, where the conduct of the other
constitutes an offense. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) (aid and abet). The conduct requirement for
conspiracy is agreement, where it is agreed that conduct that constitutes an offense will be
engaged in. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) ("conspires"). It is not necessary that each of the co-
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conspirators personally engage in the prohibited conduct to which the agreement relates.
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645 (1946)(agreement alone equals conspiracy);
Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711-13 (1943) (aid plus intent equals conspir-
acy). If specified, conspiracy also requires an overt act. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) (overt act);
Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338, 340 (1945)(none specified, none required). No state of
mind is set out in the general complicity or conspiracy statutes, and the lower courts are split
on what state of mind should be implied. The split is represented by the views of Judges
Learned Hand and John J. Parker. Compare United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d
Cir. 1938)(intent for complicity) and United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.)
(intent for conspiracy), affdon other grounds , 311 U.S. 205 (1940), with Backun v. United States,
112 F.2d 635, 637 (4th Cir. 1940) (knowledge for complicity) and Scales v. United States, 227
F.2d 581, 587 (4th Cir. 1955) (knowledge for complicity), affdon other grounds , 367 U.S. 203
(1961). The decisions remain in conflict. Compare United States v. Kelton, 446 F.2d 669, 671
(8th Cir. 1971)(intent for complicity) and United States v. Aviles, 274 F.2d 179, 190 (2d Cit.
1962) (intent for conspiracy), with United States v. Harris, 435 F.2d 74, 88-89 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (knowledge for complicity) and United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1024 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (knowledge for conspiracy), cerl. denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1975). The Supreme Court has
never authoritatively resolved the split. Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 713
("stake in the venture" as test of intent "may not be essential").
The legal rules for determining the criminal responsibility of entities parallel those appli-
cable to individuals. A corporation is responsible for the offenses its employees or agents
commit in the scope of their employment or authority with intent to benefit the corporation.
New York Cent. & H. R. R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493-95 (1909) ("because the act
is done for the benefit of the principal" under the "principle governing civil liability," there is
"no valid objection in law, and every reason in public policy, why the corporation which
profits by the transaction, and can only act through its agents and officers, shall be held
punishable"; the corporation and individuals may be joined in one indictment). In addition,
the duty to be enforced by the criminal sanctions may "not arise out of the relation of em-
ployer and employee but [may be] one that, in virtue of the statute, [is] owed by [the corpora-
tion itself to the] public." United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 303 U.S. 239, 244 (1938).
Corporations have been regularly convicted since 1909. See, e.g., United States v. Cincotta,
689 F.2d 238, 241-43 (1st Cir. 1982). See generally Developments in the Lau-Corporate Crime.:
Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1227, 1246-51
(1979). Similar rules are applicable to partnerships, United States v. A & P. Trucking Co.,
358 U.S. 121, 125-27 (1958), and voluntary associations, United States v. Adams Express Co.,
229 U.S. 381, 389-90 (1913) (joint stock companies). The individual and the entity, however,
are both responsible; entity responsibility does not mean an end of personal responsibility.
United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 408-11 (1962). Generally, for criminal purposes, unlike
civil liability, one partner's knowledge will not be imputed to another. Gordon v. United
States, 347 U.S. 909, 910 (1954). But criminal responsibility may be strict and vicarious.
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 277.
Where the imposition of civil liability or criminal responsibility on governmental entities
or officials is involved, a variety of constitutional considerations, statutes, and judicial doc-
trines are implicated. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2701 (1982) ("guided by the
Constitution, federal statutes, . . . history . . .[and] common law"); W. PROSSER, supra,
§ 131, at 970-92. The United States may, of course, not be sued without its consent. Cohens
v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.). That limited consent is
defined by the narrow terms of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976). See
generally 14 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3658 (1976). Individual federal officials, too, may have an absolute or qualified immunity
from personal civil liability. Compare Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. at 2690 (president has
absolute immunity), with Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504-08 (1978) (secretary of agricul-
ture has qualified immunity). But no general immunity exists from personal criminal respon-
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sibility. See, e.g., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507-29 (1972)(senator); United
States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706, 709-12 (11th Cir. 1982)oudge). In addition, the eleventh
amendment and related judicial doctrine preclude suits in federal courts by individuals
against the states. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XI (suits by citizens of another state); Hans v. Loui-
siana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-19 (1890) (suits by its own citizens). See generally 13 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, supra, at § 3524 (1975). Counties or municipalities do not enjoy simi-
lar immunity. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890) (county); Monell v. De-
partment of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 695-701 (1978)(municipality). Nevertheless,
injunctive and damage actions may be maintained against state officials themselves within
the context of a complex body ofjurisprudence. See general L. TRIaE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 130-47 (1978). State officials, too, may have personal immunities. Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238-49 (1974)(executive official has qualified immunity); Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-57 (1957) (state judge has absolute, a police officer qualified immu-
nity); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-75 (195 1)(express abrogation of absolute privi-
lege by state legislature required). Like federal officials, state officials have no immunity from
federal criminal sanctions. United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp 997, 1023-24 (D. Md.
1976)(governor subject to RICO), rev'd on other groundr, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), reinstated by
equally divided court, 602 F.2d 653 (4th 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980). See O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974) ("[T]he judicially fashioned doctrine of official immunity
does not reach 'so far as to immunize criminal conduct proscribed by an Act of Congress'")
(quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 627 (1972)); United States v. Gillock, 445
U.S. 360, 371-74 (1980) ("have drawn the line at civil actions"); United States v. Thompson,
685 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1982)(office of governor may be "enterprise" without tenth amend-
ment violation under National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) and Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981)); United States v. Ange-
lilli, 660 F.2d 23, 34 (2d Cir. 1981)(felons automatically removed from office, but federal
forfeiture of office not "displac[ing] the State's freedom to structure integral governmental
functions"). No textual, legislative history, or policy reasons exist why this general jurispru-
dence ought not be applicable to RICO. Indeed, RICO was designed to supplement, not
supplant current law. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 947
(1970). It has not always been so interpreted in criminal prosecutions.
Like the antitrust statutes upon which it was modeled, RICO neither sets out a state of
mind requirement nor differentiates between its elements on the question. See United States
v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438-46 (1978). Unfortunately, the lack of an
express state of mind element has led some courts to conclude that no showing of state of
mind is necessary. United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1980) ("the RICO
count does not include a scienter element over and above that required by the predicate
crimes"). Nevertheless, as Scotto correctly recognized, RICO and its predicate offenses are
separate offenses; its predicate offenses are not lesser included offenses. See United States v.
Boylan, 620 F.2d 359, 361-62 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 571 (9th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-452, 84 Stat. 947 ("Nothing in this title shall supersede any provision of Federal, State, or
other law imposing criminal penalties or affording civil remedies in addition to those pro-
vided for in this title."). As such, the elements RICO adds to the predicate offenses are not
mere aggravating factors, that is, grading elements. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d
1358, 1367-68 n.17 (8th Cir. 1980) (RICO is not just a special recidivist type statute). See also
United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 664 (8th Cir. 1982). In short, RICO does not stand in
relation to its incorporated offenses in the same manner as greater tolesser included offenses,
but rather as compound to predicate offenses. See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 709
(1980)("Two statutes stand in the relationship of compound and predicate offenses when one
statute incorporates several other offenses by reference and compounds those offenses if a
certain additional element is present.'). Accordingly, a state of mind requirement should be
read into RICO; thus, Scotto and Boylan were wrongly decided. See United States v. Bledsoe,
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674 F.2d at 661 ("we express grave doubts as to propriety of these holdings"). For a detailed
analysis of RICO, each of its elements-conduct, surrounding circumstances, and result-and
the issue of state of mind, see W. Kolen, RICO and State of Mind, in MATERIALS, supra note 23,
at 1286, 1318-31. The correct approach to the state of mind requirement was followed in
United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 906-07 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); and
United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535, 553-55 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946
(1980). See also United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181, 1191-95 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 1451 (1982). RICO contains conduct requirements: (a) "use or invest"; (b)
"acquire or maintain"; (c) "conduct or participate"; (d) "conspire." Unfortunately, RICO's
conduct requirement for conspiracy has also been misread. In Elliott, the Fifth Circuit ob-
served: "To be convicted as a member of an enterprise conspiracy, an individual, by his words
or actions, must have objectively manifested an agreement to participate, directly or indi-
rectly, in the affairs of an enterprise through the commission of two or more predicate crimes." 571
F.2d at 903 (emphasis in original). The court's observation in Elliott, however, is ambiguous.
Does it mean that an individual committed two or more offenses, that he agreed personally to
commit two or more offenses, or that he agreed that someone in the enterprise would commit
two or more offenses? See United States v. Lemm, 680 F.2d 1193, 1203 n.11 (8th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1136 (lst Cir. 1981).
Arguably, the Fourth Circuit requires that two offenses be committed before a conviction
will be upheld for conspiracy. United States v. Karas, 624 F.2d 500, 503 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1078 (1981). Even Tarlow concedes that this result "conflict[s] with the basic
principle of conspiracy law that one can be guilty of an agreement to commit an offense even
if he did not attempt to commit the offense." Tarlow, supra note 25, at 256 n.488. Karas, he
suggests, "fails to explain why a group of people cannot agree to commit two racketeering acts
without attempting to commit the offenses." Id.
Initially, the Fifth Circuit used Elliott as a rule of evidence. Where a defendant in fact
committed two acts, the court was willing to uphold a verdict that he was a member of a
RICO conspiracy. Compare Elliott, 571 F.2d at 903 ("Where the evidence establishes that each
defendant . . . committed several acts of racketeering in furtherance of the enterprise's af-
fairs, the inference of an agreement is unmistakable."), with United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d
804, 834 (5th Cir. 1980). Nonetheless, in United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 394 (5th
Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds en banc, 681 F.2d 952 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2006
(1982), cert. grantedsub nom. Russello v. United States, 51 U.S.L.W. 3497 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983),
the court undertook to restate RICO's statutory elements: (1) the existence of the enterprise;
(2) the enterprise's effect on commerce; (3) the association of the defendant with the enter-
prise; (4) the defendant's participation in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise; and (5)
the defendant participated in the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. The
court, citing Bright and Elliott, commented that a RICO conspiracy was formed by an agree-
ment "[t]o participate in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise through the commission
of two or more predicate crimes." 648 F.2d at 394. The court then proceeded to apply the
Elliott rule of evidence, however, as if it were a rule of law, finding that because individual
defendants had not been shown to have committed two or more predicate offenses, they were
guilty of committing neither a RICO conspiracy nor violating RICO itself. 648 F.2d at 396.
The court noted: "One who does not agree to do that vital element-participate in the enter-
prise through the commission of at least two predicate acts--cannot be convicted on a RICO
conspiracy charge." Id. The court also observed: "The evidence establishes that . . .[the de-
fendant] committed only one predicate act. . . . A RICO conspiracy conviction requires
that . . . two predicate crimes [be] agreed to." Id. at 400. Accord United States v. Phillips,
664 F.2d 971, 1011-12, 1039 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181,
1189 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1451 (1982); United States v. Welch, 656 F.2d
1039, 1057 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 341 (5th Cir. 1981).
Nevertheless, unlike the Fourth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit does not require that the two of-
fenses actually be committed. Sutherland, 656 F.2d at 1186-89. Likewise, the Ninth Circuit
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does not require that the two predicate offenses actually be committed. United States v.
Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1220 (9th Cir. 1982). The First Circuit has also followed the Fifth
Circuit's lead. United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d at 1136 (defendant must have agreed to
commit "personally two or more predicate crimes"). The First Circuit adopted the Fifth
Circuit's two personal act rule to provide "protection to those who might otherwise be con-
victed through guilt by association." Id.
While few wish to promote guilt by association, it must be observed that the two per-
sonal act rule is not justified in the text of RICO or its legislative history. It is also impossible
to square it with the general principles of accomplice or conspiratorial responsibility, as noted
in Direct Sales Co., 319 U.S. 703 (1943) or Pinkerton, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). Most importantly,
however, it is perverse. RICO was designed to attack modern forms of organized crime. That
aspect of RICO ought not be quarrelled with. It was designed, for example, to facilitate the
prosecution of diversified organizations that the traditional conspiracy doctrine, with its nar-
row focus on a single offense or a single offense and a limited range of cognate or subservient
offenses, could not easily reach. Traditional conspiracy doctrines were generally ineffective
because they had to rely on circumstantial evidence to establish state of mind, which, of
course, determined the scope of conspiratorial liability. United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d
1208, 1222 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Griffin, 660 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (4th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Barton, 647 F.2d 224, 237 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 307 (1981);
United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d at 900-05. Compare United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d
503, 507 (2d Cir. 1944)(one who intentionally joins a multi-dimensional scheme "takes his
chances" as to the people involved and their objectives), with United States v. Bright, 630
F.2d 804, 834 (5th Cir. 1980) ("one who embarks on a criminal venture with a circumscribed
outline is not responsible for acts of his co-conspirators which are beyond the goals as the
defendant uinderstands them.").
To the degree that the ABA has made recommendations that would modify RICO in
these areas, it has myopically failed to take into account the character of contemporary crimi-
nal groups. ABA, supra note 25, at 7, 12, 23. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra, at 460 n.75
("The advantages of division of labor and complex organization characteristic of modern
economic society have their counterparts in many forms of criminal activity."). As such, its
recommendations are retrogressive. Concern over guilt by association is real, but complicity
and conspiracy doctrine, even in the RICO context, takes those considerations into account.
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 225-27 (1961) ("Any thought that due process puts
beyond the reach of the criminal law all individual associational relationships, unless accom-
panied by the commission of specific acts of criminality, is dispelled by familiar concepts of
the law of conspiracy and complicity.. . . [We] can perceive no reason why one who actively
and knowingly works in the ranks of. . .[an] organization [which engages in criminal activ-
ity], intending to contribute to the success of those specifically illegal activities, should be any
more immune from prosecution than he to whom the organization has assigned the task of
carrying out the substantive criminal act."). See also United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d at 903.
Here, as elsewhere, "the good sense of prosecutors, the wise guidance of the trial judges, and
the ultimate judgment ofjuries must be trusted." United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277,
285 (1943). The defendant's role in the enterprise, not specific individual offenses he agrees to
commit, ought to suffice for RICO liability. See, e.g., United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159,
1171 (9th Cir. 1980) (the court found sufficient evidence to connect the defendant, a "finan-
cier and overseer to the enterprise" with the conspiracy), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1359 (1981).
See also United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1220-23 (9th Cir. 1982) (contrary rule
imposes "unnecessary burden"). Yet under the two personal act rule any one who keeps his
hands clean-merely directs others-will not be criminally responsible either for conspiracy,
or for violating RICO itself. The fact patterns, for example, in People v. Luciano, 277 N.Y.
348, 361, 14 N.E.2d 433, 446 (1938) (Luciano did not take an active part in the management
or daily operations of the business, "but he cannot escape his criminal responsibility as the
leader and principal.'), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 620 (1938), or United States v. Aviles, 274 F.2d
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commercial entities (e.g. corporations, 52 partnerships, 153 sole proprie-
torships); 154  (2) benevolent organizations (e.g. unions,1 55 benefit
funds,t 56 schools 57); (3) governmental units (e.g. the office of a gov-
179 (2d. Cir.) (the defendant did not handle narcotics himself, but was still convicted), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 974 (1960), would be difficult, if not impossible to prosecute under RICO;
this result is hardly consistent with Congressional intent, for an analysis of both prosecutions
played a key role in the early stages of the thinking that led to RICO. TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 40, at 4, nn.46 & 82. The Luciano prosecution is particularly instructive. Thomas
E. Dewey, the prosecutor, had to get legislation passed that would permit the joinder of a
number of crimes in one indictment in order to present the full picture of the Luciano's vice
syndicate. It was called the "Dewey Law." H. POWELL, NINETY TIMES GUILTY 168 (1939).
In addition, there was no crime called "racketeering," although that was how Luciano's oper-
ation would ordinarily be described. Id at 167. RICO, of course, permits the prosecution of
diverse predicate offenses, making them independently unlawful when they are related to a
common "enterprise." RICO also describes the conduct in ordinary language: "racketeer-
ing." It is but a perfectly proper generalization of Dewey's 1939 experience to see that "racke-
teering" is not limited to the underworld, or persons like Luciano. See note 41 supra. In
addition, the Fifth Circuit has suggested that a RICO conspiracy requires an overt act. Suth-
erland, 656 F.2d at 1186 n.4. RICO does not contain such a requirement, as is demonstrated
in United States v. Barton, 647 F.2d 224, 237 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 307 (1981).
Unfortunately, the developing civil jurisprudence under RICO at the district court level also
evidences slight awareness of the text of the statute, its legislative history, or general jurispru-
dence. See notes 129-371 supra.
152 United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1120 (2d Cir.) (theater operated through
pattern of securities and bankruptcy fraud), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 209 (1980). The corpora-
tion may be foreign. United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 436 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1105 (1975). It also includes unincorporated subdivisions as "associations in fact."
United States v. Computer Sciences, 689 F.2d 1181, 1190 (4th Cir. 1982).
153 United States v. Zang, Nos. 80-2227, 80-2228 (10th Cir. 1982) (partnership) (available
on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir file); United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp 1182, 1185-86
(E.D. Pa. 198 1) (law firm operated through payment of bribes), rev'd on other grounds and convic-
tion reinstated, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir. 1982). See United States v. Griffin, 660 F.2d 996, 949 (4th
Cir. 1981) (partnership may be enterprise).
154 State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 676 (N.D. Ind.
1982)(business operated by pattern of arson and mail fraud). See United States v. Melton,
689 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1982) (conviction of Caton accomplices affirmed).
155 United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194, 199-200 (3rd Cir. 1982); United States v.
Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1980),cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1982); United States v. Kaye,
556 F.2d 855, 861 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 921 (1977).
156 United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 978 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 439
U.S. 810 (1978) reinstated in relevant part, 591 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864
(1979). See note 177 infra.
1;7 United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 597-98 (7th Cir. 1978). See United
States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1982)(co-operative may be enterprise).
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ernor,15 8 a state legislator, 59 a court,1 60 a prosecutor's office,161 a po-
lice162 or sheriff's 63 department, or an executive department or
agency'64); or (4) associations in fact (licit or illicit). 65 The catego-
158 United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993,994-95 (6th Cir. 1982). But see United States
v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1020-22 (D. Md. 1976)(State of Maryland not "enterprise"),
re'd on other grounds, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), afdon rehearing en banc, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980). Mandel does not reflect the law in the Fourth Circuit.
United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5, 7 n.7 (4th Cir. 1980) (county prosecutor's office; Mandel
rejected); United States v. Baker, 617 F.2d 1060, 1061 (4th Cir. 1980)(sheriff's department;
"constrained to disagree with" Mandel). See note 93 supra.
159 United States v. Long, 651 F.2d 239, 241 (4th Cir.) (office of state senator), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 896 (1981). See United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 373 n. 11 (1979) ("Of course,
even a Member of Congress would not be immune under the federal Speech or Debate Clause
from prosecution for the acts which form the basis of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and
RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962, charges here.').
160 United States v. Stratton, 649 F.2d 1066, 1074-75 (5th Cir. 1981) (judicial circuit).
161 United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5, 7 (4th Cir. 1980)(county prosecutor's office).
162 United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 685-87 (7th Cir. 1979)(police department),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980).
163 United States v. Lee Stoller Enters., 652 F.2d 1313, 1316-19 (7th Cir.) (sheriffs office),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).
164 United States v. Dozier, 672 F.2d 531, 543 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1982) (Louisiana Depart-
ment of Agriculture); United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d 1065, 1067 (3d Cir. 1978) (warden of
county prison), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978); United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083,
1091-92 (3d Cir. 1977) (Pennsylvania Bureau of Cigarette and Beverage Taxes), cer. denied,
434 U.S. 1072 (1978).
165 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981)("there is no restriction upon the
associations embraced"). In Trketlle, the Court observed: "The enterprise is an entity, for
present purposes a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in
a course of conduct. . . . The. . .[enterprise] is proved by evidence of an ongoing organiza-
tion, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing
unit." 452 U.S. at 583. Prior to Turkette, the courts of appeals had little difficulty finding that
associations in fact existed. See, e.g., United States v. Errico, 635 F.2d 152, 156 (2d Cir.
1980)("community of interest and continuing core of personnel'), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 911
(1981); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 898 (5th Cir.)(diversified criminal enterprise),
cer. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978). The Eighth Circuit was an exception, largely because of the
Sixth Circuit's panel decision in Sutton. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th
Cir. 1980)("enterprise" does not "encompass a simple association to commit the predicate
crimes [but is]. . .only an association having an ascertainable strvcture which exists for the
purpose of maintaining operations directed toward an economic goal. . . that can be defined
apart from. . .the predicate [offenses].'). Since Turkette rejected the reasoning of the Sutton
panel, the other courts of appeals have had no difficulty in implementing the approved per-
spective. See, e.g., United States v. DeRosa, 670 F.2d 889, 896 (9th Cir. 1982)("activities...
apart from . . . predicate acts of narcotics . . . sufficient to establish 'enterprise'"); United
States v. Griffin, 660 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (4th Cir. 1981) ("proof of. . .existence [of enter-
prise] may overlap proof of . . .pattern of racketeering activity" but from "circumstantial
evidence," "common purpose," and "composition," an inference of "continuity, unity, shared
purpose and identifiable structure" may be made); United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877,
890-91 (9th Cir. 1981)("separate and discrete element .. .[but] government .. .not pre-
cluded from using the same evidence," which was sufficient to establish an association in fact
to make gambling legal). The Eighth Circuit has continued to have trouble. In United
States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1982), the court stated that RICO was "not intended
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ries are not mutually exclusive. 66
"Patterns of racketeering activity"167 may also be grouped into
four broad, but not mutually exclusive categories: (1) violence; 68 (2)
to be a catchall reaching all concerted action." Id at 659. A RICO violation requires "an
association with an enterprise which is distinct from participation in the conduct of the enter-
prise through a pattern of racketeering activity." Id at. 663. A RICO "enterprise cannot
simply be the undertaking of the acts of racketeering, neither can it be the minimal associa-
tion which surrounds these acts." Id at 664. A RICO enterprise is more than "a conspiracy
of two or more persons. . .[plus] two or more overt acts of fraud," id. at 661, or any confed-
eration, no matter how loose or temporary," id at 662. A RICO enterprise requires a distinct
structure like, for example, "[tihe command system of a Mafia family. . .[or] the hierarchy,
planning and division of profits within a prostitution ring." Id. at 665. See also United States
v. Lemm, 680 F.2d 1193, 1198 (8th Cir. 1982) ("(1) common or shared purpose; (2) some
continuity of structure and personnel; and (3) an ascertainable structure distinct from that
inherent in the conduct of the pattern"). Ironically, the Eighth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit
are now on a collision course. Compare Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1365 n.10 (association in fact
issue could have been avoided if governmental entity charged) with United States v. Thomp-
son, 685 F.2d 993, 1000 (6th Cir. 1982)(governmental entity issue could have been avoided if
association in fact charged).
166 They are also not exhaustive. See, e.g., Gunther v. Dinger, 547 F. Supp 25, 27
(S.D.N.Y. 1982)(decedent's "estate" may be enterprise). On the meaning of "includes" see
note 16 supra; Basic Concepts, supra note 3, at 1023. "The shifting definition of 'enterprise'
.[is] necessary in view of the fluid nature of criminal associations." United States v. Swi-
derski, 593 F.2d 1246, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979). Accordingly,
"enterprise" also includes an enterprise composed of several corporations, United States v.
Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 394 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980); an enterprise com-
posed of two corporations and a union, United States v. Companale, 518 F.2d 352, 357 n. 11
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 1050 (1976); and an enterprise that consists of an area-
wide type of business, United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159, 1162 (9th Cir. 1980)("tavern
business of Pierce County"). The "enterprise" concept is not unconstitutionally vague.
United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 52-53 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981);
United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159, 1170 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Aleman, 609
F.2d 298, 305 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Swiderski, 593
F.2d 1246, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1978),cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); United States v. Hawes, 529
F.2d 472, 478-79 (5th Cir. 1976).
167 The "pattern of racketeering activity" concept is not unconstitutionally vague.
United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 381 (5th Cir. 1981), modified on other grounds, 681 F.2d
952 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2006 (1982), cert. grantedsub nom. Russelo v. United States,
51 U.S.L.W. 3497 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983); United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159, 1170 (9th Cir.
1980); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 441 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105
(1975). See United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)(not vague since
predicate offenses clearly defined), agt'd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819
(1976). Seegeneral(y United States v. Morelli, 643 F.2d 402, 412 (6th Cir. 1981)("RICO...
has survived various void-for-vagueness challenges."). The Parness case is discussed in further
detail in note 175 infra.
168 The violence offenses would include state murder, kidnapping, arson, robbery, and ex-
tortion, and federal loansharking (18 U.S.C. §§ 891-894), obstruction of justice (18 U.S.C.
§ 1503), obstruction of criminal investigations (18 U.S.C. § 1510), extortion (18 U.S.C.
§ 1951), robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951), and interstate racketeering (18 U.S.C. § 1952)("crime of
violence").
RICO has been used against a wide variety of violent groups. Foreign terrorists have
been successfully prosecuted. See, e.g., United States v. Ljubas, No. 81-CR402 (S.D.N.Y.
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June 30, 1982) (use of book bombs) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file); Depart-
ments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciagy, and Related Agencies Appropriationo for 1983" Hear-
ings before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1093 (1982)
(testimony of William H. Webster) [hereinafter cited as 1983 Appropriations Hearings] ("The
application of. . . RICO. . . to terrorist activity has provided further thrust to the investi-
gation of terrorists groups who are involved in murder, extortion, bombing or arson activity..
. . RICO . . . [was] successfully used against Croatian terrorists to prevent a bombing and
assassination plot from taking place and to effect the arrest and conviction of several key
members of this group."). See also In re Grand Jury Proceeding Involving Rosahn, 671 F.2d
690, 695 (2d Cir. 1982) (grand jury investigation of $1.5 million Brinks robbery-murder under
18 U.S.C. § 1961 attacked as "attempt to harass. . . because of political views"); In re Fula,
672 F.2d 279, 283 (2d Cir. 1982); N.Y Times, July 4, 1982, at 16, col. 6 (Motley, J: "[T]he
mere advocacy of ideas is a precious right in this country . . . [but] [iut is these acts of vio-
lence, and not the defendants' beliefs, for which the defendants [Croatian terrorists] were
tried and convicted."). See also N.Y. Times, November 6, 1981, at 14, col. 3 (17 New World of
Islam sect members convicted on a RICO charge for robbing $113,000 from nine banks over
a 10 month period to raise money for their religion. In one robbery, a police officer was
killed.); United States v. Dickens, 695 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1983) (conviction upheld). In addi-
tion, the Hell's Angels motorcycle gang was unsuccessfully prosecuted in California. See
United States v. Chesher, 678 F.2d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981) (Hell's Angels Motor Club
charged as RICO enterprise); TIME, May 26, 1980, at 10, 1i (Ralph "Sonny" Barger: "I
done exactly what I wanted to do, but I haven't done racketeering and murder. There's been
Hell's Angels convicted of murder, but that was on a one-to-one basis, not club policy.");
N.Y. Times, July 4, 1980, at A19, col. 1 (mistrial); N.Y. Times, February 26, 1981, at 8, col. I
(cost to government of proceeding estimated at four to seven million dollars by the United
States Attorney, and 10 to 20 million dollars by defense attorneys.). Individual members
were subsequently convicted in separate prosecutions of the predicate offenses. United States
v. Motley, 655 F.2d 186, 190 (9th Cir. 1982) (charge of vindictive prosecution rejected) ("It is
understandable why the prosecutor would abandon the RICO substantive and conspiracy
counts with all their complications in favor of straight forward charges of the predicate drug
offenses. After a long, fruitless trial, the complex RICO counts lost some of their seductive
appeal."). A civil action was unsuccessfully brought against the KKK in Vietnamese Fisher-
men's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. Supp. 993, 1014 (S.D. Texas 1981) (Klan
held to be "enterprise," but no "pattern of racketeering activity" shown). The result in
Vietnamese Fisheren's Ass'n is appropriately criticized in Civil RICO, supra note 52, at 711
n.375 ("sufficient 'predicate' acts, including arson and extortion").
The most successful use of RICO against violent groups, however, has been in criminal
prosecutions brought against major organized crime figures, though not all of these prosecu-
tions have been based on RICO charges. See 1983 Appropriations Hearings, supra, at 1050, 1051
("[D]uring calendar year 1981, 14 recognized leaders of the 25 traditional Organized Crime
'families' were indicted or convicted. Included in this unprecedented statistic are the 'Bosses'
of the New Orleans Organized Crime 'Family'; the Colombo and Genovese 'families' of New
York; and the Bufalino 'Family' of Pennsylvania, who have all been convicted. Indicted were
the 'Bosses' of the Organized Crime 'Families' in Boston, Cleveland, Tampa, and Chicago.
With regard to the Bonanno 'Family' in New York and the Organized Crime 'Families' in
Kansas City and Milwaukee, not only have the 'Bosses' been indicted, but also the ruling
hierarchies of these 'families.' '). See, e.g., United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1213 (9th
Cir. 1982) (RICO prosecution of "members of La Cosa Nostra, a secret national organization
engaged in a wide range of racketeering activities, including murder, extortion, gambling,
and loansharking."); United States v. Marcello, 537 F. Supp. 1364 (E.D. La. 1982) (convic-
tion of New Orleans boss under RICO). For a description of several recent RICO prosecu-
tions, see Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, The Judiciag, and Related Agencies
Approprations for 1982: Hearing before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 97th
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Cong., 1st Sess. 49-61 (1981) (testimony of William F. Smith). Compare United States v. Bufa-
lino, 285 F.2d 408, 419 (2d Cir. 1960) (Clark, J., concurring) ("not a shred of legal evidence
that the Apalachin gathering was illegal.") with United States v. Bufalino, 683 F.2d 639, 647
(2d Cir. 1982) (evidence introduced to show that Bufalino, who was at the Apalachin gather-
ing, was a member of "La Cosa Nostra, an organization whose members perform murders for
one another as a matter of professional courtesy.").
As impressive as these individual prosecutions against major organized crime figures are,
a word of caution is nevertheless in order. In 1969 President Nixon observed, "For two de-
cades now, since the Attorney General's Conference on Organized Crime in 1950, the Federal
effort [against organized crime] has slowly increased. . . . But. . .[nlot a single one of the
24 Cosa Nostra families has been destroyed." Senate Hearings, supra note 28, at 445. It was
estimated in 1969 that the "overall strength of these gangs [was]... 3,000 to 5,000." S. REP.
No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1969). Currently, 50% of the F.B.I.'s organized crime
program (676 agents) is devoted to these groups. 1983 Appropriations Hearings, supra, at 1074-
75. Overall, the organized crime program of the Bureau in 1983 will involve more than 2,000
positions and spend more than 90 million dollars. Id at 1069. Federal Strike Forces operate
in 14 cities with 12 sub-offices; the entire program costs more than an estimated $100 million
per year. Stronger Federal E4frt Needed ln Fight Against Organized Crime, REPORT BY COMPTROL-
LER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 1, 3 (December 7, 1981). Investigative techniques
used include undercover agents, electronic surveillance, financial reviews, and informants.
1983 Appropriations Hearings, supra, at 1072. Today, our knowledge of organized crime is
vastly improved. Id at 967 (testimony of William H. Webster) ("We are at a point in our
experience where we know a great deal more about organized crime mechanisms and units
than we did, say, 20 years ago when I was a United States Attorney being told that there
wasn't anything like organized crime except for some loose familial relationships."). The cur-
rent level of the commitment of the Department of Justice resources is, moreover, resulting in
approximately 150 convictions a year of members or associates. 1983 Appropriations Hearings,
supra, at 992. In 1980, 132 traditional organized crime members or associates were convicted
or awaiting trial. In 1981, the number increased to 185. Id Yet, the blunt fact is that even if
these criminal convictions permanently disabled each defendant, and no new members
joined, it would take more than a quarter of a century to incarcerate and thus end the crimi-
nal careers of each member of these organized crime groups. On the impact in fact of indi-
vidual prosecutions, see note 176 infra. In addition, organized crime obviously involves more
than just these groups. The strategies employed and the level of existing efforts against organ-
ized crime, in all its various forms, are inadequate. A strategy of organized crime control, for
example, that relies almost exclusively on criminal prosecutions will not achieve meaningful
success. The public resources devoted to the program must, in short, be increased and the
strategy followed must include more than the mere use of criminal sanctions. Private enforce-
ment must also be integrated into the overall effort.
On organized crime and violence, see generally Organized Crime and Use of Violence: Hear-
ings Before Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Covemmental Afairs, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess., Parts 1 and 2 (1980); 127 CONG. REC. H8,623, H8,626-27 (daily ed. Novem-
ber 19, 1981) (statement of Congressman Louis Stokes on introduction of Violence Control
Act of 1982) (in 1980, 23,000 murders, of which only 73% were cleared by arrest; between
1977-79, 1,280 organized crime-related killings). Finally, while violence against anyone is to
be deplored, one facet of contemporary organized crime violence that is historically unique in
the United States is the extent to which it is directed toward judicial and prosecutive officals.
See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1982, at 10, col. 1 (conviction of killers of Judge John H. Wood,
Jr.); id., March 14, 1982, at 18, col. 3 (review of plots against judges, prosecutors, and investi-
gators taking part in drug cases); id. April 16, 1982, at 7, col. 6 (indictment of "narcotic
smuggler and a hired killer. . .on charges of murdering the Federal district judge" sched-
uled to preside over a drug case against them).
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provision of illegal goods and services;169 (3) corruption in the labor
169 The category of illegal goods and services would include: (1) gambling: state gambling
and federal sports bribery (18 U.S.C. § 224), transmission of gambling information (18 U.S.C.
§ 1084), obstruction of local law enforcement (18 U.S.C. § 1511), transportation of wagering
paraphernalia (18 U.S.C. § 1953), gambling businesses (18 U.S.C. § 1955), and interstate
racketeering (18 U.S.C. § 1952); (2) narcotics: state narcotics and dangerous drugs; federal
narcotics, dangerous drugs, and interstate racketeering (18 U.S.C. § 1952); (3) liquor (18
U.S.C. § 1952); (4) prostitution (18 U.S.C. § 1952) and white slavery (18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424);
(5) loansharking: state extortion and federal loansharking (18 U.S.C. §§ 891-894); (6) theft and
fencing: state robbery and federal theft from interstate shipments (18 U.S.C. § 659), robbery
(18 U.S.C. § 1951), interstate transportation ofstolen property (18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315); and
(7) counterfeiting (18 U.S.C. §§ 471-473).
The scope and impact of the traffic in illegal goods and services are substantial. Two
areas illustrate both longstanding attitudes and practices and current realities: gambling and
drugs. Traditionally, gambling is thought of as the chief source of income for organized
crime. PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 43, at 188 ("Law Enforcement officials agree almost
unanimously that gambling is the greatest source of revenue for organized crime."). The
Justice Department estimated for the National Gambling Commission in 1974 that the gross
volume of illegal gambling was between 29 and 39 billion dollars each year. GAMBLING IN
AMERICA: FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE REvIEw OF NATIONAL POLICY To-
WARD GAMBLING 63 (1976)[hereinafter cited as GAMBLING IN AMERICA]. Studies done for
the Commission, however, put the figure at five billion dollars, characterizing an upper range
beyond $10 billion "statistically impossible." Kallick, Kaufman, & Reuter, Micro and Macro
Dimensions of Gambling in the UnitedStates, 35 J. OF Soc. IssuES 19 (No. 3 1979). The Commis-
sion expressed reservations about the validity of the studies insofar as they estimated the
illegal handle. GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra, at 63-65. Even at the lower figure, illegal gam-
bling would almost equal the overall figure for the national amusement and recreation serv-
ices industry in 1975, 5.2 billion dollars. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1982,
at 105 (1981). Nevertheless, using the figures from the Commission's study, the net take
would not exceed $1.5 billion. Other estimates of handle and take are higher. See, e.g., EASY
MONEY: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LEGALIZED GAMBLING 54 (Fund for the City of
New York and the Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1974) [hereinafter cited as EASY
MONEY] (handle: 22.9, gross take: 3.5, net take: 1.6 billion dollars). Plainly, gambling is not
the major source of income for organized crime. The popular myth of organized crime's
monopoly ownership of illicit gambling is also unsupported by hard evidence. Current esti-
mates of ownership or control by mafia-type organized crime are as follows: far west, 29.2%;
midwest, 41.4%; northeast, 53.2%; southeast, 35.7%; and southwest, 2%. EASY MONEY, supra,
at 9. Indeed, revisionist literature makes gambling today a marginal activity of organized
crime. Reuter & Rubinstein, Fact, Fanqy and Organized Crime, 53 PUB. INTEREST 45, 47 (Fall
1978). On the other hand, monopoly ownership or control is not necessary to take monopoly
profits out of an industry. As long as a monopoly can be maintained over an essential compo-
nent of a product or service, monopoly profits can be extracted. See P. SAMUELSON, EcO-
NOMICS 93-97 (6th ed. 1964). Increasingly, loansharking is characterized as having that
relationship to illicit gambling. As the Pennsylvania Crime Commission observed in 1980,
"Gamblers are a natural market for the illegal money lender." PENNSYLVANIA CRIME COM-
MISSION, A DECADE OF ORGANIZED CRIME: 1980 REPORT 126 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
PENNSYLVANIA 1980]. Public participation in illegal gambling, too, is not as high as many
believe; only about 11% of adults bet in any form of an illegal game. GAMBLING IN AMERICA,
supra, at 58. For a history of federal gambling legislation, see Blakey & Kurland, The Develop-
ment of the Federal Law of Gambling, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 923 (1978). For an empirical study of
gambling enforcement, see F. Fowler, T. Mangione & F. Pratter, GAMBLING ENFORCEMENT
IN MAJOR AMERICAN CITIES: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1978)(conclusion: less than one per-
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cent of resources are devoted to gambling enforcement because lack of public support sus-
pected). For a discussion based on empirical surveys of what are in fact current social
attitudes toward gambling enforcement, see GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra, at 48-49 (42% of
sample thought gambling enforcement "very important"; 55% thought jail an appropriate
consequence).
Today, the traffic in illicit drugs is in fact the major source of income for organized
criminal groups. Illegal drugs "generated $64 billion in retail sales in 1979 compared to $50
billion in 1978 and 48 billion in 1977." TIlE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CONSUMERS COMM.,
THE SUPPLY OF DRUGS TO THE U.S. ILLICIT MARKET FROM FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC
SOURCES IN 1979, at 5 (1979). The rise "was principally the result of increased consumption
of cocaine, marihuana and dangerous drugs." Id. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1982, at 11, col. 6
(1980: $79 billion). Perspective is helpful. An income of $79 billion per year would make
the drug traffic more than twice as large as banking ($34 billion) or insurance ($24 billion),
and it would rank in between transportation ($76 billion) and the medical and health services
($86 billion) industries. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1982, at 105 (1981).
Profit margins are incredibly high. Seegenerally S. REP. No. 887, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
The cocaine traffic is illustrative. A South American farmer sells 500 kilos of coca leaves for
approximately $250, which ultimately produced one kilo of cocaine hydrochloride; it, in turn,
is then cut to about 12% purity and sold at the street level for $800,000. Id. at 13. The traffic
in most drugs is also highly organized. Organized Crime andthe Use of Violence.- Hearings Before the
Perm. Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Aairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
61-62 (1980) (testimony of Peter B. Bensinger) ("sophisticated organized criminal syndicates
with a corporate-like structure and motivated by power and profit").
Little evidence exists that current law enforcement resource commitment and strategy
are having a significant impact on drug traffic. Federal expenditures in drug control pro-
grams amount to one billion dollars each year, yet only two to five percent of the heroin, for
example, is diverted. N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1982, at 11, col. 6. Overall, less than 10% of all
drug traffic entering the country is intercepted. N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1982, at 6, col. 1. For
the most comprehensive study of the federal effort, see S. REP. No. 1039, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976). A number of changes have been made since 1976, but the traffic in drugs continues to
grow. On October 14, 1982, the President announced the creation of 12 special task forces to
fight narcotics and organized crime estimated to cost 160 to 200 million dollars. N.Y. Times,
Oct. 15, 1982, at 1, col. 2. Sadly, the money for the task forces will "be found by shifting
funds from existing budgets." Id
Organized crime's role in loansharking is comprehensively analyzed in Goldstock &
Coenen, Controlling the ContemporaqT Loanshark. The Law of Illicit Lending and the Problem of Wit-
ness Fear, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 127 (1980). Organized crime's role in theft and fencing is
comprehensively analyzed in Blakey & Goldsmith, Criminal Redistribution of Stolen Propery: The
Needfor Law Reform, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1511 (1977). See also Professional Motor Vehicle Theft and
Chop Shops.- Hearings before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Govern-
mental Afairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979)(auto theft four billion dollars a year, with 3
billion dollars in insurance claims); N.Y. Times, June 13, 1982, at 33, col. 1 (1.1 million cars
"many of. . .[which are]... quickly disassembled in 'chop shops' and sold as spare parts").
For a study of illicit sex in one state, see PENNSYLVANIA 1980, supra, at 118-25. See also R.
Rohde, The Massage Parlor Problem and RICO Civil Remedies, in 3 MATERIALS, supra note 23, at
1562. Current studies of the traffic in illicit liquor or counterfeiting that focus on the nation
as a whole and integrate law and procedure do not exist. In fact, the number of counterfeit
notes passed has remained fairly stable in the past 10 years (135,775 to 189,015), although the
dollar amount has increased by 39% (2.1 million to 5.5 million). U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUS-
TICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1981, at 379. Similarly, the number
of investigations received in the counterfeit area has also remained relatively stable (22,346 to
18,289). Id. at 437.
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movement °70 or among public officials;' 7 ' and (4) commercial and
170 The category of "corruption within the labor movement" would include: state extor-
tion and bribery and federal embezzlement from unions and pension and welfare funds (18
U.S.C. § 664; 29 U.S.C. § 501 (c)); mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341); wire fraud (18 U.S.C.
§ 1343); extortion (18 U.S.C. § 1951); interstate racketeering (18 U.S.C. § 1952)("bribery" or
"extortion"); unlawful payments (18 U.S.C. § 1954); welfare and pension funds (18 U.S.C. §
1986); and theft and fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315).
Labor racketeering, the use of lawful union power and wealth for personal aggrandize-
ment or profit, has been characterized by David Dubinsky, the former president of the Gar-
ment Workers, as a pervasive and dreaded disease, a "cancer that almost destroyed the
American Trade Unions." D. DUBINSKY & A. RASKIN, DAVID DUBINSKY: A LIFE WITH
LABOR 145 (1977). The conclusions of numerous national and local studies are reviewed in
G. BLAKEY, R. GOLDSTOCK, & G. BRADLEY, LABOR RACKETEERING: BACKGROUND
MATERIALS (Cornell Institute on Organized Crime (1979)). See also Blakey & Goldstock, On
the Waterfront.- RICO and Labor Racketeering, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 341 (1980). One cannot
question that the disease is dread. That it is pervasive is an overstatement, for the vast major-
ity of the nation's 500,000 elected labor officials have never been charged or convicted with a
crime. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 8, 1980, at 33. Even the Department of Justice,
hardly a disinterested observer, does not suggest that more than 300 of the 75,000 union locals
are plagued with corruption. Labor Management Racketeering Hearings before the Permanent Sub-
comm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Aairs, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 9 (1978)
(testimony of Benjamin Civilleti) (labor racketeering termed "a serious national problem").
In fact, the federal government, as part of its current high priority effort, has secured convic-
tions between 1973 and 1980 of only 450 union officers and employees, and of that number,
one-third were concentrated in only four unions: the Teamsters, the Laborers, the Hotel
Workers, and the Longshoremen. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 8, 1980, at 34. The
Teamsters Union illustrates the corruption and organized crime influence in these unions,
which seems impervious to the traditional law enforcement efforts and strategies launched
and followed over the past twenty years. In 1956, Robert F. Kennedy, a counsel to a Senate
committee, learned that Dave Beck, the President of the Teamsters Union, was corrupt. R.
SCHLESINGER, JR., ROBERT KENNEDY AND HIS TIMES 139-44 (1978). Beck was eventually
prosecuted, Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962), only to be pardoned by President Ford.
SCHLESINGER, supra, at 149. Beck was succeeded by James R. Hoffa, who was prosecuted
while Robert F. Kennedy was Attorney General. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966)
(ury bribery); United States v. Hoffa, 436 F.2d 1243 (7th Cir. 1970)(benefit fund corrup-
tion), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1000 (1971). His sentence was commuted by President Nixon.
SCHLESINGER, supra, at 202. Hoffa was succeeded by Frank E. Fitzsimmons, who died before
he was prosecuted. Fitzsimmons' successor, Roy L. Williams, who has been linked to organ-
ized crime in congressional testimony, has recently been convicted for conspiracy to bribe a
United States Senator and for wire fraud. See note 177 infra. Williams's leadership may be
worse than the first, for while Beck was personally corrupt, he was not dominated by mob
figures. As with the Mandel commutation, note 176 infra, the relationship of powerful unions
to political power, too, is manifest.
171 The category of "corruption among public officials" would include state bribery or
extortion and federal bribery (18 U.S.C. § 201); mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341); wire fraud (18
U.S.C. § 1343); obstruction of justice (18 U.S.C. § 1503); obstruction of criminal investiga-
tions (18 U.S.C. § 1510); obstruction of state law enforcement (18 U.S.C. § 1911); extortion
by fear or color of law (18 U.S.C. § 1951); interstate racketeering (18 U.S.C. § 1952)("extor-
tion or bribery'); and interstate transportation of stolen property (18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315).
From their beginnings, governments have had corrupt officials, and the problem has not
dissipated. Witness the 1970's: a "President left office in disgrace, a Vice-president was con-
victed of abuse of position, and a Supreme Court Justice resigned under a cloud of suspicion."
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other forms of fraud. 172 Since RICO's standards make "unlawful"
BLAKEY & GOLDSTOCK, OFFICIAL CORRUPTION: BACKGROUND MATERIALS 2 (Cornell In-
stitute on Organized Crime (1977). "In turn, two cabinet officers, two U.S. Senators, eight
Congressmen, a federal judge, five governors and Lt. governors, several state judges (44) and
various and assorted mayors (43), state legislators (60), and sheriffs and police officials (260)"
were indicted or convicted. Id. Then came Abscam, which cost $800,000, involved more
than 100 FBI agents in five cities, and resulted in the exposure of eight national legislators
and at least two dozen lesser officials. TIME, Feb. 18, 1980, at 10. The overall statistics on the
corruption uncovered by the current federal program are impressive. Since 1970, federal
(1,119), state (520), and local (1,757) officials as well as others (1,738) have been federally
indicted, while 3,937 convictions (federal: 924, state: 369, local: 1290; others: 1354) have been
obtained. 1,300 trials are pending. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON THE ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS OF THE PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION FOR 1981, at 20
(1982). Frequently employed statutes in the anticorruption program of the Public Integrity
Section include RICO and its predicate offenses. Id. at 25-27. While the work of the Public
Integrity Section is impressive, it is not well managed. See general'y REPORT BY THE COMP-
TROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES: JUSTICE NEEDS TO BETTER MANAGE ITS
FIGHT AGAINST PUBLIC CORRUPTION (1980). The corruption uncovered by the Section is a
source of shame for our nation. But see U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 28, 1981, at 36
(acting Deputy Attorney General quoted: "There's no way to tell whether we have more
corruption than we had 100 years before. But there's no question that efforts to prosecute
those who betray public office are at a higher pitch than ever before.").
172 The category of "commercial or other frauds" would include state arson and bribery,
and federal sports bribery (18 U.S.C. § 224); counterfeiting (18 U.S.C. §§ 471-473); theft from
interstate shipments (18 U.S.C. § 659); mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341); wire fraud (18 U.S.C.
§ 1343); interstate racketeering (18 U.S.C. § 1952)("bribery" and "arson"); interstate trans-
portation of stolen property (18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315); bankruptcy fraud, and fraud in the
sale of securities. For data on the scope and impact of fraud, see text accompanying notes
224-35 infra.
The expressed fear, note 120 supra, that taking civil RICO at face value in the area of
"common law" type fraud will result in the uncontrollable and unwarranted inundation of
federal courts with new litigation has about it, in Mr. Justice Cardozo's words, a "sanguinary
simile." Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 217 (1946). First, it has hardly
been true since 1970. "Only a handful of cases have been brought in more than a decade.
Apparently the RICO plaintiff needs more, not less, incentive to sue." Basic Concepts, supra
note 3, at 1043. Second, it will take a resourceful and hardy plaintiff to bring a civil RICO
case in many of the fact patterns that arise under it, considering the type of defendant who
can be expected to engage in the conduct that falls within its terms and the difficulty in
gathering evidence by the government, much less private individuals, in some of the areas
covered by RICO. PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 43, at 198-99. See notes 59 supra and 175
infra. Third, many of the typical RICO defendants will be judgment proof or their assets,
appropriately concealed, will not be subject to the kind of traditional legal process available
to private plaintiffs. Fourth, where the civil case follows, rather than precedes, a criminal
prosecution, the litigation should be brief and conclusive under modern concepts of issue
preclusion and summary judgment. See Anderson v. Janovich, 543 F. Supp. 1124, 1128-34
(W.D. Wash. 1982) (follow-up civil suit to United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981)); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton,
540 F. Supp. 673, 682-83 (N.D. Ind. 1982)(Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979)
held applicable for non-mutual issue preclusion to civil RICO suit following criminal convic-
tion); FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (judgment on affidavits); Basic Concepts, supra note 3, at 1044.
Fifth, much of what is covered by civil RICO can already be-and is now-brought in fed-
eral courts, including types of antitrust actions (bid rigging, for example), securities fraud,
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certain investments, acquisitions or conduct in connection with an
"enterprises," the roles that the enterprise may play in a violation of
these standards may be variously-but not mutually exclusively-
described as "prize," "instrument," "victim," or "perpetrator."'
173
A violation involving an unlawful investment will usually cast
the enterprise in the role of a "prize." 174 Typically, a violation in-
commodity fraud, and copyright fraud. In fact, most major commercial fraud litigation is
already now in the federal courts. RICO will often provide, in short, a new theory of recov-
ery, not a new basis for federal jurisdiction. On securities fraud and RICO, see Long, Treble
Damages for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws A Suggested Analysis and Application of the
RICO Civil Cause of Action, 85 DICK. L. REV. 201 (1981); Morrison, Old Bottle-Not So New
Wine: Treble Damages in Actions Under the Federal Securities Laws, 10 SEC. REG. L.J. 67 (1982).
Finally, even the lure of treble damages is not wholly new. RICO requires more than a
showing of "common law fraud," as it reflects the elements, if not the burden of proof, of
conduct otherwise considered criminal. RICO does not provide for constructive fraud, negli-
gence, or strict liability. See note 216 infra. In such cases, punitive damages are already gener-
ally available. See D. DOBBS, REMEDIES §§ 3.9, 9.1-9.6 (1973); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS
§ 18 (4th ed. 1971). What RICO promises is not so much new as certain, for the law of fraud
and punitive damages, as hoary as it is, is hardly well settled. That, too, is RICO's point: if
the RICO fraud suit is to serve its appointed purpose of helping to underwrite legally the
integrity of the nation's marketplace, it must be, in an appropriate combination, swift, sure,
and severe. See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 7.2 (2d ed. 1977). RICO
promises that combination, unless it is unduly restricted by unauthorized judicial
interpretation.
173 See note 19 supra for the text of 18 U.S.C. § 1962. The analysis here reflects basic
linguistics theory. See, e.g., Fillmore, The Casefor Case, in UNIVERSALS IN LINGUISTICS THE-
ORY 24-25 (E. Bach & R. Harms ed. 1968).
174 For example, in United States v. McNary, 620 F.2d 621, 628 (7th Cir. 1980), the
mayor of the Village of Lansing, Illinois, was convicted of a § 1962(a) violation. The mayor
owned two businesses, B&M Manufacturing Company and Ports of Call Travel Service. Us-
ing his authority as mayor, he extorted certain contractors; he also took certain bribes, the
acts of extortion and bribes constituting a "pattern of racketeering activity." The mayor was
convicted of having received income from the pattern of racketeering activity and investing it
in the operation of the two enterprises. Of $85,000 received, the mayor deposited $65,000
into his Manufacturing Company account. Subsequently, he transferred in excess of
$103,000 from the Manufacturing Company account to his Ports of Call account. The gov-
ernment contended that the commingling of the illicit income with the licit funds and the
subsequent investment of these combined assets constituted a violation of § 1962(a). The
court of appeals held: "Whether. . .[the mayor's] investment in Ports of Call is termed as
'indirect' use or investment of racketeering income, or the use or investment of the 'proceeds
of such income,' it is. . . the. . . activity proscribed by" RICO. 620 F.2d at 629. The court
also upheld a special verdict finding that the mayor's interests in the businesses were subject
to criminal forfeiture. It is possible to term the interests in the two businesses underwritten by
the racketeer funds as the "prize" sought or maintained by the mayor's prohibited conduct.
Under the theory of the prosecution, neither of the two businesses were, of course, implicated
in the scheme to generate the funds; they were not, therefore, used as "instruments" of an
offense, "victimized" by it in any fashion, or involved as a "perpetrator" in the racketeering
activity itself. See United States v. Zang, No. 80-227 (10th Cir. June 7, 1982) (available on
LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir. file) (§ 1963(a) forfeiture limited to amount of investment). See
also United States v. Goins, 593 F.2d 88, 89-90 (8th Cir.) (bribe money used to purchase
tavern), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 827 (1979).
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volving an unlawful acquisition will find the enterprise in the role of
"prize" or "victim. '' 175 Violations involving the operation of an en-
175 For example, in United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1105 (1975), Milton Parness was convicted of a § 1962(b) violation. Allan Goberman
refinanced and completed the construction of a $3.5 million hotel-casino complex in the
Netherlands Antilles. Parness owned Olympic Sports Club, Inc., a corporation, through
which he ran "junkets" for Goberman's hotel-casino; he also collected for Goberman "mark-
ers" from gamblers who went on thejunkets. Parness, however, withheld $400,000 in overdue
"markers" from Goberman, forcing him to borrow $160,000, which Parness arranged to lend
him through Parness's nominees. The S160,000 was in fact Goberman's own money.
Goberman had to put up the casino-hotel as security, which Parness subsequently foreclosed
when Goberman was unable to repay the $160,000 "markers" because Parness was withhold-
ing them. Parness was convicted of acquiring the hotel-casino through a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity, which consisted of the interstate transportation of money obtained by fraud; it
also involved causing the victim, Goberman, to travel interstate.
As Parness was prosecuted, it is possible to term the hotel-casino either a "prize" or a
"victim." Had no economic or other damage been done to the hotel-only Goberman's inter-
est taken over-it would be a pure "prize" case. As it was, the money withheld from the
hotel-casino not only damaged Goberman, it also probably damaged the hotel-casino. Ac-
cordingly, the fact pattern illustrates both the "prize" and "victim" relationships. Clearly,
the hotel-casino itself played no role in the scheme as an "instrument" or "perpetrator." For
another example, see United States v. Jacobson, 691 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1982) (collection of
unlawful debt to acquire lease); United States v. Gambino, 566 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1977) (ex-
tortion used to take over garbage company), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978).
Parness avoided jail on his ten year sentence for 25 months, until the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals ordered his incarceration in United States v. Parness, 536 F.2d 474, 475 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 820 (1976), noting that Parness had been "presented as a dangerous
special offender" under Title X of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (18 U.S.C. §§
3575-3578). The court of appeals also noted that Parness had been on a period of mandatory
release supervision or parole from stolen securities convictions when he victimized Goberman.
The sentencing provisions of Title X have been sustained as constitutional. United
States v. Schell, 692 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1982). See also United States v. Moccia, 681 F.2d 61
(1st Cir. 1982)(DSO sentence sustained under parallel provisions of drug statute). In addi-
tion, their provisions for appellate review of sentences by the government have been upheld.
United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980). The reasons offered by the Department of
Justice for failing to use RICO and Title X as part of a comprehensive strategy to deal with
organized crime type offenders are unsatisfactory. See generalv REPORT BY COMPTROLLER
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES: STRONGER FEDERAL EFFORT NEEDED IN FIGHT
AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME (1981); REPORT BY COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES: WAR ON ORGANIZED CRIME FALTERING--FEDERAL STRIKE FORCES NOT GET-
TING THE JOB DONE (1977). For a comprehensive analysis of the rationale, legislative history
and proper statutory construction of Title X, see Brief as Amicus Curiae in support of United
States, United States v. Duardi, No. 75-1354 (8th Cir. 1975), reprinted in 18 CRIM. L. REP.
[BNA] 3001 (1975). It is regrettable that greater use is not made of the sentencing provisions
of Title X, as they were designed to strengthen the impact of RICO by assuring an upper
range of extended incarceration where isolation by imprisonment is the only way to deal with
certain offenders, like Parness.
It also appears that Goberman sued Parness civilly, but the docket entries show that
Goberman not only suffered a dismissal of his complaint, but also a judgment in excess of
S150,000 on a counterclaim, Goberman v. Parness, No. 71-182 (N.J. 1977), a fact that might
be related to Parness's connection with Angelo DeCarlo, a caporegima in the Genovese family
of La Cosa Nostra. Senate Hearings, supra note 28, at 127. Parness, it seems, was a money
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terprise by a pattern of racketeering activity may find the enterprise
in the role of an "instrument," 1 76 "victim, ' 177 or "perpetrator." 1 78
mover for DeCarlo. H. ZEIGER, THE JERSEY MOB 50, 126 (1975). See generaly R. SALERNO
&J. TOMPKINS, THE CRIME CONFEDERATION 101 (1969)("Gambling, loansharking, narcot-
ics and other activities produce a multi-billion dollar cash flow. The money mover solves a
twofold problem: he puts the cash to work and hides its true ownership."). Apparently, it is
not always wise to sue mob-connected defendants.
Parness was criticized by the ABA as an inappropriate prosecution under RICO on the
ground that separate transactions as part of a common scheme were not shown. ABA, supra
note 25, at 5 n. I. Even on this narrow ground, the criticism is mistaken. In fact, Parness
engaged in two separate transactions: the conversion of Goberman's money (the wrongfully
withheld markers, each of which constituted a separate theft), and the fraudulent loan of
Goberman's own money back to him.
176 The role of "instrument" is played in at least three different contexts: "tool," "front,"
and "conduit." The "tool" relationship is well illustrated by United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d
47 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981). Anthony Scotto was convicted of a
§ 1962(c) violation. Scotto was president of Local 1814 of the International Longshoremen's
Association (ILA); he and a codefendant were convicted of operating the union "through" a
pattern of racketeering activity, which consisted of receiving in excess of $250,000 in violation
of 29 U.S.C. § 186(b) (1976). Scotto argued on appeal that the district court's instructions on
the concept "through" were inadequate. The court of appeals upheld the instructions, ob-
serving that "[RICO] declines to define in quantitative terms the degree of interrelationship
between the pattern. . . and the conduct of the enterprise's affairs." 641 F.2d at 54. "[O]ne
conducts the activities of an enterprise," the court said, "through a pattern of racketeering
when (1) one is enabled to commit the predicate offenses solely by virtue of his position in the
enterprise or involvement in or control over [its] . . . affairs. . ., or (2) the predicate offenses
are related to the activities of that enterprise." Id. It is not necessary, the court concluded, to
show that the enterprise's affairs were "advanced," that it was itself "corrupt," or that the
racketeering acts were "authorized." Id.
As Scotto was prosecuted, it is possible to term the union a "tool." It was the instrument
through which Scotto committed the predicate offenses. Under the theory of the prosecution,
the union itself was not a "prize" Scotto gained or maintained. Nor was the union in any
primary sense "victimized." To be sure, Scotto was a faithless servant who should have to
account to the union for his stewardship, but that is a secondary sense of "victimization." See
note 218 infta for an analysis of possible RICO civil relief in the context of breach of fiduciary
duties. Nor was the union itself a "perpetrator"; as its affairs were not "advanced," it was not
"corrupt," and it had not "authorized or approved" Scotto's unlawful conduct. For other
similar examples, see United States v. Kopitok, 690 F.2d 1289 (1 lth Cir. 1982) (ILA water-
front corruption prosecution under RICO); United States v. Palmeri, 630 F.2d 192, 199 (3d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 967 (1981)(kickback scheme in union local); United States v.
Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 829 (5th Cir. 1980)(bribery and kickback schemes in sheriff's office).
In 1981, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, as a culmination of a
year-long investigation, held two weeks of hearings on corruption and organized crime domi-
nation of the waterfront. See general'y Waterftont Corruption: Hearings before the Penn. Subcomm. on
Investigations, Comm. on Governmental Afairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981)[hereinafter cited as
Corruption]. Testifying before the Committee were representatives of the Department of Jus-
tice, prosecutors, agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, including its director, The
New York-New Jersey Waterfront Commission, representatives of law enforcement agencies
from New. Jersey, the industry and the union, as well as those who paid off and those who
were paid off. The evidence reviewed by the Committee was the result not only of its own
efforts, but of a five year investigation by the Department of Justice, called UNIRAC, that
[Vol. 58:237]
THE NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
included extensive electronic surveillance, undercover activities, and grand jury hearings.
This evidence revealed a pervasive and sordid pattern of payoffs, kickbacks, threats, intimida-
tion and obstruction of justice on the waterfront along the east coast from New York City to
Miami, Florida. For example, witnesses were shot. Id. at 235. As of the date of the hearings,
129 indictments and 110 convictions had been obtained, including 52 union officials, 9 of
whom were organized crime members or associates; of the remaining 77 defendants, which
included industry officials and corporations, 20 were organized crime members or associates.
Id. at 11. A "racketeering" tariff had been added to every service or product being moved in
commerce by the shipping industry, making American goods less competitive and American
ports more costly. Id The victims included members of the union, who had placed their
trust in its leadership, the stockholders of the companies, whose money was unlawfully paid
out, and the American people, who had to pay higher prices for goods. In short, for a number
of years, "the free enterprise system simply ha[d] not functioned on the east coast of the
United States." Id at 227 (statement of Robert B. Fiske, Jr., former U.S. Attorney for the
Southern District of New York). The investigation was termed "the most successful labor
racketeering investigation ever conducted by the FBI." Id at 8 (statement of FBI Director
William Webster). It was also called the "one of the most productive and successful" of the
four year term of the principal prosecutor. Id at 248 (statement of Robert B. Fiske, Jr.).
Nevertheless, the hearings indicated that corrupt ILA officials still controlled certain ILA
locals. Corruption "bred by organized crime [was] still 'business as usual' in some port cities."
Id at 3 (statement of Senator Nunn). See also id at 18 (statement of William Webster). The
Department of Justice, through criminal prosecution, had done all that it could, "yet the
convicted union officials. . . still [held] office or exert[ed] control over the ILA through asso-
ciates or surrogates." Id at 4 (statement of Senator Nunn).
The hearings also traced Scotto's career from the day he pledged loyalty to Cosa Nostra
family boss Carlo Gambino, at age 28, for which he was made a member, ultimately a
caporegima, and president of Local 1814 of the ILA, to the day when he was indicted under
RICO. As a result of his pledge of loyalty, he rose to have significant political power on the
local, state and national level. Scotto's political position in New York City at the time of his
trial was illustrated by his character witnesses: Governor Hugh Carey, former mayors John
Lindsey and Robert Wagner, and Lane Kirkland, then secretary-treasurer, now president of
the AFL-CIO. Id. at 229. He influenced state legislation, id. at 392 (testimony of D.
O'Hearn, President McGrath Servs. Corp.), and political appointments, id. at 250 (statement
of Robert B. Fiske, Jr.). Because he was a ranking member of organized crime, those who
dealt with him had to be concerned about "physical retaliation." Id. at 251. Scotto was,
moreover, paid "tribute" by businessmen in terms of cash payments, not only by those who
expected something specific in return, but also by others "solely to maintain [their] company's
existing business." Id. He had sources in the Waterfront Commission that informed him of
pending matters. Id. at 236 (testimony of Robert B. Fiske, Jr.). Scotto's conviction was possi-
ble largely because of electronic surveillance; it was termed the "single most important tool"
in the Scotto investigation. Id at 233 (testimony of Jack Burrett, special FBI agent). See also
N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1979, at 27, col. 5 (Juror Lucile Brockway: "The tapes were crucial [; it
was] the hardest evidence"). The surveillance was upheld in a companion prosecution,
United States v. Clemente, 482 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), afd, 633 F.2d 207 (2d Cir.
1980). After the Waterfront Commission removed Scotto from his office, his "handpicked"
successor succeeded him. Corruption, supra, at 247 (testimony of Alan Levine, former Assistant
United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York). No evidence was presented to
the Committee that indicated that the union had any "intention of cleaning its own house."
Id at 226 (testimony of Robert F. Fiske, Jr.). Its record was termed "a disgrace." Id. at 241.
Criticism was leveled at the Department of Labor, id at 296 (testimony of Michael Devorkin,
former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York) and the Department of
the Treasury, id. at 292. The sentencing practices of the judiciary were also criticized, be-
cause Scotto received only 5 out of a possible 20 years, considerably less than other defendants
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in other prosecutions. In addition, the prosecutor recognized that he would be out on parole
in even less time. Id. at 223-24 (testimony of Robert B. Fiske, Jr.). Congress was also implic-
itly criticized, for recommendations were made for new tools to help law enforcement, in-
cluding the mandatory criminal forfeiture of the proceeds of illicit transactions, more
stringent civil sanctions, and procedures for obtaining the imposition of more stringent crimi-
nal sanctions. Id. 312-13 (statement of Michael Devorkin). See the statement of former Assis-
tant U.S. Attorney Michael Devorkin, id. at 288, that the place to start is "by raising the
stakes to both sides of these potential criminal transactions, to make the penalties much
higher, much swifter, much more certain, to try to deter at least those on the margins;" in
short, some way "to motivate businessmen to reject demands from corrupt union officials
needed to be found." Id. at 27 (testimony of Michael Levin, Attorney-in-charge, Miami Or-
ganized Crime Task Force).
While one can have nothing but praise for the dedication and craftsmanship of those
associated with the investigation and criminal prosecution of the Scotto case, not all was done
that could have been done. Indeed, the Scotto prosecution aptly illustrates the futility of rely-
ing on a legal strategy that rests exclusively--or almost exclusively--on criminal prosecution
without the consideration of parallel public and private civil sanctions. In fact, the prosecu-
tive authorities in Scotto did not even appear to know what authority they had, or to have
used that authority-beyond obtaining the conviction-in such a fashion that it had the
greatest impact, criminally and civilly. The failure, in short, was not of law or of courage, but
of understanding, and the fault lay with those connected with the prosecution who were the
freest with their criticism of others. For example, the Scotto jury was not asked to return a
special verdict under § 1963(a)(2) criminally forfeiting Scotto's positions in the ILA. See, e.g.,
United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 991-93 (5th Cir. 1977) (forfeiture of union office up-
held), vacated and remanded, 439 U.S. 810 (1978), reinstated in relevant part, 591 F.2d 278 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979). The prosecutors were dissatisfied with the sentence
imposed on Scotto by the court, but they had not filed for a Title X proceeding, so no appeal
of the lenient term was possible. See note 175 supra. Nor was a civil suit filed seeking to have
Scotto removed from office immediately after the conviction. See 559 F.2d at 993. Only the
ILA representative at the hearing appeared to recognize that RICO was applicable to remove
an officer civilly. Compare Corruption,supra, at 231 (testimony of Robert E. Fiske, Jr.) with id. at
463 (testimony of ILA President Thomas W. Gleason, Sr.). Moreover, by statute the criminal
conviction was available to the government as estoppel in civil litigation. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(d)
(1976) ("shall estop"). It was final when returned; it was not necessary to await the outcome
of the appeal. United States v. NYSCO Laboratories, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 87, 89 (E.D.N.Y.)
(stay pending appeal denied and summary judgment granted for injunction), aj'd, 318 F.2d
817 (2d Cir. 1963). See Huron Corp. v. Lincoln Co., 312 U.S. 183, 189 (1941) ("while appeal
. . . stays execution at the judgment, it does not detract from its. . . finality"). To be sure,
the Waterfront Commission stood ready to act, and did act, Corruption, supra, at 230 (testi-
mony of Robert B. Fiske, Jr.), but removal from office by the Commission was a remedy that
the prosecutors themselves could not control. Nor has the government sought, through civil
litigation under § 1964, to reform the ILA in light of its extensive history of corruption and
domination by organized crime figures. RICO explicitly authorizes such suits. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1964(a) and (b) (1976). The legislative history was favorable. See notes 87 and 116 supra.
So, too, was the case law. See United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974) (civil
RICO provision held constitutional), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975). Corruption and mob
influence in the ILA had a venerable history. See generally H. NELLI, THE BUSINESS OF
CRIME 107-09, 245 (1976); D. CHANDLER, BROTHERS IN BLOOD 42 (1975). There was no
reason to believe that one or two, or even a series of, prosecutions would impact on the indus-
try or the union.
In fact, since 1970 only one civil suit has been brought by the government under RICO
to reform a union; it is currently pending against Local 560 of the Teamsters in New Jersey.
United States v. Local No. 560, 550 F. Supp. 511 (D.N.J. 1982) (civil RICO complaint up-
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held). It is based on the domination of Local 560 by Anthony Provenzano, a caporegima in the
Genovese family of La Cosa Nostra. See generally S. BRILL, THE TEAMSTERS (Pocket Book
1978).
Civil suits under RICO, however, have been brought by private parties growing out of
the Scotto investigation and prosecution. Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. O'Hearn, 523 F. Supp. 244
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Prudential Lines, Inc. v. McKeon, No. 80-5853, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21,
1982). In Hellenic Lines, the plaintiff was a Greek shipping corporation, which operated out of
a Brooklyn pier. According to the complaint, an official of Export Carpenters, Inc. conspired
with ILA officials (Scotto included) to take bribes from Hellenic Lines employees with the
approval of the president of McGrath Services Corp., causing Hellenic Lines to pay out
$100,000 for services never rendered. Similarly, the president of Jackson Engineering made
cash kickbacks to Hellenic Lines employees to cause Hellenic Lines to place orders with and
accept padded bills from Jackson Engineering to generate cash for payoffs to ILA officials,
from which Hellenic Lines suffered $800,000 damages. The complaint prayed for treble dam-
ages under § 1964(c) and actual and punitive damages under common law fraud. The de-
fendants included individuals and corporations. See note 147 supra. The court denied a
motion to dismiss on the grounds that Hellenic Lines was in pari delicto and that neither "or-
ganized crime" nor "competitive" injury was alleged. The court observed that there was no
requirement that the defendants "be members of a group or society of criminals operating
outside of the law"; the argument that RICO requires "competitive injury" was "specious";
and that "the broad remedial purposes of RICO clearly permit[ted] private lawsuits by a firm
forced to pay bribes or kickbacks," even though the predicate crimes might also "be actiona-
ble under state fraud laws." 523 F. Supp. at 248. In addition, Hellenic Lines could not have
been involved because its employees acted for their own, and not Hellenic Lines' benefit. Id.
Nevertheless, the court dismissed the complaint, with leave to replead, for a failure to plead
fraud with specificity under FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b). On the availability of the common-law in
pan" delicto defense under the antitrust laws, see Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International
Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138 (1968) ("There is nothing in the language of the antitrust acts
which indicates that Congress wanted to make the. . .paridelicto doctrine a defense to treble-
damage action. . . . We have often indicated the inappropriateness of invoking broad com-
mon-law barriers to relief where a private suit serves important public purposes."); Javelin
Corp. v. Uniroyal Inc., 546 F.2d 276, 278-80 (9th Cir. 1976).
In Prudential Lines, the plaintiff was engaged in the shipping business. According to the
complaint, the defendant, who owned a warehouse, conspired with one of Prudential Lines'
employees to pay him kickbacks to enter into a lease on terms favorable to the defendant,
from which Prudential Lines suffered $1,800,000 damages. The complaint prayed for treble
damages under § 1964(c) and injunctive and declaratory relief under a common law fraud
and breach of fiduciary duties theory. The court denied a motion to dismiss on the grounds
that MeKeon's personal operation of the warehouse could not be an enterprise and that
neither "organized crime" nor "competitive" injury was alleged; it also refused to defer to a
pending state action under Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
817 (1976)(federal courts have an "unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction
given them"). In addition, it rejected a contention that the claim was time-barred, holding
that the New York statute of limitations dealing with fraud governed, rather than the penalty
or forfeiture provision. On RICO and the statute of limitations, see State Farm Fire and Cas.
Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 683-85 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (sole proprietor enterprise
upheld, and RICO's remedial character indicated proper state statute of limitation to be the
Indiana fraud, not penalty, provision); Basic Concepts, supra note 3, at 1047; Special Project,
Time Bars in Specialized Federal Common Law: Federal Rights of Action and State Statutes of Limita-
tions, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 1011 (1980). For an excellent study of the Scotto prosecution, see
Note, United States v. Scotto: Progression of a Waterfront Corruption Prosection from Investigation
Through Appeal, 57 NOTRE DAME LAw. 364 (1981).
The "front" relationship is well illustrated by United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174
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(4th Cir. 1981), modf ed on reh'g, 669 F.2d 185 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 307 (1982).
Walter R. Webster was convicted of a § 1962(c) violation. He was convicted of operating the
1508 Club Tavern and Liquor Store, owned by the codefendant, "through" a pattern of
racketeering activity, which consisted of illegal drug activities. Webster argued on appeal
that although "the facilities of the . . . [c]lub were regularly made available to, and put in
service of, the. . . drug dealing business. . . the evidence completely failled] to demonstrate
that the affairs of the 1508 Club were promoted in any way by the illegal drug racketeering."
639 F.2d at 184. The court of appeals initially agreed with Webster's argument and reversed
his conviction, relying on United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1375-76 (4th Cir.) (mere
transfer of business interest not "conducting"), vacated on other grounds by an equally divided court,
602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), petition for reh'g denied, 600 F.2d 107, cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961
(1980) and United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1366-67 n.13 (8th Cir. 1980) ("the
requirement that defendant operate through a pattern of racketeering activity . . . pose[s]
substantive limitations on prosecutorial zeal in the setting of infiltration of legitimate busi-
ness"). On Anderson, see Basic Concepts, supra note 3, at 1025 n.91. The court observed, "the
prosecution was required to prove that the 'enterprise'. . . had its affairs advanced or benefit-
ted in some fashion . . . by the pattern of racketeering activities." 639 F.2d at 185-86. On
rehearing, the court modified its judgment. The court stated: "Unfortunately, we introduced
'promoted,' 'improved,' 'advanced' and 'benefitted' . . . for 'conducted'. . . . The problem
in [that] approach. . . immediately surfaces in cases where the enterprise is governmental in
nature, and almost universally not organized for profit." 669 F.2d at 186. Accordingly, the
court abandoned its effort to define "conduct . . . through" in a simple fashion, correctly
recognizing that the required nexus would vary with the character of the "enterprise" and the
alleged "pattern of racketeering activities." See United States v. Kovic, 684 F.2d 512, 516
(7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Welch, 656 F.2d 1039, 1060-61 (5th Cir. 1981) (unmodified
Webster rejected as "unduly restrictive" in context of operation of sheriff's office by pattern of
racketeering), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3802 (U.S. Apr. 5, 1982). The convictions were then
affirmed.
As Webster was prosecuted, it is possible to term the 1508 Club neither a "prize," "vic-
tim," nor "perpetrator." It was merely a "front" for the drug activity. It was the disguise
that marked the illegitimate activity with the facade of the club's legal activities. For other
similar examples, see United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159, 1167 (9th Cir. 1980) (tavern
business "'front' for illegal gambling'), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981); United States v.
Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("Sylvestor's [Restaurant]. . . was also...
a. . . front for the illegal activity of trafficking in cocaine"), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979);
United States v. Smaldone, 583 F.2d 1129, 1131-32, 1133 (10th Cir. 1978) (conduct of Gae-
tano's Restaurant through a pattern of illegal gambling and collection of unlawful debt ac-
companied by forfeiture under § 1963(a)(2)), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979).
The "conduct" relationship is well illustrated by United States v. Mandel, 408 F. Supp.
679 (D. Md.), supplemented by, 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md.), supplemented by, 415 F. Supp. 1025
(D. Md.),supplemented by 415 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Md.),supplemented by, 415 F. Supp. 1079 (D.
Md. 1976), supplemented by, 431 F. Supp. 90 (D. Md. 1977), rev'd, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), a'd
by equally divided court en bane, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980).
Marvin Mandel was convicted of a § 1962(b) violation; he was also charged with a § 1962(c)
violation. Codefendants were convicted of a § 1962(c) violation. Mandel was the governor
of Maryland. Mandel was convicted (count 21) of acquiring an interest in Security Invest-
ment Company "through" a pattern of racketeering activity. In addition, he was charged
(count 22) with conducting the State of Maryland "through" a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity. Count 22 was dismissed by the District Court. Co-defendants were convicted (count 23)
of operating Security Investment Company "through" a pattern of racketeering activity; they
were also convicted (count 24) of operating Marlboro Race Track "through" a pattern of
racketeering activity. The racketeering activity alleged in each count consisted of mail fraud
and bribery. The basic allegation was that Mandel had received approximately $350,000 in
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"gifts" from his co-defendants during his six years in office in return for which he strength-
ened their financial positions. Mandel argued to the district court that "through" in
§ 1962(b) should be read to mean that "only those 'racketeering acts' which proximately
resulted in the acquisition or maintainance of" the interest in the enterprise could "be alleged
to be part of the 'prohibited pattern.' " 415 F. Supp. at 1020. The district court rejected the
contention, holding that such a "narrow . ..meaning of the word 'through' would .. .
reward subtle and sophisticated patterns. . . in which it. would be difficult, if not impossible,
to identify the 'proximate cause' of an acquisition." Id. It would "unnecessarily frustrate
Congress' intention to rid the influence of racketeering activities from legitimate businesses."
Id. Similarly, Mandel's co-defendants argued that "conduct or participate" in § 1962(c) re-
quired "involvement in the operation or management of" the enterprise. 591 F.2d at 1375.
As such, the mere transfer of a partnership interest in Security Investment Company from one
of the co-defendants to Mandel did not violate § 1963(c). The district court agreed, and set
aside the jury verdict on count 23, which was appealed by the government. The court of
appeals upheld the district court's interpretation, and added: "We find additional support for
[the district court's] view in the use of the word 'through'. . . . We do not believe Congress
meant to sweep so broadly, especially in light of the mandatory forfeiture penalties . .. ."
591 F.2d at 1375. The transfer of the interest was "the antithesis of operating it." Id at 1376.
"Mandel's interest was purely passive[;]... he was not entitled to any management role
. .. Id. It was not "the situation where the . . . enterprise [was] ... a front for racketeer-
ing activity." Id.
The restrictive reading of "conduct or participate" and "through" by the district court
and the court of appeals in Mandel was wrong in light of the liberal construction clause and
the remedial purpose of RICO. See United States v. Palmeri, 630 F.2d 192, 199-200 (3d Cir.
1980) ("statute ... includes within the regulated class all persons who exercise control, direct
or indirect, authorized or unauthorized" in light of the liberal construction clause), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 967 (1981). Compare United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 830 (5th Cir. 1980)
(bonding company operation pay-off of sheriff associated with sheriff's office) with United
States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1135-36 (3d Cir. 1977) (magistrate being paid off by bond-
ing company operator associated with bonding company). See also United States v. Martino,
648 F.2d 367, 394 (5th Cir. 1981) ("The substantive proscriptions of the RICO statute apply
to insiders and outsiders . . . '") (quoting United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 903 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978)), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2006 (1982), cert. granted sub. nom.
Russello v. United States, 51 U.S.L.W. 3497 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983). Indeed, in light of Webster,
Mandel may no longer reflect the law in the Fourth Circuit. In any event, as Mandel was
prosecuted, Security Investment Company was a "prize" under count 21, but it was neither a
"prize," "victim," nor a "perpetrator" under count 23. It was not a "front" either, as the
court correctly noted, or a "tool," as in Scotto, but it was a "conduit" through which the
payoff was made. It was only through the operation of the Security Investment Company, by
a transfer of its shares, that the payoff was made; Security Investment Company was, in short,
the "instrument" through which the objective of the scheme was achieved. Indeed, it is hard
to see how a district court concerned with not "rewarding subtle and sophisticated" offenders
or "frustrating Congress' intent" could have failed to see that the role the company played
was well within the scope of the statute. See United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 613
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("No good reason suggests itself as to why Congress should want to cover
some but not all of [the]. . .forms [of the perversion of legitimate enterprises]; nor is there
any good reason why. . .[a] court should construe the statute to do so."), af'd, 527 F.2d 237
(2nd Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976). But see 591 F.2d at 1376 (Sofsky
distinquished).
The Mandel prosecution also aptly illustrates Mr. Justice Holmes' dictum: "Great cases
like hard cases make bad law. . . . [I]mmediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pres-
sure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well set-
tled principles of law will bend." Northern Sees. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 200-01
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(1904). Mandel was widely publicized. Newspaper coverage of the investigations and prose-
cution was extensive. 415 F. Supp. at 1053, 1069-76 (neither severance nor change of venue
granted because of publicity). The defense counsel publicly expressed dismay that RICO
would be used against political corruption. For example, William G. Hundley, a prominent
Washington defense counsel who represented one of Mandel's co-defendants, stated: "You
know as well as I do that Congress never would have passed. . .[RICO] if they ever thought
they were going to use it against governors and people like that." Marro & Shannon, Are
Prosecutors Going Wild Over RICO, LEGAL TIMES OF WASHINGTON, Oct. 8, 1979, at 32, col. 1.
Ironically, Hundley was a former chief of the organized crime and racketeering section in the
Department of Justice, and had testified in favor of other sections of the Organized Crime
Control Act that dealt with police corruption in the gambling area. Senate Hearings,supra note
28, at 424. The attention focused on the trial, the novel character of the issues, and the high
quality of the advocacy caused the district court to make a number of errors in interpreting
RICO. It is remarkable that more mistakes were not made. Those that were merit close
attention.
In Mandel, the prosecution moved at pre-trial, under § 1963(b), to freeze certain of the
defendant's assets subject to forfeiture under § 1963(a)(2), but the district court refused to
grant the freeze. The court held that freezing defendant's assets would be inconsistent with
the defendant's presumption of innocence, 408 F. Supp. at 683. This judgment leaves, in the
words of one court, "few, if any circumstances in which a restraining order might issue before
trial. .. [and] emasculates. . .[RICO] render[ing] it nearly useless." United States v. Bello,
570 F. Supp. 723, 724 (S.D. Cal. 1979) (restraining order granted) ("The restraining order
does not make a determination that the defendant is a racketeer, but only freezes those assets
to prevent dissipation pending determination of guilt or innocence"). This aspect of Mandel
was wrongly decided. See United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 618, 619 & n.4 (9th Cir.
1982) (Mandel rejected, but order held subject to adversary hearing, including rules of evi-
dence, on probability of guilt and likelihood of forfeiture). But see United States v. Scharf,
551 F.2d 1124, 1126 (8th Cir.) (dictum) (entry of order authorized by indictment), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 824 (1977); United States v. Scalzitti, 408 F. Supp. 1014, 1015 (W.D. Pa. 1975)
(pretrial order like posting of bond), appeal dismissed, 556 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1977). The Spilotro
court was correct in its determination that Mandel was wrongly decided, but Spilotro, too, goes
too far in applying the rules of evidence to'a § 1963(b) hearing. Indeed, persuasive arguments
can be made that the indictment itself ought to be considered a sufficient finding of probable
cause on the question of criminal responsibility and that the property is therefore subject to
seizure. As such, no further judicial review ought to be necessary on these issues. See Gerstein
v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 n.19, 119-25 (1974) (while judicial review of an information is
required to hold defendant before trial, no review is required of indictment by grand jury).
In a proper case a court might want to inspect the grand jury minutes to satisfy itself that the
grand jury's decision was proper. See, e.g., United States v. O'Shea, 447 F. Supp. 330, 331-32
(S.D. Fla. 1978) (inspection and dismissal where indictment not supported by evidence);
Jaffe v. Scheinman, 47 N.Y.2d 188, 417 N.Y.S.2d 241, 390 N.E.2d 1165 (1979) (inspection
under N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRO. § 210.30) (evidence not legally sufficent, must show "reason-
able cause" for court to examine, without adversarial argument, the stenographic transcript
of the grand jury proceedings). The only issue before the court should be the "proper" terms
of the "restraining order" or the performance bond. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) (1976). But see
United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 914-15 (3d Cir. 1981)("full hearing" required). As
§ 1963(b) itself does not set out the procedure required for its implementation, FED. R. CRIM.
P. 57(b) governs ("If no procedure is specifically prescribed by rule, the courts may proceed in
any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules or with any applicable statute."). See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 54(b)(4) (nonapplicability to civil forfeiture implies applicability to crimi-
nal forfeiture). See also United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 246 n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
The applicability of the rules of evidence, in turn, is determined by FED. R. EvID. 1101.
Subsection 1101 (b) makes the Federal Rules of Evidence "generally" applicable "to criminal
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cases and proceedings," but subsection(d)(3) makes them inapplicable to "proceedings with
respect to release on bail or otherwise." See 18 U.S.C. § 3146(t) ("need not conform"). Thus,
the Rules are inapplicable to determinations relating to pretrial liberty. See, e.g., United
States v. Wind, 527 F.2d 672, 675-76 (6th Cir. 1975) (hearing required to deny release, but
reliance on hearsay upheld). See also, United States v. Graewe, 689 F.2d 54, 56-58 (6th Cir.
1982) (pretrial bail denied based on hearsay showing of danger to witnesses in RICO prosecu-
tion); United States v. James, 674 F.2d 886, 891-92 (1 lth Cir. 1982) (pretrial bail raised to $2
million to assure appearance at RICO prosecution). See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S.
359, 364 (1965) ("Neither justice nor the concept of fair trial requires" an abandonment of
the practice of returning indictments on hearsay.). The analogy between pretrial bail for the
person and a pretrial restraining order for property is compelling. Surely, property ought not
receive more protection than person. Section 1963(b) hearings ought to be held, therefore, to
fall within "or otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 1 101(d)(3). Converting a § 1963(b) hearing into a
mini-trial, as Spilotro requires, will cause unnecessary delay and may unwisely afford defend-
ants pretrial criminal discovery that could lead to the fabrication of defenses and the interfer-
ence with the lives and physical safety of witnesses, subverting the policy of limited discovery
of FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(i) (protective order may be granted on showing to court alone). See,
e.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 625 (5th Cir. 1982) (RICO prosecution involving
obstruction of justice and murder of principal government witness). Spilotro relied on United
States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 680 F.2d at 619 n.4. While the court's opinion in Veon is
thoughtful (propriety of orders upheld, hearing required, and burden of persuasion by pre-
ponderance on government for probability of guilt and likelihood of conviction), it misapplies
the rule of lenity in the RICO context. Compare 538 F. Supp. at 244-45 with notes 25 & 150
supra. The court did not consider the applicability of FED. R. EVID. 1101 (d) (3), as the gov-
ernment apparently only argued that a § 1963(b) hearing was a "preliminary examination,"
538 F. Supp. at 249 n.18 ("disingenuous argument"); the court also misread United States v.
Long, 654 F.2d 911, 914-15 (3d Cir. 1981) ("full hearing" required under 21 U.S.C. § 848
(1976), rejecting argument that indictment alone was sufficient). In fact, the court of appeals
in Long approved the receipt of hearsay testimony from the case agent. 654 F.2d at 915
("agent's testimony is enough to sustain the restraining order and the performance bond").
But see 538 F. Supp. at 249 (Long distinguished). The government declined to put on admissi-
ble evidence, filing instead a notice of lis pendens under 28 U.S.C. § 1964 (1976) and CAL.
CODE CIV. P. § 409. The court expunged it, United States v. Veon, 549 F. Supp. 274 (D.C.
Cal. 1982), a decision for which there is little that can be said that is charitable. The "settled
doctrine" is that a forfeiture takes place "immediately upon the commission" of the offense,
and the right to the property then vests in the government, although it is not "perfected"
until a judicial decree so declares. United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1890); Florida
Dealers and Growers Bank v. United States, 279 F.2d 673, 676 (5th Cir. 1960). Accordingly,
the government should have been held to have had an interest in the property subject to
forfeiture from the time of the offense. See Trojanowski, RICO Forfeiture: Tracing andProcedure,
I Materials, supra note 23, at 353 (forfeiture like equitable lein). Determining that due process
considerations argue for a hearing, moreover, does not answer the question of what process is
due. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). That question requires a particularized
analysis. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-35 (1976) (the factors to analyze are the
private interest affected, risk of error, and the government interest protected). Given the
stakes at issue, see note 59 supra, the issues ought to be limited and hearsay ought to suffice,
particularly because the defendant can secure the release of his property, as he can secure his
own release, with the posting of a "satisfactory performance bond." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963(b)(1976). See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 n.27 (1975) (" 'process that is due'
for seizure of person or property in criminal cases"; "relatively simple civil procedures. . . are
inapposite and irrelevant in the wholly different context of the criminal justice system.').
The district court in Mandel, on the other hand, properly rejected Mandel's contention
that RICO only applied to "organized crime." Compare 415 F. Supp. at 1018 ("would simply
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render the statute unenforceable") with notes 112, 113 & 136supra. It also held that the state
of Maryland could not be an "enterprise," compare 415 F. Supp. at 1020 with note 115 supra,
largely on the supposed inapplicability of civil remedies to governmental units. Compare 415
F. Supp. at 102 with note 93 supra. It also wrongly held that the liberal construction clause
only applied to the civil remedies. Compare 415 F. Supp. at 1022 with note 25 supra.
The high pressure atmosphere in which the Mandel prosecution was brought is also un-
derscored by the efforts that were made to fix the jury, which resulted in a mistrial. N.Y.
Times, Dec. 9, 1976, at 1, col. 1. A person, with "direct Mafia" acquaintances and affilia-
tions, contacted defense counsel and offered to "shag" the trial for $15,000. Id He was subse-
quently convicted for obstruction ofjustice. United States v. Neiswender, 590 F.2d 1269 (4th
Cir. 1979). A relative of one of the jurors also offered to prevent the conviction for $10,000.
N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1976, at 1, col. 1. Accordingly, the remarkable aspect of the trial was not
that the district court judge made errors but that he made so few and that it was possible to
secure any verdict after almost two weeks of deliberation. Id.
The State of Maryland did not follow up the criminal prosecution by filing a RICO civil
suit against Mandel or his codefendants under RICO. See note 218 in/ra. Private civil ac-
tions were, however, brought under federal and state securities laws and the common law of
fraud by plaintiffs claiming they were defrauded in the sale of stock in the Marlboro Race
Track. Nevertheless, the district court dismissed the federal action as time-barred; it then
dismissed the pendent state claims under United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 303 U.S. 715, 726
(1966). On the scope of Gibbs, see note 212 in/ja. The district court applied the one-year state
securities fraud statute of limitations to the federal claim and the court of appeals affirmed.
O'Hara v. Kovens, 625 F.2d 15, 17-18 (4th Cir. 1980) (noting "commonality of purpose be-
tween federal right and the state statutory scheme"). Apparently, no thought was given to
bringing a private RICO action, where a three year statute of limitations probably would
have been applicable. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN § 5-101 (1974). See Seaboard
Terminals Corp. v. Standard Oil Co., 104 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1939) (as a matter of Maryland
law, the three year statute applied to a treble damage antitrust suit). See also N.Y. Times,
Jan. 5, 1983, at 8, col. 4 (private non-RICO civil suit against former vice-president Agnew
resulting in $248,735 judgment).
The Mandel jury also returned a special verdict finding that one of Mandel;s codefend-
ants owned stocks subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2)(1976) "through. . .[a]
nominee." 505 F. Supp. at 190. When the government petitioned the court for an order
authorizing the seizure of the property under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b)(1976) "upon such terms
and conditions as the court shall deem proper," the district court issued a show cause order to
"any and all interested parties" why the property should not be forfeited. 505 F. Supp. at
190. The "nominee," who was not a defendant, responded with a claim of actual ownership.
The government answered that the special verdict was "dispositive of the question of owner-
ship and that . . . [the] court had no discretion to deny forfeiture . . . ." Id The district
court observed that it did have discretion in ordering the forfeiture, but did not determine the
issue, since it decided to remand the "nominee" to the Attorney General to seek "remission or
mitigation" under § 1963(c). 505 F. Supp. at 192. Both actions were wrong. Other forfeit-
ures involved in the Mtandd prosecution were upheld in United States v. Hess, 691 F.2d 188
(4th Cir. 1982).
Section 1963 forfeitures are mandatory. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b) ("When a verdict con-
tains a finding of property subject to a criminal forfeiture, the judgment of criminal forfeiture
shall. . . '"). See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c) (2) ("No judgment of forfeiture may be entered...
unless the indictment. . . shall allege the extent of the interest."); FED. R. CRIM. P. 31 (e) ("If
the indictment .. .alleges that an interest ... is subject to criminal forfeiture, a special
verdict shall be returned.'). The forfeiture is not discretionary. Hess, 691 F.2d at 190; United
States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 809-13 (5th Cir.), reh g denied, 615 F.2d 383 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980). But see United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d Cir. 1979)
(discretion permitted to avoid draconian application), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); United
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States v. L'Hoste, 615 F.2d 383, 389 (5th Cir.) (Tate, J. dissenting from petition for rehearing)
(arguing for strict construction), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980). Hess and L'Hoste are well
reasoned and correctly decided. The government was grossly mistaken, however, in its sug-
gestion that the special verdict was dispositive of the nominee's rights, for it could only settle
the scope of the defendant's interest-whatever it was-as the nominee was in fact not a party
to the proceedings. See United States v. Scharf, 551 F.2d 1124, 1127 (8th Cir. 1977) (dismissal
of count "automatically eliminated the possibility . . . [of forfeiture] . . . [of] assets under
§ 1963"); United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 145 (N.D. Ga. 1979) ("To the extent that
[others]. . . are not before the Court, there can be no forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1963, since
there can be no conviction under § 1962."), affdon other grounds, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1982).
Forfeiture under § 1963 depends upon an in personam criminal judgment. Due process pre-
cludes binding one who is not a party. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395
U.S. 100, 110 (1969) ("It is elementary that one is not bound by a judgment in personam
resulting from litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been
made a party by service of process."). But see 609 F.2d at 812 (wife may lose marital interest).
Section 1963 does not involve an in rem forfeiture that may, consistent with due process, bind
innocent parties. See generally Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 684
(1974); Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Law-Banished at Last, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 768
(1977). But see United States v. Ore Tintoretto Painting, 691 F.2d 603, 605-08 (2d Cir. 1982)
(in rem forfeiture only on negligence). Accordingly, there was nothing for the Attorney Gen-
eral to remit or mitigate. The nominee's interest, if any, had not been affected by the crimi-
nal proceeding. But see ABA, supra note 25, at 18 (criminal court issues forfeiture against
third parties' property). The court's decision is supportable, if at all, only to the extent that it
can be read to require a third party claimant to exhaust administrative remedies before seek-
ingjudicial relief. Seegeneraly 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 20.02-10 (1958) (exhaus-
tion sometimes required, but sometimes not). But if the claimant does not receive
satisfaction, nothing should stand in the way of his filing a civil action to seek relief from
possible adverse action by the Attorney General, who is mandated to act under § 1963(c) with
"due provision for the rights of innocent persons." See 28 U.S.C. § 2409(a); U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION, CRIMINAL FORFEITURES UNDER RICO AND THE CONTINU-
ING CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE STATUTE 34-35 (1980).
On December 3, 1981, on the advice of the Department of Justice, the President com-
muted Mandel's sentence; he had served seventeen months of a three year term. N. Y. Times,
Dec. 4, 1981, at 18, col. 4. As is the situation with powerful unions, political figures, too, have
friends in high places. See note 170 supra. On October 28, 1982, the Maryland Court of
Appeals disbarred Mandel. N. Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1982, at 7, col. 6.
177 For example, in United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 989 (5th Cir. 1977), vacatedand
remanded, 439 U.S. 810 (1978), reinstated in relevantpart, 591 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 864 (1979), Bernard G. Rubin was convicted of a § 1962(c) violation. Rubin was a
Special International Representative of the Laborer's International Union; he also held of-
fices in a district council, various locals, and benefit funds. Rubin was convicted of operating
the various unions and benefit funds "through" a pattern of racketeering activity, which con-
sisted of embezzlement. Rubin argued on appeal that the district court's instructions on
"through" were inadequate because they did not require the government to prove that the
embezzlement "furthered" his ability to participate in or conduct the affairs of the locals or
funds. The court of appeals upheld the instructions, observing that it was only necessary that
there be a "substantial nexus" between the defendant's conduct and the enterprise's affairs.
559 F.2d at 990.
As Rubin was prosecuted, it is possible to term the union and welfare funds neither
"prizes," "instruments" nor "perpetrators." They were, in short, "victims." No other concept
more clearly describes the role they played in Rubin's pattern of racketeering activity, and it
is difficult to imagine a clearer illustration of the victim concept. For similar examples, see
United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194, 200 (3d Cir. 1982) ("The fact that the union was
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harmed rather than benefited does not remove the conduct from RICO's ambit."); United
States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 617 (2d Cir. 1982) (embezzlement of union funds); United
States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1123 n.4 (2d Cir. 1980) (operation of theatre by pattern of
bankruptcy fraud).
The court of appeals in Rubin also affirmed an order under § 1963(a)(2) forfeiting
Rubin's present union and benefit fund offices, but it struck down the forfeiture insofar as it
applied to the right to hold office in the future, noting that that was left under § 1964 to
"equitable discretion." 559 F.2d at 993. Without mentioning the liberal construction clause,
the court applied the rule of lenity to § 1963, see notes 25 & 150 supra, a result that has misled
district courts, United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 142 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (liberal con-
struction to be ignored in construction of forfeiture, held not to include illicit proceeds), afd
on ot rgrounds, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1982), but has not led ultimately to the establishment
of bad law, see United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952, 955 nn.17 & 15 (5th Cir. 1982) (Thevis
rejected and illicit proceeds held subject to forfeiture) cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2006 (1982), cert.
grantedsub nom. Russello v. United States, 51 U.S.L.W. 3497 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983). Plainly, the
Rubin court was wrong. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904,
84 Stat. 947 (1970); notes 25 and 150 supra.
The court of appeals in Rubin also noted that nothing in its opinion reflected a "finding
or sense of any kind that. .. [Rubin] is or has been affiliated with what might be labeled
organized crime." 559 F.2d at 991. In fact, the Laborer's Union is thought by the Justice
Department to be "a tool of the crime syndicate." U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 8, 1980,
at 35. See note 170 supra. The International president, Angelo Fosco, who took over when his
father, Peter, died in 1975, is thought to take "his orders" from Joseph Aiuppa, the current
organized crime family head in Chicago, Illinois. U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Sept. 8, 1980,
at 35. Peter, in turn, had been an associate of Paul Ricca, a former Chicago crime family
head. Id. Rubin himself was subsequently tried along with Fosco and Anthony Accardo, a
former crime family head, now senior "statesman" in Chicago, for skimming an alleged two
million dollars from the Union's health and welfare funds. Chicago Sun-Times, June 19,
1982, at 14, col. 1. Rubin was convicted, while Fosco and Accardo were acquitted. Id A
grand jury is now probing allegations that the jury was fixed. Miami Herald, Aug. 13, 1982,
at C2, col. 3.
In 1979, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, as a culmination of a
year's investigation, held three weeks of hearings on labor union insurance activities. LABOR
UNION INSURANCE AcTIvITEs OF JOSEPH HAUSER AND His ASSOCIATES, S. REP. No. 426,
96th Cong., Ist Sess. 58 (1979) [hereinafter cited as INSURANCE]. The Subcommittee focused
on the activities of Joseph Hauser. Of some $39 million in union insurance premiums ob-
tained by Hauser-connected companies, $11 million were illegally diverted. Id at 2. The
Teamsters' Central States Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare Fund (Team-
sters Fund), for example, lost $7 million. The Teamsters'Fund is a sister fund to the Central
States Southeast and Southwestern Areas Pension Fund (Teamsters Pension Fund). Id at
119. In addition, the Laborer's Union in Florida lost $1 million. Id "[Ilndividual policy
holders suffered significant financial losses and great hardship when their insurance compa-
nies failed in the wake of Hauser's scheme." Id Ultimately, Hauser was convicted of bribery
in connection with payoffs made to trustees of California union benefit plans. Id Despite the
investigation that led to his conviction, Hauser gained control of Farmers National Life Insur-
ance Company (Farmers) in Florida and Family Provides Life Insurance Company (Family)
in Arizona, neither of which, however, were licensed to do business nationwide. Conse-
quently, Hauser entered into a reinsurance arrangement (called "fronting") with Old Secur-
ity Life Insurance Company of Missouri (Security). Id at 54. Eventually, the companies
went into receivership after the collapse of Hauser's schemes which centered in Florida, Indi-
ana, Massachusetts, and Arizona. Hauser's acquisition of Farmers was approved by Thomas
D. O'Malley, then the Florida State Insurance Commissioner, despite a recommendation that
called into question Hauser's "integrity, competency and experience." Id at 64. O'Malley
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was eventually impeached by the Florida House of Representatives, but he resigned before he
was tried by the Florida Senate. Id at 64 n.8. He was also convicted of mail fraud. Id Once
Hauser gained control of Farmers, he corruptly used Seymour A. Gopman, an attorney, to
gain illicit influence with Rubin. Gopman later pleaded guilty to embezzlement, kickbacks,
and tax evasion in connection with the operation of the union benefit plans. Id at 5 n.8.
In a scheme unrelated to Hauser, Rubin was convicted of the embezzlement of $400,000
from union and benefit funds. Id at 6. Immediately after Rubin's indictment in 1975 for
embezzlement, the government sought to place the union and benefit funds under trusteeship
under § 1963(b). When the Labor Department declined to assist, raising questions of "statu-
tory authority" and "lack of manpower," the effort was abandoned. Id The Laborer's
Union itself took no action. Rubin was convicted in October, 1975. Sentence was stayed
pending appeal. In a bond revocation hearing in October, 1977, the government established
that Rubin had embezzled an additional $2 million after his conviction. It was only then that
the International imposed a trusteeship on the Rubin-connected local and benefit funds. Id
at 6.
Hauser's most ambitious scheme, however, centered around the Teamsters Welfare
Fund, which then provided $216 billion of in force insurance for 180,000 teamsters and had
$23 million in annual premiums. Id at 16. Despite bids from major insurance companies,
including Prudential Life Insurance of America, Hauser succeeded in having the insurance
contract awarded to Security, which was acting as a front for Family. A key factor in the
award was Hauser's agreement to permit the Amalgamated Insurance Agency of Illinois
(Amalgamated) to process claims. Id at 117. Amalgamated was operated by Allen Dorfman,
whose stepfather, Paul Dorfman, took over the Waste Handlers Local Union in Chicago in
1939 after its founder and president was murdered. R. KENNEDY, THE ENEMY WITHIN 87
(Popular Lib. ed. 1960). James Hoffa gained the presidency of the Teamsters in 1957 though
an alliance with Paul Dorfman, who, in turn, was closely connected to Anthony Accardo,
then the crime family head in Chicago. Id Dorfman's reward was the insurance business of
the Teamster Welfare Fund, which was then given to Allen. Allen Dorfman was found not
guilty in 1964 in Hoffa's jury tampering prosecution; he was also found not guilty in 1974 of
embezzlement and mail fraud in connection with a Benefit Fund loan of $1 million, when a
key witness was shotgunned to death in front of his wife and two-year-old son before testify-
ing. S. BRILL, THE TEAMSTERS 208, 222-32 (Pocket ed. 1979). Among Dorfman's co-defend-
ants was Anthony Spilotro, described by the Illinois Crime Investigating Commission as "one
of the most dangerous gang terrorists in the Chicago area." Id. at 220. Dorfman was, how-
ever, found guilty in 1972 for conspiracy to take a $55,000 kickback for arranging a $1.5
million Teamsters Pension Fund loan. United States v. Dorfman, 335 F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y.
1971), aft'd, 470 F.2d 2166 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. dirmissed, 411 U.S. 923 (1973). Dorfman was
released from prison after serving eight and one-half months of a one year sentence. INSUR-
ANCE, supra, at 26 n.36. No effort was made by Frank Fitzsimmons, the Teamsters' president
and a trustee of the Teamster Welfare Fund, or the Fund itself, to remove Amalgamated from
its role with the fund. Fitzsimmons said, "[ilt is like a horse that will bite one person but
won't bite another .. " Id The Committee, however, concluded: "The influence of Dorf-
man over the Teamsters [Welfare] . . . Fund at the time of the insurance award to . . .
Security appears to have been as pervasive as it was 20 years ago when his activities were first
exposed [by Senate investigations under the leadership of Robert F. Kennedy]." Id Shortly
after the award to Security, Hauser's operation collapsed, resulting in a loss of $7 million to
the Teamsters' Welfare Fund.
A number of civil suits have been filed since Hauser's companies went into receivership,
including actions brought by the Department of Labor, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, the Teamsters Welfare Fund, and Fund beneficiaries. Id at 161-63. See also, e.g.,
Thornton v. Evans, 692 F.2d 1064, 1065 (7th Cir. 1982) (beneficiary suit) ("Evidence. . . of
• . . fraud traces a pattern . . . distressingly prevalent today . . . ."). The Commission
sought injunctive relief to bar Hauser from holding a position with any other public company
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for a period of ten years. A consent judgment was entered in December, 1976. INSURANCE,
supra, at 162 n.47. The Department of Labor acted under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1914 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 el. seq. No RICO civil suits growing out of
Hauser's scheme, however, have been reported. Nothing in ERISA would have prevented
such actions. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) ("nothing [in ERISA] shall be construed to. . .supersede
any law of the United States"). As with the waterfront prosecutions, the Hauser matter aptly
illustrates the futility of a less than comprehensive legal strategy in dealing with corruption;
the only redeeming feature of the saga is that in the Rubin aspect of the story at least the
Department of Justice tried. Nothing as charitable can be said about the role of the other
participants and the other aspects of the matter.
The Committee concluded its investigation with a finding that the "present state insur-
ance regulatory network does not provide adequate protection to employee benefit plans."
INSURANCE, supra, at 29. The Committee described the "relative ease with which diversions
of assets of business entities and payments for influence can be disguised" and "the difficulty
. ..of recovering funds. . . improperly diverted." Id. at 40.
For a comprehensive review of the government's efforts to investigate the Teamsters Pen-
sion Fund since 1955, concentrating on the period after 1975, see OVERSIGHT INQUIRY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S INVESTIGATION OF THE TEAMSTERS CENTRAL SYSTEM PEN-
SION FUND, S. REP. No. 177, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as OVERSIGHT
INQUIRY]. The report notes, "Substantial portions of [the Fund's] resources have been used to
finance high risk real estate ventures. Many of its loans were made to reputed organized
criminals. The fund has earned the reputation for being a lending institution for unsavory
borrowers and questionable projects." Id at 159. One private source has estimated that $600
million of the Fund's $1.2 billion in loans since 1957 have been to those who are "organized
crime" connected. S. BRILL, THE TEAMSTERS 255 (Pocket ed. 1978). Undercharged interest
has cost the Fund $100 million; bad loans have cost the Fund $285 million. Id at 262-63. As
part of the investigation that led to its report, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Inves-
tigations examined the relationship between Roy Lee Williams, the successor of Frank Fitz-
simmons, and Nicholas Civella, the head of the organized crime family in Kansas City,
Missouri. OVERSIGHT INQUIRY, supra, at 174-75. Civella's record in the courts is long and
impressive. United States v. Civella, 648 F.2d 1167 (8th Cir. 1981) (bribery of public official
uncovered in course of RICO bug of automobile and restaurant table); United States v.
Civella, 533 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1976) (large scale illegal bookmaking) (a principal govern-
ment witness in this prosecution was murdered); United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d
Cir. 1960). Evidence introduced before the Committee indicated that Williams was the bene-
ficiary of $1,500 a month of "skim," money taken unlawfully from a Las Vegas casino.
OVERSIGHT INQUIRY, supra, at 174 n.2. Williams and Dorfman were recently convicted in
Chicago, Illinois, for conspiracy to bribe a United States Senator and for wire fraud. New
York Times, Dec. 16, 1982, at 1, col. 1. See United States v. Dorfman, 532 F. Supp. 1118
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (detailed description of charges upheld on face of indictment),supplenentedby,
542 F. Supp. 345 (N.D. 11. 1982) (motion to suppress 14 months of electronic surveillance
denied), supplemented by, 542 F. Supp. 402 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (motion to permit Thorman P.
Sullivan, former United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, to represent
Dorfman denied under 18 U.S.C. § 207(b) (1976) as a conflict of interest and MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 ("appearance of impropriety')), supplemented by,
550 F. Supp. 877 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (motion by media to inspect exhibits granted in part). One
of their co-defendants, Joseph Lombardo, has been identified as "a major figure in Chicago-
area organized crime." New York Times, Apr. 4, 1982, at 19, col. 3. See also United States v.
Dorfman, 690 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1982) (appeal of denial of motion to suppress); id. at 1230
(appeal of order granting inspection). Dorfman was the victim of a gangland slaying on
January 20, 1983. New York Times, Jan. 21, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
178 For example, in United States v. Marubeni America Corp., 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir.
1980), Marubeni America Corporation and Hitachi Cable Ltd., as well as a corporate officer
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of each, were charged under § 1962(c) with operating the affairs of an enterprise "through" a
pattern of racketeering activity, which consisted of mail fraud, wire fraud, and interstate
bribery. The indictment alleged that Marubeni's local representative paid bribes to Richard
McBride, an employee of Anchorage Telephone Utility, an instrumentality of the Municipal-
ity of Anchorage, Alaska, to obtain confidential bidding information that was used to secure
$8.8 million in telephone cable contracts. See United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591 (9th
Cir. 1982) (conviction of representative upheld). In addition, the government sought forfei-
ture under § 1963(a)(1) of "any and all sums or amounts paid or payable" to either corpora-
tion as a result of contracts procured through the § 1962(c) violation. When the district court
dismissed the forfeiture count on the ground that forfeitures under § 1963(a)(1) were limited
to interests "in an enterprise" and did not include proceeds acquired by a pattern of racke-
teering, the government appealed, arguing that "Congress was not so short-sighted as to at-
tempt to stop criminal infiltration into legitimate institutions by attacking only the actual
infiltration." 611 F.2d at 766. "Congress must," it suggested, "have sought to attack the
potential for infiltration by depriving criminals of the ill-gotten gains." Id. The court of
appeals conceded that the "government's position [was]. . . attractive," but after an analysis
of the statute's text and legislative history, it upheld the district court. Id. But see United
States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1979) (denied the source of income to use to invest
in legitimate business), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980). Rone is not mentioned in the court's
opinion, yet the force of its reasoning should have been compelling, and it is difficult to justify
its omission. On remand, after a five week trial, Marubeni and one of its supervisors were
convicted on all counts; Hitachi had plead guilty to the predicate offenses before trial. Na-
tional Law Journal, Nov. 24, 1980, at 1, col. 1. The evidence introduced showed that they
had paid more than $330,000 in bribes. Id The government also alleged that Marubeni and
Hitachi were among the "persons" charged and the "enterprise" itself. Id.
Although "through" was not a matter of contention in the Marubeni prosecution, it is
possible to term the two corporations "perpetrators." Under the theory of the prosecution,
neither corporation was a "prize," "victim," or an "instrument" of the other. Each was in
fact the "perpetrator" of a pattern of racketeering, which was undertaken to "advance" its
affairs. To be sure, each acted only through its agents and employees, but the agents and
employees were not acting on their own; their conduct, unlike in Scotto, was "authorized" and
"approved." See note 151 supra. The corporations themselves were, in short, "corrupt." For
similar examples, see United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 990-91 (11 th Cir. 1982) (opera-
tion of shrimp business by pattern of mail fraud and interstate transportation of money ob-
tained by fraud); United States v. Computer Sciences Inc., 689 F.2d 1181, 1189-91 (4th Cir.
1982) (operation of unincorporated subdivision by a pattern of mail, wire fraud, and bribery);
United States v. Starnes, 644 F.2d 673, 675, 679-80 (7th Cir.) (operation of business by pat-
tern of arson and mail fraud), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981); United States v. Zemek, 634
F.2d 1159, 1167 (9th Cir. 1980) (tavern business operated through a pattern of arson, bribery,
mail fraud, extortion, and obstruction of communications to a criminal investigator), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 985 (1981); United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1030-31, 1037-39 (4th
Cir.) (operation of construction company by a pattern of extortion and mail fraud; forfeiture
under § 1963(a)(2) ordered), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830 (1980); United States v. L'Hoste, 609
F.2d 796, 800-01 (5th Cir.) (operation of construction company by pattern of bribery and
mail fraud; forfeiture under § 1963(a)(2) ordered), reh'g denied, 615 F.2d 383 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 393-94 (2d Cir. 1979)
(operation of group of corporations by pattern of fraud and theft; forfeiture under
§ 1963(a)(2) ordered), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980).
Where the enterprise is an illicit association in fact, no problem with "through" is
presented; the association will inevitably play the role of "perpetrator." See, e.g., United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 579 (1980) (drugs, arson, mail fraud, and bribery conglomer-
ate); United States v. Errico, 635 F.2d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 1980) (network ofjockeys and betters
[December 1982]
RICO CIVIL ACTIONS
Where an enterprise is a "prize" or "victim," no salutory remedial
purpose would be served by attributing the conduct of an individual
involved in the pattern of racketeering activity to the individual or
entity playing the role of the enterprise, whether for civil liability or
criminal responsibility. Indeed, doing so would undermine the pur-
pose of the Act. 179 On the other hand, the remedial purpose of the
statute would be enhanced by such an attribution where the individ-
ual or entity was playing the role of "perpetrator." Vicarious and
entity civil liability and criminal responsibility are well-established
principles in federal jurisprudence; they should also serve well in im-
plementing RICO's broad remedial purposes. 80
A more difficult issue, however, is presented by the role of "in-
strument." The enterprise is used in the unlawful conduct, but it is
not its author in the same sense as it is when the enterprise is the
"perpetrator." Nonetheless, it is not wholly innocent, as when it
plays the role of purely a "prize" or "victim." The crucial issue
comes down to determining the general impact of vicarious or entity
fixing races), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 911 (1981); United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985,989,
992-93 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980) (labor kickbacks scenario); United States v.
Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523, 525 n.l (4th Cir. 1980) (prostitution ring run by bribery); United
States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 304-05 (7th Cir. 1979) (professional robbery and burglary
ring), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 568-69 (9th Cir.
1979) (extortion scheme), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d
880, 896-98 (5th Cir.) (arson, theft, murder, and drug conglomerate), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953
(1978).
Following the Marubeni conviction, the Municipality of Anchorage filed a civil suit under
RICO. The municipality moved for summary judgment relying on the prior RICO convic-
tion. Recovery could include treble damages for the amount of the bribes and rescission of
the contracts without quantum meruit accounting. The decision is pending. Municipality of
Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 644-45 (D.C. Alaska 1982). See note 218
infta .
179 Judge Shaudur in Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, 548 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
grasped the correct principle, even if he incorrectly applied it. In Pames two brokers, acting
within the scope of their apparent authority, were alleged to have defrauded the plaintiff.
Suit was brought against their agency for treble damages. Terming the agency a "victim,"
Judge Shaudur expressed an "intuitive unease" at imposing civil liability under RICO.
"That sort of respondeat superior application, perhaps permissible to establish ordinary civil
liability, would be bizarre indeed as a means to warp the facts alleged in this case into the
RICO mold. Under that theory, malefactors at a low corporate level could thrust treble
damage liability on a wholly unwitting corporate management and shareholders." Id at 24
n.9. Apparently, Judge Shaudur was unaware that well-established federal jurisprudence im-
poses criminal and civil responsibility under precisely that theory. See note 151 supra. His
arguments were in fact rejected in the criminal context by the Supreme Court in 1909. New
York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909). If they do not
preclude the imposition of criminal responsibility, it is difficult to see how they ought to
preclude civil liability. In addition, the facts alleged make the agency not a "victim," but a
"perpetrator," which hardly casts the agency in a sympathetic role.
180 See note 151 supra.
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liability in controlling the unlawful conduct. Should the risks of loss
be shifted for civil liability? Would a broadening of the onus of crim-
inal responsibility tend to alter the conduct of other individuals or
those who are in charge of the entity, so that the unlawful conduct
itself would be curtailed? On balance, the remedial purposes of
RICO tip the judgment toward finding civil liability, but not crimi-
nal responsibility for the enterprise when its role is purely that of
"instrument."'' Indeed, once it is recognized that substantial policy
181 It is the classic question where should the line be drawn, to which the classic answer of
Lord Nottingham in the Duke of Norfolks case, 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 960 [Ch. 1682] is appropri-
ate: "I will stop wherever any visible inconvenience doth appear." See generally R. POSNER,
ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 120-59 (2d ed. 1977). The various considerations are percep-
tively analyzed in Calabresi, Some Thoughts On Risk Distribution And The Law of Torts, 70 YALE
L. J. 499 (1961). For some purposes, civil liability and criminal responsibility may be treated
similarly, at least where only monetary sanctions are to be imposed, because "damages...
paid to the plaintdf [are], from an economic standpoint, a detail." R. POSNER, supra, at 143
(emphasis added). Nevertheless, criminal sanctions carry a condemnation, whose effective-
ness is cheapened if it is not generally related to fault. See J. FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERV-
ING 111-13 (1970). Accordingly, substantial policy reasons exist to distinguish the scope of the
liability of an enterprise for civil sanctions and the responsibility of an enterprise for criminal
penalties, even though the imposition of each sanction represents a form of strict liability.
Two recent decisions of the courts of appeals in the context of criminal prosecutions also
faced the "enterprise as person" question. United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961 (1 lth Cir.
1982); United States v. Computer Sciences, 689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982). Hartley is a
thoughtful, well-reasoned opinion, while the reasoning of Computer Sciences is fatally flawed.
In Hartley, Treasure Isle Inc., its vice president, and its plant manager were convicted for
conspiring to defraud the United States and for operating Treasure Isle Inc. as an enterprise
by a pattern of racketeering, including mail fraud and the interstate transportation of money
obtained by fraud in connection with a scheme of supplying breaded shrimp to the govern-
ment that did not conform to military specifications. On appeal, the defendants contended
that there was insufficient evidence to link the military inspectors to the scheme. As such, the
conspiracy charge should fail, because a corporation cannot conspire with its officers and
employees, since they form a single entity. The Eleventh Circuit found, however, that there
was sufficient evidence to tie the inspectors to the scheme. The court also indicated that it
would have upheld the convictions anyway. The court rejected the single entity fiction, up-
held the no-intra-corporate conspiracy rule, and recognized that the purpose of the single
entity fiction was "to expand. . . corporate responsibility." 678 F.2d at 970. The court then
declined to permit the fiction "to limit corporate responsibility" by "allowing a corporation or
its agents to hide behind the identity of the other." Id. The court then rejected antitrust
precedent as "a peculiar form of legal action." Id at 971.
The defendants in Hartley also argued that Treasure Isle Inc. could not be named as both
defendant and enterprise. In light of the liberal construction clause, and in the absence of
"any prohibition" of "assuming a dual role," the court held that a "corporation may be
simultaneously both a defendant and the enterprise under RICO." Id at 988. The defend-
ants argued that such a holding would read the enterprise element out of the statute; the
court noted that proof would still be required of the corporation's separate identity. Id The
defendants then argued that the rule would be "particularly grievous" in view of the doctrine
of corporate liability for the acts of its agents and employees; the court responded that that
was "simply a reality to be faced by corporate entities." Id at 988-89 n.43. "With the advan-
tages of incorporation must come the appendant responsibilities." Id The court also agreed
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justifications in certain cases support treating the "enterprise" as a
"person" and that the result, in any event, may be achieved by artful
pleading (as the Bennett court noted), requiring the plaintiff to plead
a "person" separate from the "enterprise" can be seen to be artificial.
Accordingly, the court of appeals wrongly decided in Bennett that a
single RICO count may not treat an "enterprise" as both an "enter-
prise" and a "person."
C. The Question of an "Enterprise" Separate From the Charged "Pattern
of Racketeering Activity"
The defendants in Bennett contended that the complaint failed
to allege .the existence of an "enterprise" distinct from the alleged
pattern df "racketeering activity." The district court agreed, noting
that the complaint portrayed the enterprise, the John Knox Village,
as "pervasively fraudulent."18 2 The court of appeals disagreed, find-
ing that the Village had an existence separate from the fraud alleged,
since it provided "numerous legitimate services"; 183 it was, moreover,
an incorporated body under Missouri law.
The defendant's objection here did little more than echo the
with the government that a contrary rule would not have made sense, as it could have been
circumvented by pleading an association-in-fact enterprise. Finally, the court saw no reason
why the corporate veil could not have been pierced for some, but not all, of the roles Treasure
Isle played in the scheme. Id at 989.
In Computer Sciences, individuals and Computer Sciences Inc. were indicted for operating
"In Fonet," an unincorporated division of the corporation, as an enterprise by a pattern of
racketeering, including mail and wire fraud and bribery in connection with a scheme to de-
fraud the government by false claims. 689 F.2d at 1182, 1184. The district court dismissed
the indictment on a variety of grounds, and the government appealed. The Fourth Circuit
began its analysis by expressing doubt that Congress intended RICO to extend to false claims
against the government. The court also noted that the "defendants. .. [did] not immedi-
ately appear to fit a category against whom the act was generally considered to be directed."
Id at 1189. The court did not resolve its doubts, however, as it did not have a full record
before it. Nevertheless, the court held that "enterprise was meant to refer to a being different
from, not the same as or part of, the person whose behavior the act was designed to prohibit,
and, failing that, to punish." Id at 1190. The court observed, "we would not take seriously,
in the absence, at least, of very explicit statutory language, an assertion that a defendant
could conspire with his right arm." The court also rested its judgment on the principle that
"lenity applies even in RICO cases." Id at 1190-91. The Computer Sciences opinion does not
withstand close analysis. First, it ignores the liberal construction and no supersession clauses.
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904, 84 Stat. 947 (1970). See
note 25 supra. See notes 40 and 41 supra. Second, it lets a fiction dictate a result without a
consideration of the policy behind the fiction. Finally, it proceeds on the false assumption
that RICO was designed to deal with "a certain category of defendants" rather than anyone
who commits designated offenses in a specified fashion. See notes 40 and 41 supra. Accord-
ingly, Computer Sciences was wrongly decided, and other courts should not follow it.
182 685 F.2d at 1060.
183 Id.
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now discredited analysis of Sutton, Anderson, and Turkette. 184 At least
where legitimate entities are involved, little difficulty exists in dis-
cerning and establishing the elements of "enterprise" and "pattern."
The objection therefore represented little more than a shotgun ap-
proach that sought to raise all conceivable errors.185 Appropriately,
it was rejected.
D. The Question of "Pattern"
The defendant next contended that the complaint had failed to
allege a "pattern of racketeering activity." In addition, they objected
under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the speci-
ficity of the allegations of fraud. The court of appeals rejected the
first contention out of hand, but it found "some merit" in the second
objection.1 86 The court was troubled that matters relating to time,
place, and content had been alleged as to only some of the represen-
tations and particularized as to only some of the defendants. Never-
theless, while the court struck the offending allegations, the action
was taken without prejudice to make proper amendment on remand.
Rule 9(b) requires all averments of fraud or mistake to state the
circumstances with particularlity.18 7 The rule is rooted in a conced-
edly valid desire to protect defendants from lightly made claims,
often advanced only for their settlement value as part of "strike"
184 See note 165 supra; Basic Concepts, supra note 3, at 1025 n. 91.
185 See United States v. Computer Sciences, 689 F.2d 1181, 1183 (4th Cir. 1982) ("Re-
sourceful lawyers representing criminal defendants often desire to be thorough and to over-
look nothing in their commendable zeal to afford first-class representation. Consequently in
many cases they tend to excess as they inundate us with a plethora of arguments, some good
and some not so good. Sometimes one wonders whether such lack of selectivity is not counter-
productive, for a party raising a point of little merit exposes himself to the risk of excessive
discount for a better point because of the company it keeps") United States v. Hart, 693 F.2d
286, 287 n. 1 (3d Cir. 1982) (inordinate number of meritless objections makes finding a bona
fide issue like finding a needle in a haystack). The court of appeals reserved judgment on the
question whether a "not-for-profit" corporation or a single individual could be an enterprise
for purposes of RICO. 685 F.2d at 1061. This reservation, too, was an echo of the Eight
Circuit's effort in United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 912 (1981) to give the enterprise concept a special definition: "a discrete economic
association existing separately from the racketeering activity." In light of United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981), the effort need not have been made. No reason existed to
limit the concept to "economic" associations. See note 168 supra.
186 685 F.2d at 1062.
187 FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) states:
Fraud, Mistake, Condition of the Mind. In all averments of fraud or mistake,
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.




suits.18 8 Nevertheless, the rule does not abrogate Rule 8,189 and the
two must be harmonized. 90 Ultimately, Rule 9(b)'s aim is to pro-
vide "adequate notice of plaintiff's claim of fraud."19' Circumstances
usually include such matters as the time, place, and content of false
representations, the identity of the speaker, and what was lost.192 In
the context of the general jurisprudence of Rule 9, the court of ap-
peals' decision was, therefore, wholly proper. 19
3
E. The Question of "Investment, " "Acquisition," or "Conduct"
The defendants also argued that the plaintiffs had failed to al-
lege that they had "invested" racketeering proceeds in an enterprise,
188 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1296, at 299
(1969). See McGinty v. Beranger Volkswagen Inc., 633 F.2d 226, 229 n.2 (Ist Cir. 1980)
("designed to protect defendants whose reputation could be harmed by lightly made charges
of wrongdoing involving moral turpitude, to minimize 'strike suits' and to discourage the
filing of suits in the hope of turning up relevant information"). For a discussion of the general
problem in the context of Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979), see note 199 infia.
189 FED. R. CIv. P. 8 states:
(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an
original claim, counterclaim, crossclaim or third party claim, shall contain (1) a
short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction de-
pends, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds
ofjurisdiction to support it, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for relief to
which he deems himself entitled.. Relief in the alternative or of several different
types may be demanded.
190 633 F.2d at 228-29.
191 Id See Credit & Fin. Corp. Ltd. v. Warner & Swasey Co., 638 F.2d 563, 567 (2d Cir.
1981). Rule 9 merely lists those actions "in which slightly more is needed for notice." Tomera
v. Gait, 511 F.2d 504,508 (7th Cir. 1975). Where "the issues are complex. . . or the transac-
tions. . cover a long period of time" the court allows greater leniency in not pleading detail.
2 J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 9.03, at 9-28 (2d. ed. 1982). Leave
to amend, where particularity is not met, is "almost always" granted. Id at 9-34. See, e.g.,
Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. O'Hearn, 523 F. Supp. 244, 248-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (leave granted in
RICO suit). See note 176 supra for a detailed discussion of Hellenic Lines. But dismissal is
proper where, even though leave is granted, the amended complaint does not meet the test of
the rule. Englund v. Mathews, No. 81-3017 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (RICO fraud complaint dis-
missed for failure to replead with specificity).
192 2AJ. MOORE &J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 190, § 9.03, at 9-
24.
193 Rule 9(a) may be "relaxed somewhat as to matters peculiarly within the adverse
party's knowledge." Id at 9-26; Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 379 (2d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975). Compliance with the Rule, in short, is a question
of "variables." 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1298
(1969). The issue boils down to "notice." Id at 415. "Accordingly, challenges [under Rule 9]
should be limited to instances in which there is a clear justification for imposing a higher
pleading burden than is set forth in Rule 8(a)." Id That plus a "liberal amendment policy"
will "guarantee that there are a minimal number of purely technical pleading attacks under
Rule 9(b)." Id.
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"acquired an interest in" an enterprise through a pattern of racke-
teering activity, or "associated with" an enterprise in the conduct of
its affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. The court of
appeals treated only the allegation of "association with," noting that
it was the plaintiffs "strongest claim."1 94 The court had no diffi-
culty, however, in finding that the "multiple incidents" of mail and
wire fraud and the "numerous allegations of particular false state-
ments"1 95 constituted conduct falling within the proscription of Sec-
tion 1962(c).1
96
Here, too, the defendant's challenge to the language of the com-
plaint was little more than another effort to touch all bases in re-
sisting the plaintiffs suit. It was clearly without merit, and it
deserved the cursory treatment it received.
F. The Question of Cognizable Inquigr
The defendants also contended that the plaintiffs "failed to al-
lege the kind of injury which supports standing to bring a civil RICO
suit.' 9 7 The plaintiffs had alleged several forms of monetary loss,
including depreciated entrance endowment payments and higher
monthly service charges. Defendants responded by arguing that such
injury was not "injury to property" within section 1964(c), 98 which
194 685 F.2d at 1060 n.8.
195 Id at 1062.
196 Id. at 1060 n. 8.
197 Id at 1058.
198 For the text of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), see note 14 supra. For the defendants to win, the
court of appeals had to be willing to redraft § 1964(c) to read:
[Only] a person [competi'ive'y] injured in his business or [commercial] property...
may sue therefore ....
The italized words do not appear in § 1964(c) as Congress drafted it. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
The court of appeals properly declined the invitation to undertake the requested legislative
reform, noting: "[I]t is beyond our authority to restrict the reach of the statute." 685 F.2d at
1064. Apparently, some district courts felt they had broader authority than courts of appeals.
See text accompanying notes 130 & 134-35 supra.
Congress was concerned about "competitive" and "commercial" injuries. The defend-
ant's contention, therefore, was a deceptive half-truth, false only in what it omitted, like a
number of other arguments that have been advanced under RICO. See Basic Concepts, supra
note 3, at 1035 n. 117. Congress was concerned about competition. See, e.g., Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 923 (1970) ("competing organizations"
harmed and "free competition" interfered with by "organized crime"). But its concern was
not limited only to competitive injuries. Id. ("Corruption" was used "to infiltrate. . . legiti-
mate business and . . . to subvert . . . our [Nation's] democratic processes," the effects of
which "undermine[d] the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens." "Fraud" was used
to "harm innocent investors." "[L]abor unions" were "corrupt[ed].") Accordingly, limiting
RICO to "competitive" or "commercial" injury would hardly have implemented either the
text or the purpose of RICO.
[December 1982]
RICO CIVIL ACTIONS
was, they suggested, limited to injury to "competitive or commercial
interests." 199
The court of appeals termed the argument "troublesome," 200
and it noted that it had found favor with "some courts." 20 ' Never-
199 685 F.2d at 1058. This argument was not unknown to the Eighth Circuit. In Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., 579 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 330 (1979), defendants, in an
action under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) on which RICO was modeled,
argued that consumers of price-fixed hearing aids had not suffered a "commercial" injury.
Accordingly, they were not entitled to treble damage relief. The Reiter court first looked to
the legislative history of the Sherman Act and concluded that it "was designed to prevent
restraints of trade significantly affecting business competition." 579 F.2d at 1079. The court
also quoted Senator Morgan's remarks that the bill "ought not. . . be a breeder of lawsuits."
Id at 1080. When the Clayton Act was enacted in 1914, it was not, the panel held, designed
"to amend the [scope of] the Sherman Act" in the area of treble damage suits. Id Finally,
the court indicated it found nothing in the jurisprudence of the antitrust statutes or subse-
quent congressional action that convinced it that consumers injured in their property could
seek relief under § 4. Its decision was, it observed, "sensible as a matter of policy and com-
pelled as a matter of law." 579 F.2d at 1087. The plea of three members of the court of
appeals for a rehearing en banc went unanswered. 579 F.2d at 1087-88. The Supreme Court
unanimously disagreed with the Eighth Circuit. So, too, did the Department of Justice and
the Attorneys General of forty-seven states, who filed amicc curiae briefs. In an opinion by
Chief Justice Burger, the Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's decision. The Chief Justice
began his analysis with "the language employed by Congress." 442 U.S. at 337. "On its
face," he observed, § 4 "contain[ed] little in the way of restrictive language." Id. In Pfizer
Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 312 (1978) the Court had, he noted, given "person" its "naturally
broad and inclusive meaning." 442 U.S. at 337-38. "Similarly. . .the word 'property' has a
naturally broad and inclusive meaning." Id at 338. "Money, of course, is a form of prop-
erty." Id The Chief Justice then rejected the defendant's efforts to use "business" in the
phrase "business or property" to limit "property." It would, he wrote, "ignore the disjunctive
'or' and rob the term property of its independent and ordinary significance." Id Nothing in
the legislative history of § 4 "conflict[ed] with [the Court's] holding." Id at 342. Nor did he
find Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977) (antitrust-type injury
required) inconsistent with the Court's ruling. 442 U.S. at 343. Finally, he noted the defend-
ant's argument that recognition of the plaintiff's claim would "add a significant burden to the
already crowded dockets of the federal courts." Id at 344. He replied, "That may well be
true but [it] cannot be a controlling consideration. . . ." Id "We must take the statute as
we find it." Id Congress in fact, "created the treble-damage remedy . . . precisely for the
purpose of encouragingprivate challenges to antitrust violations." Id (emphasis in original).
"District courts" could "identify frivolous claims brought to extort nuisance settlements." Id
at 345. "[If] the district courts exercise sound discretion and use the tools available" the
Court's decision need not "result in administrative chaos." Id The relevance of the reason-
ing of the Chief Justice to the facile claims of the defendants in Bennett could hardly have
escaped the court of appeals, although Reiter was not cited in its opinion. It was, however,
cited in the plaintiff's brief and relied upon in materials that the court did use. See 685 F.2d
at 1059, 1064; Basic Concepts, supra note 3, at 1041; Materials, supra note 23, at 533-73. Surely,
too, the defendants' counsel must have felt uncomfortable arguing the antitrust analogy,
without citing and distinguishing Reiter.
200 685 F.2d at 1058.
201 685 F.2d at 1058-59. Here, the court referred to Van Schaick v. Church of
Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982) and North Barrington Dev. Inc. v. Fanslow,
547 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Ill. 1980). See note 134 supra.
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theless, it held that "commercial or competitive injury" [was] not re-
quired by. . .RICO. ' '202 To be sure, RICO was "intended. . .to
combat the threat posed by racketeer influence in the free market
system, [but]. . .Congress did not see the objectives of RICO and
the antitrust laws as coterminous. ' '20 3  The court noted that
"[d]ifferent policies under[lay] the two bodies of law. '20
4
The court of appeal's opinion is a refreshing model of clarity of
expression and insight on this issue. It was precisely the possibility of
the argument advanced by the defendants that led Congress to draft
RICO outside of the antitrust statutes.20 5 That defendants would
make such a specious argument is understandable. That district
courts would be persuaded by it is lamentable. 20 6 Appropriately, the
court of appeals rejected the defendants' contentions.
G. The Question of Equitable Relief Not Available to Pivate Plaintli
Finally, the defendants argued that the equitable relief re-
quested by the plaintiffs was not available to "private plaintiffs.120 7
202 The court observed:
RICO is said to require competitive injury. We are not convinced.
We acknowledge that RICO was intended in part to combat racketeer influences in
the free market system. . . .This does not mean, however, that RICO should be
viewed as an extension of antitrust law in all respects. Different policies underlie
the two bodies of law. To ruin an antitrust defendant, usually a legitimate busi-
nessman, would generally lessen competition and increase concentration in a partic-
ular industry. . . . In a RICO context, there are few countervailing reasons to
lessen the impact of RICO remedies by importing the limitations on standing
which apply in antitrust law .... Congress did not see the objectives of RICO
and the antitrust laws as coterminous....
We conclude that an allegation of commercial or competitive injury is not required
by the RICO Act.
685 F.2d at 1058-59.
203 Id at 1059.
204 Id
205 See notes 51, 63 & 73 supra.
206 Without rejecting Landmark Say. & Loan v. Rhoades, 527 F. Supp. 206, 208-09 (S.D.
Mich. 1981), the court of appeals robbed it of any significance. Landmark held that the plain-
tiff must allege more than injury by the predicate offenses; a "racketeering enterprise" injury
had to be averred. Se note 134 supra. Landmark did not, however, define the character of the
allegation that would meet its judicially imposed limitation. Nevertheless, the court of ap-
peals in Bennett held that the test was a "reiterat[ion] in a new guise [of] the argument that no
'enterprise'. . . [was] alleged in the complaints." 685 F.2d at 1059 n.5. The Bennett court
then held the complaint sufficient when it "allege[d] the conduct of the affairs of an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering." Id. Whatever Landmark was intended to do, it now
should pose no problem to a plaintiff in drafting a RICO complaint.
207 685 F.2d at 1057.
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In addition to treble damage relief, the plaintiffs had sought to have
the Village reorganized under section 1964(a).208 The court of ap-
peals, however, declined to "reach the difficult question whether...
this equitable relief [was] available to private plaintiffs pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 1964 and, if not, whether such relief may be granted
under the court's general equitable powers. ' 209 The court added,
without "endorsing or rejecting the opinions there expressed," that
such scholarship as the court had discovered had concluded that "eq-
uitable relief [was] available to the private plaintiff.
'210
It is, of course, wholly understandable that the court of appeals
was reluctant to essay the scope of the district court's equity powers
in the absence of a full record. Mr. Justice Cardozo put it well:
"The plastic remedies of the chancery are moulded to the needs of
justice, [b]ut . . .facts . . .are the coin which . . .[a court] must
have in [its]. . .pocket if. . . [it is] to pay [its] way with legal tender.
Until [it is] provided with a plentiful supply. . .[it would] do better
to stay at home .... ,,211 Nevertheless, scholarship is not so circum-
scribed. Comment may be usefully offered on the issue.
It is difficult to see how a court could conclude that RICO does
not provide equitable relief for private parties. Section 1964(a) is a
general grant of equitable power. It is not limited on its face or in its
legislative history. Section 1964(b) grants the government authority
to seek relief, an authority that it was necessary to set out lest old
learning be used to circumscribe the new governmental power to seek
equitable relief.212 Nothing in section 1964(b) speaks in negative
terms about an authorization for private parties to seek similar relief.
208 Id at 1064.
209 Id
210 685 F.2d at 1064. The court of appeals cited Baric Concepts,supra note 3, at 1014, 1038
nn.132-33. See also id. at 1047 n.197; BaileyP ivateAction for Injunctive Relief, in I MATERIALS,
supra note 23, at 407 (analysis of text, legislative history, and relevant Supreme Court
decisions).
211 Foreman v. Foreman, 251 N.Y. 273, 274, 167 N.E. 428, 429, 227 N.Y.S. 807, 808
(1929) and B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 98 (1924).
212 Early English jurisprudence reflected the maxim that "equity will not enjoin a crime."
Gee v. Pritchard, 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 674 (ch. 1818). Equity would act only where a property
right was at stake, but the government was not thought to have a property right, absent
unusual circumstances. See In re Pebs, 158 U.S. 564, 482-84 (1895). Section 1964(b), there-
fore, put beyond question the right of the government to bring a civil suit beyond the tradi-
tional limitations of equity jurisprudence. United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358-59
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975). As such, § 1964(b) ought not to be read to
deny the injured party the right to seek equitable relief. Civil RICO, upra note 54, at 714-15
concludes: "[T]he statute should not be read to make treble-damage remedy exclusive. ...
Actions brought by private parties to prevent and restrain racketeering activity. . . further
Congressional intent. RICO's liberal construction clause. . . should govern."
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Indeed, the governmental suits are to be brought on behalf of private
parties. No satisfactory explanation can be offered as to why Con-
gress would have precluded victims from seeking help themselves.
Section 1964(c), moreover, says "sue and" and not "sue to." The
contrary argument would have to suggest that by adding the right to
secure treble damage relief to the general right to sue Congress some-
how manifested an intenton to subtract the right to obtain other
forms of relief. How addition might be converted into subtraction in
a remedial statute that must be liberally construed strains even the
legal imagination. Section 1964 ought to be read as authorizing both
governmental and private suits to obtain equitable relief. To the de-
gree that any ambiguity might be thought to exist in the choice of
language, the liberal construction clause and the remedial purpose of
the statute come down on the side of finding private suits to be au-
thorized and that full relief can be granted. No satisfactory rationale
can be offered, in short, to explain why a court ought to feel itself
circumscribed in doing full justice for a victim under RICO.
To be sure, arguments can be made to the contrary. The reme-
dial purpose of the statute and its liberal construction clause can be
ignored. Section 1964(b) can be read to carry with it a negative im-
plication by inserting an "only" in its text. In addition, the "and" in
section 1964(c) can be read to mean "to." As so interpreted, RICO
would then authorize governmental suits for equitable relief, but pri-
vate suits would be limited to the recovery of treble damages. Yet it
takes but a brief examination of the consequences of this illiberal re-
writing of section 1964 to realize that it could not be what Congress
intended. Equity's hand would, in fact, be tied down in only one
situation. Where damage was threatened but not yet suffered, RICO
would not afford the private plaintiffs equitable relief. But where
damage was sustained, the jurisdiction conferred on the court to
grant treble damage relief would carry with it the power, under well-
established principles of pendent jurisdiction, to grant equitable re-
lief for the common law causes of action that would unquestionably
also exist under state law. 213 Subject to general limitations on federal
213 In Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 738, 823 (1824), Chief
Justice Marshall observed, "[W]hen a question to which the judicial power of the Union is
extended by the Constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of
Congress to give the [federal]. . . courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of
fact or of law may be involved in it." There "could hardly be any other rule." 13 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3567, at 439
(1975). The contemporary scope of that power and the conditions for its discretionary exer-
cise were delineated in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). In Gibbs, plain-
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jurisdiction 2 4 the relief would be complete.2 1 5  Nevertheless, the
terms and conditions under which justice might be done would be
tiff sought relief under the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 6, 29 U.S.C.
§ 303 (1976) and Tennessee common law for actual and punitive damages for a secondary
boycott characterized by violence. The district court denied plaintiff relief under the Taft-
Hartley Act, but upheld his common law claim. The Supreme Court sustained the district
court's exercise ofjurisdiction, but reversed on the ground that the Norris-La Guardia Act, 29
U.S.C. § 106 (1976) required "clear proof" of actual participation or actual authorization as a
prerequisite to union entity liability for individual unlawful conduct in labor disputes and
that this requirement had not been met. 383 U.S. at 738-42. The scope of the district court's
power was defined to include all claims "deriv[ed] from a common nucleus of operative fact"
that were such that a plaintiff "would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial
proceeding." Id at 725. Pendent jursidiction, however, was "a doctrine of discretion, not of
plaintiff's right." Id at 726. Its "justification. . .[lay] in considerations ofjudicial economy,
convenience and fairness to litigants." Id "Needless decisions of state law should be avoided
as a matter of comity. . .[and] if it appears that the state issues substantially predominate,
whether in terms of proof, of the scope of the issues raised, or of the comprehensiveness of the
remedy sought, the state claims may be. . .left for resolution to state tribunals." Id at 726-
27. A district court should also consider the issue of "jury confusion," although the Supreme
Court recognized that such confusion, which might stem from differing standards of proof or
measures of damage, "could be lessened by employing . ..special verdict[s]." Id at 729.
The law applicable to the state claims would be governed by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938). Id at 726. Erie established the doctrine that "[e]xcept in matters governed by
the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of
the State. . .whether the law of the State shall be declared by its legislature in a statute or
by its highest court." 304 U.S. at 78. "Congress. .. [has] no power to declare substantive
rules of common law applicable in a State. . .be they commercial law or a part of the law of
torts." Id See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop. Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 536-37 (1958) (jury
trial appropriate in diversity legal action, because contrary state rule not "bound up with the
definition of the rights and obligations of the parties" and "affirmative countervailing consid-
erations at work"); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (substitute service appropri-
ate, as policy of "discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable
administration of laws" not implicated by valid federal rule of procedure); Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 103-09 (1945) (state statute of limitations governs to protect "sub-
stantially the same" "outcome" in a diversity equity action, where it "substantially affect[s]"
the enforcement of the right as given by the state). See also Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap,
308 U.S. 208 (1939) (burden of proof controlled by state law); Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S.
109 (1943). But see 326 U.S. at 106 (a federal court dealing in equity is free to grant or
withhold remedies without regard to what a state court would do in a similar case); Guffey v.
Smith, 237 U.S. 101 (1915) (federal injunction granted to protect leasehold interest, even
though not avoidable under Illinois law, as equitable remedies matter of federal law). Com-
pare Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U.S. 491 (1923) (Delaware statute authorizing re-
ceiver to enforce unsecured creditor not enforced because equity power of federal court not
enlarged by state law.) with Stern v. South Chester Tube Co., 390 U.S. 606, 609-610 (1968)
("need not decide whether . . . a federal [equitable] remedy can be provided . . .in the
absence of a similar state remedy'). See generally 17 & 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, Supra, §§ 2943, 3413 (1973 & 1982) (Issuance of preliminary injunctions under Rule
65 or the appointment of receiver under Rule 66 not controlled by state law, but final injunc-
tion would be, while the question of receivers "hardest" to determine).
214 See note 212 supra.
215 See Chicago G. W. Ry. v. Kendall, 266 U.S. 94, 98 (1924); ("relief [injunction] to
which entitled would be same"); Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 277 U.S. 593, 607-10
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dependent, not upon the special jurisprudence of RICO, but the gen-
eral federal jurisprudence of remedies and the elements of the state
causes of action.
21 6
While the relief granted could in fact be complete, that differ-
ence might be determinative of the outcome in many situations
where the issue in question involved providing provisional relief,
fashioning temporary'restraining orders, or granting temporary in-
junctions,21 7 as well as affording ultimate relief of an equitable char-
(1926) (suit for private antitrust relief not valid, but counterclaim upheld and equitable relief
granted). See Lincoln Gas Co. v. Lincoln, 250 U.S. 256, 264 (1919) (dictum).
216 See note 212 supra. The contrast between the elements of a state cause of action and a
RICO claim for relief could be substantial. The question of provisional or temporary reme-
dies is discussed at notes 217-18 in/fa. The area of fraud illustrates the differences between a
state cause of action and a RICO claim. Generally, the emphasis in imposing criminal re-
sponsibility for fraud under the mail fraud statute and its cognate provisions is on a breach of
legal duty accompanied by a lack of good faith. Interference with tangible rights is not para-
mount. See, e.g., Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1896) (mail fraud not lim-
ited to common law fraud and false pretenses); United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919, 925-26
(3d Cir. 1982) (decisions reviewed and intangible rights doctrine called "persuasive," but "not
boundless"; it includes breach of fiduciary relations, but not violation of The Nat'l Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976)); United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 120-30
(2nd Cir. 1982) (fiduciary duty of political figure). On the other hand, common law fraud,
rooted in considerations derived from the special history of the crime of larceny, emphasizes
interference with tangible rights rather than a breach of duty, which may involve only intan-
gible considerations. Interference with intangible rights is foreign to its jurisprudential frame-
work. See Comment, The Intangible-Rights Doctrine and Political Corruption Prosecutions Under the
Federal Mail Fraud Statute, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 562 (1980), which argues unpersuasively for a
reinterpretation of the mail fraud statute in light of the old learning, but surveys the cases and
concedes the basic distinctions. Some implications of the distinctions are also analyzed in J.
Coffee, From Tort to Crime.: Some Reiections on the Criminalization of Fiducia y Breaches and the Prob-
lematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 117 (1981). In addition, the com-
mon law tort of deceit has its own special history, which "has been colored to a considerable
extent by the ethics of bargaining between distrustful adversaries." W. PROSSER, supra note
151, § 105, at 684 (4th ed. 1971). Deceit, in turn, tends to run into warranty and negligence,
where the requirement of a particular state of mind is absent. The proper measure of dam-
age-out of pocket or loss of bargain-is also not free from doubt. Id. at 734-35. Equity, too,
developed its own notions of fraud as a grounds for relief, which included innocent misrepre-
sentation. Id at 607-87. See generally, D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 11.3, at 591-652 (1973). It is
not an understatement to say, therefore, that there "has been a good deal of overlapping of
theories and no little confusion." W. PROSSER, supra note 151, at 684. "Any attempt to bring
order out of the resulting chaos must be at best a tentative one, with the qualification that
many courts do not agree." Id at 685. More than substantive notions would be involved.
Remedies, too, would have to be considered. See note 218 in/a.
217 Provisional relief is the same for actions bottomed upon federal question or pendent
jurisdiction. See note 212 supra; Granny Goose Foods Inc. v. Local 70, Int'l Brotherhood of
Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 436-37 n.10 (1974) ("long-settled federal law . . . in all cases in
federal court. . . state law is incorporated to determine the availability of prejudgment rem-
edies for seizure of person or property"). FED. R. Civ. P. 64 provides that "all remedies
providing for seizure of person or property for the purpose of securing satisfaction of the
judgment. . . are available under the circumstances and in the manner provided by the law
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of the state in which the district court is held." Such remedies include "attachment. . . and
other corresponding or equivalent remedies." Id "Typically, state law will reflect the dis-
tinction between law and equity in granting its provisional remedies, a distinction that must
be honored in the federal proceedings." 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2932, at 346 (1973). See DeBeers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325
U.S. 212, 218 (1945) (state law controls). Attachment may not always, for example, be avail-
able to a plaintiff suing in tort. See, e.g., Crist v. United Under Writers Ltd., 343 F.2d 902
(10th Cir. 1965) (securities action for rescission sounds in tort, where attachment not available
under Colorado law). Generally, availability of attachment is dependent "upon each state's
attitude toward the debtor-creditor relationship." 7 J. MOORE & J LucAs, MOORE'S FED-
ERAL PRACTICE 64.04[3] at 64-13 (2d ed. 1948). "Some states are definitely 'creditor' states
in which the provisional remedies are generally available for all types of legal claims and with
few restrictions; others are as definitely 'debtor' states in which the provisional remedies are
available only for certain types of legal claims and are subject to many restrictions. . . and
still others are somewhere between those extremes . . . ." Id at 64-13. Such provisional
remedies, too, are subject to due process limitations. Compare Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972) (prejudgment replevin without notice unconstitutional) with Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (not all dispossession, however slight, need be preceded by an adver-
sary hearing). Wrongful attachment gives rise to a claim for relief. Lugar v. Edmondson, 102
S. Ct. 2744 (1982). But good faith is a defense. Folsom Inv. Co. v. Moore, 682 F.2d 1033 (5th
Cir. 1982). Rule 64 does not deal with provisional remedies that are equitable in character,
including an injunction issued as an incident to a legal claim to effect an equitable attach-
ment. Such a remedy would be a matter of Rule 65. 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, at
64-20 to 21. See note 212 supra; note 218 infla. Finally, lis pendens is a substantive matter
governed by local property law. Accordingly, in the absence of a statute, commencement of
an action in a federal court is notice to all persons affected, but where a statute exists, its
provisions govern. Compare King v. Davis, 137 F. 198 (4th Cir. 1903) with United States v.
Calcasieu Timber Co., 236 F. 196 (5th Cir. 1916).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide the procedure for obtaining temporary
restraining orders and preliminary injunctions. FED. R. Civ. P. 65. "[T]he general availabil-
ity of injunctive relief. . . [is] not altered by the rule and depend[s] on traditional principles
of equity jurisdiction." 11 C. WRIGHT AND A. MILLER, supra, § 2941, at 359. See generally
Developments in the Law-z-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994 (1965). Issuing an injuction is a
matter of discretion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200 (1973) ("equitable remedies are
a special blend of what is necessary, what is fair, and what is workable"); Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 328 (1944) (the language "shall be granted" does not make injuncton
mandatory). Sports Form Inc. v. United Press Int'l, 686 F.2d 750, 752-54 (9th Cir. 1982)
(standard of review is abuse of discretion). Traditionally, the test for exercising that discre-
tion has emphasized four factors: 1) irreparable harm, 2) balance of inconvenience, 3)
probability of success, and 4) the public interest. 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, at 430-
31. See Doron v. Salem Inn Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931-32 (1975); Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279
U.S. 813 (1929); Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 84 n.53 (1974); Withrow v. Larkin, 421
U.S. 35, 45 (1975). The traditional factors have also been reformulated as probability of
success and irreparable injury or serious question and balance of hardships. See, e.g., John B.
Hull Inc. v. Waterbury Petroleum Prods. Inc., 588 F.2d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 960 (1979). See also Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 123
(7th Cir. 1982) ("a comparison of the probabilities and consequences (public as well as pri-
vate), of two types of error'). But generally the factors are formulated and applied in the
traditional fashion. See, e.g., Hannis Corp. v. National Iranian Radio and Television, 691
F.2d 1344, 1353-58 (11th Cir. 1982); Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir.
1980); Telvest Inc. v. Bradshaw, 618 F.2d 1029, 1032 (4th Cir. 1980); Camanish v. Univer-
sity of Texas, 616 F.2d 127, 130 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. CL
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Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 112-14 (8th Cir. 1981) (alternate and traditional test employed
and cases analyzed).
Temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions have been granted in a variety
of situations, where their goal was to preserve the status quo pending the outcome of litiga-
tion. For example, in Productos Carnic, S.A. v. Central Am. Beef & Seafood Trading Co.,
621 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1980), the Fifth Circuit upheld an order requiring that the proceeds of
a sale, allegedly obtained by fraud, be preserved in an interest-bearing account pending the
final result of the litigation. The court found that without such an injuction, a substantial
risk existed that a "meaningful decision on the merits would be impossible" because defend-
ants, by disposing of the assets, could make "any judgment ultimately obtained against
[them] . . .unenforceable." Id at 686. The court held that the threat of such an "ineffective
remedy" outweighed the alleged damages that such an injunction might cause the defend-
ants. Id at 687. Similarly, in International Control Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974), the Second Circuit upheld an order preventing the dissipa-
tion or impairment of assets located in the United States, including a Boeing 707, ICC stocks,
and a yacht. The court concluded that while "an extraordinary remedy, a preliminary in-
junction is properly granted to preserve the status quo pendnte lite where the balance of hard-
ships tips decidedly toward the party requesting the temporary relief and that party has
raised questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, and difficult as to make them a fair
ground for litigation." Id at 1347. In Vesco, the Second Circuit relied upon SEC v. Manor
Nursing Centers Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2nd Cir. 1972), which stated:
Once the equity jurisdiction of the district court has been properly invoked by a
showing of a securities law violation, the Court possesses the necessary power to
fashion an appropriate remedy. Thus, while neither the 1933 nor 1934 Acts specifi-
cally authorize the ancillary relief granted in this case [the appointment of a
receiver and an asset freeze,] "[i]t is for the federal courts to adjust their remedies
so as to grant the necessary relief where federally secured rights are invaded."
Moreover, as the Supreme Court said in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S.
375, 391 (1970), "[W]e cannot fairly infer from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
a purpose to circumscribe the Courts' power to grant appropriate remedies."
Id. at 1103-04. Arguments are sometimes made to the contrary, relying chiefly on DeBeers
Consol. Mines Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212 (1945), in which the Court denied the
government the right to freeze an antitrust violator's assets pending the outcome of a govern-
ment suit for injunctive relief. As the Court noted, the only way the defendant's assets would
be relevant to an action for injunctive relief brought by the government would be if injunc-
tive relief were granted, if the injunction were disobeyed, if contempt proceedings were
brought, if a fine were levied, if the fine were not paid, and if execution were then sought on
the assets. Id at 219. In United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378 (1965), the
Court recognized that DeBeers did not prohibit pre-judgment sequestration in other situa-
tions. In First Nat'l, the government sought to enjoin the bank from transferring the property
of the taxpayer, a Uruguayan corporation, to protect its jeopardy income tax assessment. See
I.R.C. § 7204(a) (1976) ("necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the Internal Reve-
nue Code"). The Court distinquished DeBeers and held the injunction to be "eminently ap-
propriate to prevent further dissipation of assets." Id at 385. The Court relied on Deckert v.
Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940). In Deckert, several purchasers had brought
a suit in equity to rescind the fraudulent sale of securities and to obtain restitution. The
moneys necessary to satisfy the purchaser's claim were in the hands of a third-party trusteee,
named as a defendant, but not as a violator. The suit was brought under 15 U.S.C. § 771
(1976) ("any person" who sells fraudulent stock "shall be liable to the purchaser" who may
"sue . .. to recover the consideration .. .or for damages") and 15 U.S.C. § 774 (1976)
(district courts "shall have jurisdiction ...of suits .. .brought to enforce any liability"
under the securities act). Noting that the violators' assets were "in danger of dissipation and
depreciation," 311 U.S. at 290, the Court upheld the asset freeze, observing that "the power
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to make the right of recovery effective implies the power to utilize any of the procedures or
actions normally available to the litigant according to the exigencies of the particular case."
Id at 288. The issuance of the injuction was a matter of "sound discretion" to be upheld on
appeal absent "improvident exercise of judicial discretion." Id at 290.
FED. R. Civ. P. 66 governs the appointment of receivers, as in accompanied the asset
freeze in Manor Nursing Centers. "Precisely when the first receiver was appointed by a court is
unknown, but the device was being used quite commonly as early as the reign of Queen
Elizabeth I." 12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, § 2981, at 4 (1973). The traditional rule
was well-stated by the New York Court of Appeals in Decker v. Gardner, 124 N.Y. 334, 338,
26 N.E. 814, 815, 11 N.Y.S. 388, 398 (1891). "The Court of Chancery. . . possessed and
exercised ...the power to appoint receivers pendente lite of property which was the subject
matter of litigation before the court. . . . It did not depend upon statute, and was not af-
fected by the character of the parties before it, whether an individual or a corporation, or by
the nature of the property." Id at 815. "For a long period the practice expanded as a result
of the increasing willingness of courts of equity. . .[in] the United States to undertake the
administration of the assets of corporations and other debtors when sufficient need was
shown." 12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, § 2981, at 4. The receivership concept, however,
has not been tied to the past, as the Second Circuit noted in the early part of this century.
Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Ry., 198 F. 721 (1912). "From the early principles
the law of receiverships has. . . rapidly developed and with constantly widening scope. In-
deed in no other branch of equity jurisprudence has there been such an adaptation of equita-
ble principles to the requirements of commercial advancement." Id at 236-37. The receiver
"is a person specially appointed by the court to take control, custody, or management of
property that is involved in or is likely to become involved in litigation for the purpose of
preserving. . .[it] and undertaking any other appropriate action" pending its final disposi-
tion by the suit. 12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, § 2981, at 5. See 28 U.S.C. § 959(b)
(1976) (a receiver appointed in any case shall manage and operate in the same manner as the
owner). Government agencies frequently obtain receiverships in enforcing federal statutes.
See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972). Appointment is
conditioned upon a private petitioner being more than a simple contract creditor; he must
have some interest in or to the property. Shapiro v. Wilgus, 287 U.S. 348, 355-56 (1932). But
it need not be legal. Wolf v. DeWolf & Co., 53 F.2d 999, 1004 (7th Cir. 1931) (equitable
interest supports receivership). See generally 12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, § 2983, at 17.
A receiver may be appropriate where there has been a breach of fiduciary duties, Ferguson v.
Tabah, 288 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1961) (shareholder derivative action to prevent looting of corpo-
ration), or where there is a possibility of insolvency or fraud upon creditors, Bookout v. Atlas
Financial Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1338, 1342-43 (N.D. Ga. 1974), af'd sub noam., Bookout v. First
Nat'l Mortgage Co., 514 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1975) (corporate officer appeared to be engaging
in fraudulent transactions). Nevertheless, they should be employed with caution. Kelleam v.
Maryland Casualty Co. of Baltimore, 312 U.S. 377, 381 (1941) ("watched with jealous eyes");
Gordon v. Washington, 295 U.S. 30, 39 (1935) ("only on a plain showing of some threatened
loss or injury to the property, which the receivership would avoid'). Key factors to consider
include fraudulent conduct, Burnrite Coal Briquette Co. v. Riggs, 274 U.S. 208, 212 (1927)
(stockholder alleging gross fraud and mismanagement), or imminent danger of dissipation of
assets, 295 U.S. at 37-38 (no interest, no danger, no receiver); Mintzer v. Arthur L. Wright &
Co., 263 F.2d 823 (3d Cir. 1959) (no fraud, no dissipation, no insolvency, no receiver). Bal-
ance of harm to plaintiff and to defendant as well as probability of success of the plaintiff
should also be considered. 12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, § 2983, at 23-24. Where the
defendant is willing to post a bond, a receivership should not be imposed. Wadley v. Gaunce,
87 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1937) (mail fraud conviction, sale of property to persons with notice,
receivership not imposed, since bond would be posted). Federal law governs when to appoint
a receiver. 12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, § 2983, at 28-29 ("close question on which
there is little authoritative precedent'). Connolly v. Gishwiller, 162 F.2d 428 (7th Cir.), cert.
[Vol. 58:2371
THE NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947) is illustrative. In Connolly, the receiver of the Calumet National
Bank of Chicago brought an action to recover illegal profits derived by the defendants
through the sale of assets for less than actual value. The district court issued a temporary
injunction restraining the sale or other disposition of real estate owned by the defendants and
appointed a receiver for the corporate defendant. The defendants appealed, arguing that the
plaintiff was nothing more than an unsecured creditor, having no rights, legal or equitable, in
the corporate defendant's property. The court of appeals upheld the issuance of the injunc-
tion and the appointment of the receiver. The court observed: "[T]he problem . . . [was]
either preventing the defendants from concealing or disposing of the assets or of allowing
them to make away with the fruits of the fraud charged against them. . . . [W]e cannot say
that the court abused its discretion when it appointed the receiver and awarded the injunc-
tive relief to preserve the status quo pending the litigation." Id at 435. See also Adelman v.
CGS Scientific Corp., 332 F. Supp. 137, 145-47 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (securities laws and common
law suit for rescission. Solvency no bar to injunction and appointment of receiver).
Finally, the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)(1976) may be invoked to preserve the
status quo in proper circumstances. FTC v. Dean Foods, 384 U.S. 597, 603-05 (1966) (prelim-
inary injunction to prevent merger); ITT Community Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 457 F. Supp. 224
(N.D. Fla. 1978) (injunction issued to protect damage claim).
Neither FED. R. Civ. P. 64 nor traditional equity jurisprudence controls in the face of a
specific federal statute. The text of Rule 64 is explicitly made "subject to . . . any existing
statute of the United States." FED. R. Civ. P. 64. The general rule under federal statutes
that authorize injunctions, moreover, is that neither inadequacy of the remedy at law nor
irreparable injury need be shown. United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358-59 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975). All that must be established is a reasonable likeli-
hood of success on the merits. Id at 1359. It is immaterial, too, that the party seeking relief is
private. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Lennen, 640 F.2d 255, 259 (10th Cir. 1981).
RICO grants broad equitable powers. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1976) ("prevent and
restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders"). In light of
its liberal construction clause and its legislative history, it ought to be held to authorize tem-
porary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, receiverships, and the full range of ulti-
mate equity relief on the request of the government or private parties, and because the source
of the jurisdiction is statutory, restrictive precedent ought not be held to narrow the ability of
the court to do justice. See, e.g., 115 CONG. REC. 9567 (1969) (remarks of Senator McClellan)
(RICO is not "limit[ed to] the remedies . . . already . . . established. The ability of our
chancery courts to formulate a remedy to fit the wrong is one of the great benefits of our
system of justice."); Id at 6993 (remarks of Senator Hruska) ("The bill is innovative ...
Hopefully experts on organized crime will be able to conceive of additional application of the
law. The potential is great."). Nevertheless, litigants and the courts to date have been cau-
tious in, or even hostile to, redeeming RICO's promise of new relief for old wrongs.
In USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, 689 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1982), plaintiffs alleged
that they had been defrauded of approximately $8,300,000 in connection with certain coal
leases. Count I of the complaint sought treble damages under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976).
Counts II-IV sought relief under the common law of Kentucky, including breach of fiduciary
duty, fraud, and breach of contract. Plaintiffs also sought and secured a preliminary injunc-
tion restraining the defendants from dissipating certain assets pendente lilt. An immediate
appeal was taken under 28 U.S.C. § 1282 (1976). Defendants argued that a conviction was
necessary before a civil suit could be filed under RICO and that, in any event, subject matter
jurisdiction was lacking since a showing of organized crime or racketeering or conpetitive
injury was required before recovery could be had. Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 3 & n.4.
Principally, however, the defendants argued that the district court had no power under 18
U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1976) to sequester assets to secure a treble damage judgment under
§ 1964(c). In addition, they argued that the order, which was based on federal law, was
improper under FED. R. Civ. P. 64, which mandates following state procedure. Finally, they
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suggested that RICO was not a federal statute under FED. R. Civ. P. 64(1). The court of
appeals, however, sustained the issuance of the injunction, holding that a conviction was not
a prerequisite to a civil RICO suit, observing that "nothing in the plain language of RICO
. ..suggest[s] that civil liability under § 1964(c) is limited only to those already convicted or
charged with criminal racketeering." 689 F.2d at 95 n.1. Apparently, the court did not think
that the defendants' subject matter jurisdiction arguments, which had been rejected by the
district court, 539 F. Supp. at 539, deserved detailed treatment, for it merely observed that
"Section 1964(c) states that an action for damages may be maintained by any person injured
in his business or property by reason of a violation of § 1962." 689 F.2d at 95, citing Bennett
v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982). The court then observed that a "literal reading of
RICO .. . [was] consistent with the approach of United States v. Turkette . ..and the
Supreme Court's recognition. . . that Congress intended that RICO be liberally construed
to effectuate its remedial purposes." 689 F.2d at 95 n.l.
The court of appeals also rejected the defendants' other arguments as "largely superflu-
ous." Id at 96. The court found that the district court had properly issued the injuction, not
to secure the damage award under RICO, but under its general equitable powers that
stemmed from its pendent jurisdiction under the common law claims. Id The district court,
consistent with the law of Kentucky, had the power, the court of appeals held, to impose a
constructive trust on the proceeds realized from the breach of fiduciary duties and other resti-
tution. In addition, there was a "substantial likelihood" that plaintiffs would prevail and a
"high probability" that the defendants would transfer the assets out of the country if not
enjoined. Id at 96-97. Arguments under DeBeers and FED. R. Civ. P. 64 were inapposite,
because the district court was, the court found, well within its powers under Deckert. Id at 97-
98. Finally, the court of appeals held that there was no abuse of discretion in the issuance of
the injunction tested against the traditional four factors or in setting the bond under Rule
65(c), which, the court noted, could be dispensed with entirely, particularly since the injunc-
tion did not "interfere with the defendant's day-to-day business activities." Id at 100. Ac-
cordingly, the court did not reach the defendants' various arguments about the scope of the
district court's equitable powers under RICO.
In sharp and unfavorable contrast to the Sixth Circuit's careful decision, the district
court in Ashland Oil v. Cleave, 540 F. Supp. 81 (W.D.N.Y 1982) rejected plaintiffs request
for a similar injunction, where, according to the complaint, the defendants stole 375,000 gal-
lons of gasoline through a scheme to defraud constituting a pattern of racketeering activities
under RICO. Based on admissions of the defendants, the court found that a probability of
success had been established. Id at 82. Nevertheless, the court held that the issue was gov-
erned under FED. R. CIv. P. 64 by New York attachment practice. Id at 83. Even if it were
considered as a request for an injunction, the requisites for preliminary relief had not been
met. First, the court thought that while the plaintiff had requested an injunction, it had to
treat the request as a request for an attachment. Id at 82-83. Second, it rejected plaintiff's
argument that it was entitled to preliminary equitable relief, because plaintiff was ultimately
seeking "the imposition of a constructive trust or [an] equitable lien." Id at 83 n.1. The
court believed that the plaintiffs request for a provisional remedy had "to be strictly con-
fined" because it was "in derogation of the common law." Id at 83. But see Pound, Common
Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REv., 383, 387-88, 406-07 (1908) ("proposition. . .has no
justification. . . .The public cannot be relied upon. .. to tolerate judicial obstruction...
of social policies."). The court then examined the text and legislative history of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964 (1976), but concluded, without considering the liberal construction clause or the reme-
dial purpose of RICO, that because "statutory attachment powers [would be] ...a harsh
remedy," they ought not be read into § 1964 in "cases brought by private parties." Id at 85.
Nor did the court believe that the plaintiff had established the fact of irreparable harm. "It
was questionable," the court observed, "[if the] frustration of [the] enforcement of a money
judgement . . . can ever constitute irreparable harm for purpose of preliminary injunctive
relief." Id at 86. The court rejected precedent such as Productos Carnic S.A. v. Central Beef
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acter.2 18 Such a circumscribed interpretation of the statute would, of
& Seafood Trading Co., 621 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1980), noting that such decisions "exemplify
the maxim that hard cases make bad law." Id It also relied by analogy on United States v.
Mandel, 408 F. Supp. 673, 683 (D. Md. 1976), which denied a government request for prelim-
inary relief under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) (1976). See note 177 supra. Finally, the court felt that
the plaintiff had not made an adequate showing of current bad faith conduct. 540 F. Supp.
at 84, 86-87. In light of the analysis, supra, further comment on Ashland Oil need not be made.
It was simply poorly reasoned and wrongly decided; it ought not be followed by other courts.
See note 59 supra on the problem of execution. See also Marshall Field & Co. v. Ican, 537 F.
Supp. 413, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (injuction not granted under Williams Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(e) (1976) or RICO, because of inadequate showing of likelihood of success, balance of
equities, or irreparable harm).
218 The question of fashioning ultimate relief of an equitable character is best illustrated
by the facts of United States v. Marubeni America Corp., 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980). See
also United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982) (conviption of Marubeni em-
ployee affirmed). In Marubni, the court of appeals held that the proceeds of a contract
tainted by bribery were not subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1). See note 178
supra. The court noted, however, that civil remedies, namely treble damages and equitable
relief, were available. 611 F.2d at 770 n. 13. How general federal jurisprudence of a legal or
equitable character would apply, moreover, is not in serious doubt. Breaches of the principal-
agent relationship give rise to a legal claim for relief. See Jankowitz v. United States, 533
F.2d 538 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (counterclaim to recover bribes); United States v. Drumm, 329 F.2d
109 (1st Cir. 1964) (recovery of monies paid to poultry inspector); United States v. Bowen,
290 F.2d 40, 44 (5th Cir. 1961) ("The master as the party whose trust has been betrayed...
is entitled to all of the fruits of the servant's dereliction"). Here, those damages-the amount
of the bribes-would be trebled. (3 x $330,000 = $990,000). In addition, the relief would not
be limited to damages. A constructive trust could be imposed and the proceeds duly traced
and restitution ordered. United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286 (1910) (constructive trust im-
posed on illegal profits garnered by an army captain from contracts let). Contracts vitiated
by fraud may also be rescinded without a quantum meruit accounting. K & R Eng'g Co. Inc. v.
United States, 616 F.2d 469, 476-77 (Ct. Cl. 1980). Here, that would mean $8.8 million
returned to the utility without an accounting for the cable received. The no quantum meruit
accounting in government contracts tainted by fraud rule stems from principles well-estab-
lished since the time of the Tea Pot Dome scandals. See Mammoth Oil Co. v. United States,
275 U.S. 13 (1922) (cancellation of oil lease); Pan American Petroleum and Transport Co. v.
United States, 273 U.S. 456 (1927). Accordingly, RICO should be read to authorize the
Anchorage Telephone Utility, an instrumentality of the Municiaplity of Anchorage, to seek
such a full range of legal and equitable relief.
If RICO were read to authorize only legal relief, recovery could be had for the bribes,
duly trebled, but substantial issues might rise concerning the scope of equitable relief under
pendent jurisdiction. For example, some states follow the no quantum meruit accounting rule.
See, e.g., St. Grand Inc. v. City of New York, 32 N.Y.2d 300, 344 N.Y.S.2d 938, 298 N.E.2d
105 (1973). But no Alaska precedent exists squarely on the question. A federal court should,
therefore, be reluctant under general principles of comity to decide how the Alaskan Supreme
Court might decide the question. See note 214 supra. Imposing constructive trusts is also
common in state jurisprudence. See, e.g., Boston v. Santosuosso, 298 Mass. 175, 10 N.E.2d 271
(1937) (constructive trust imposed on Mayor Curley); Jersey City v. Hague, 18 N.J. 584, 115
N.E.2d (1955) (constructive trust imposed on Mayor Hague). But what if Alaskan law had
not had an occasion to deal with the political corruption so characteristic of the northeast?
One cannot predict how a federal court would or ought to resolve such important questions.
But see note 217 supra for what the Sixth Circuit was willing to do in USACO Coal Co. v.
Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1982).
[December 1982]
RICO CIVIL ACTIONS
course, introduce great uncertainty to RICO litigation,219 create
questions of law exam complexity,220 promote forum shopping under
RICO's comprehensive jurisdiction, venue, and process provisions,
221
and produce a wholly unjustifiable lack of uniformity in the practical
impact of a major federal statute on both plaintiffs and defendants.
Nothing about the prospect, in short, commends itself to the thought-
ful observer. It cannot be what Congress intended when it crafted
RICO. It is to be sincerely hoped that it will not prevail and bring
about a need for amendatory legislation.
VII. Conclusion
The court of appeals decision in Bennett must be placed in a
larger context. The Supreme Court in United States v. Turkette com-
mented that its decision that the concept of "enterprise" included
illicit associations was "neither absurd nor surprising. ' 222 Similarly,
it is neither absurd nor surprising that Congress decided in 1970 to
make commercial and other forms of fraud subject to private civil
relief. Nothing that has happened since then undermines that 1970
congressional policy judgment.2 2
3
219 See notes 212-18 supra.
220 Does, for example, the scope of pendent jurisdiction extend to parties as well as claims?
12 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRATICE AND PROCEDURE § 3567, at 457
(1975). In Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 673, 713-16 (1973), the Court thought the
question subtle and complex and declined to answer it. Given the character of many of the
multi-state claims that may be expected to arise under RICO, an occasion to face the issue
will surely rise, particularly if relief under § 1964(c) is thoughtlessly confined to treble dam-
ages and a need manifests itself to use pendent jurisdiction to settle other important aspects of
the litigation.
221 See Basic Concepts, supra note 3, at 1039-40; M. Smith, Instituting a RICO Civil Treble
Damage Action: Jursdiction, Venue, Service of Process, Pleading and Parties, II MATERIALS, supra
note 23, at 607. A final point may be made. In Minnesota v. Northern Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48,
70-71 (1904), the Court made a "safe and conservative" interpretation of Sherman Act § 7, 26
Stat. 209, 210 (1890) and held that it did not authorize private equity relief. Its judgment did
not stand the test of time. Congress reversed it in the Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 16, 38 Stat. 730,
737 (1914). In light of the liberal construction clause, it ought not be necessary to repeat that
unfortunate history under RICO. But see G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 6 (rev. ed.
1900) ("What experience and history teach us is this-that people and governments have
never learned anything from history").
222 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981).
223 The President's Crime Commission in 1967 recognized the extent of commercial cor-
ruption in our modern society. PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 43, at 189-91. Organized
crime, for example, used "accountants, attorneys and business consultants" to run its busi-
nesses. Id "Too often because of the reciprocal benefits involved in organized crime's deal-
ing with the business world, or because of fear, the legitimate sector of society helps the
illegitimate sector." Id Businesses corrupted by organized crime "range[d] from accounting
firms to yeast manufacturing." Id In 1976, the Organized Crime Task Force of the National
Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals noted:
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The most comprehensive study of fraud done in recent years was
published in 1974 under the auspices of the Chamber of Commerce
of the United States.224 The Chamber estimated the direct economic
cost of fraud as follows:
Billions of Dollars
1. Bankruptcy Fraud .08
2. Bribery, Kickbacks & Payoffs 3.00
3. Consumer Fraud 21.00
4. Embezzlement 7.00
5. Insurance Fraud 2.00
6. Receiving Stolen Property 3.50
7. Securities Theft and Frauds 4.00
[O]ur society . . . [has developed an] increasing dependency on the profes-
sional's specialized knowledge. Attorneys, accountants, and others play a key role
in helping individuals and corporations conform to complex law and regulations.
Because of new laws designed to combat organized criminal activity and expanded
law enforcement investigative ability, organized crime figures . . . rely more on
professional assistance. . . . [S]ome professionals misuse and violate the rules by
helping known criminals to exploit the law. Professionals. . . act as direct consul-
tants and advisors to organized crime groups for the purpose of assuring the success
of criminal conspiracies.
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 40, at 92.
Organized crime, however, accounts for only a part of the corruption in the commercial
world, which is not limited to the service professions. White collar offenders do not need the
association of organized crime to engage in patterns of unlawful conduct. FBI Director Wil-
liam H. Webster recently observed:
Often, perpetrators of white collar crimes are regarded as responsible pillars of
their communities who occupy positions in government, industry, the professions
and civic organizations. Through use of their positions of trust, cunning, and guile,
white collar criminals undermine professional and governmental integrity to the
dismay of all, and ultimately are responsible for the loss of billions of dollars annu-
ally from the nation's economy.
Heanngs on the Depariments of Commerce, Justice, and State, The judiciag and Related Agties Ap-
propiationsfor 1983, Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 97th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 1078 (1982) (testimony of FBI Director William H. Webster) [hereinafter
cited as 1983 Appropriations Hearings].
224 UNITED STATES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: EVERYONE'S
PROBLEM, EVERYONE'S Loss (1974). Obviously, these estimates can only be "ballpark"
figures, for the typical perpetrator of a fraud does not file an honest "annual report." It has
been accurately noted that "there is little systematic data available regarding the incidence of
white collar crime," and two estimates of its cost have been cited: loss of taxes on $25 to $40
billion of unreported income annually and $500 million to $1 billion annually in securities
fraud. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE-TASK FORCE
REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME. On the concept of white collar crime, see G. BRADLEY, S.
ISREAL & J. SANDER, FRAUD: BACKGROUND MATERIALS (Cornell Institute on Organized
Crime 1980); W. Webster, The FBI and White Collar Crime Today, 50 N.Y. ST. Bj. 635, 636
(1978) ("[T]here is no such thing as white-collar crime as a term of art. It. . . is a cluster of
criminal activities, which distinguish it from other types of activities.").
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Along with credit card and check fraud (1.10) and computer related
crime (.10), the total figure came to more than 40 billion dollars per
year.2 25 That figure, however, omitted fraud against the govern-
ment. Given the inflation rate since 1974, moreover, it would not be
unreasonable to estimate a figure twice that today.226 In addition,
more detailed studies since 1974 of specialized areas of fraud indicate
that the Chamber's figures substantially underestimated the scope of
its economic impact.227 Recent studies have, for example, focused on
225 WHITE COLLAR CRIME, supira note 224, at 6.
226 See, e.g., Hearings on the Department ofSateJustice, and Commerce, The Judiciag, and Related
Agencier Appropriations for 1981. Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. of Appropriations, House of Repre-
sentatives, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 17 (1980) ($44 to $100 billion per year) (testimony of William
H. Webster) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Appropriations Hearings].
227 It is manifest that more than dollars and cents are implicated in fraud losses. Professor
Edelhertz wrote:
Our economy has passed the point where it is geared to meet only the basic
and elemental needs of the greater part of our population ...
Our social and economic organization exposes us to new species of white-collar
crime, having different or mixed objectives. In an earlier age the unlawful or ethi-
cally questionable amassing of wealth was characteristically accomplished by bald
plunder or seizure of the public domain. "Teapot Dome" was a classic case, as was
the land-grant device which provided the capital for building much of this Nation's
railroad grid. Today such blatant power and property grabs are avoided ....
More of us are now beneficiaries of trusts and quasi-trusts managed by the growing
fiduciary industry. New targets for crime are the increasing proportion of trusts
and estates of middle-class decedents, interests in union and company pension, wel-
fare, and profit-sharing funds, and the broad panoply of mutual funds, investment
trusts, credit unions, and investment clubs. .. . As individuals we are more ex-
posed to abuse. We are more likely to deal with strangers than with those we know
(whose blemishes we can assess), and we are more vulnerable than we used to be
because we tend to rely more on one another or on protection by government.
Those who buy securities are better protected than ever before because of the work
of the Securities and Exchange Commission and comparable state agencies, yet are
more exposed to the stock fraud artist who deceives the regulatory agent or totally
circumvents its supervision. . . . Caveat emptor loses meaning when we buy closed
packages. . . . White collar crime is a low visibility, high impact factor in our
society. Because of the changes in the nature of our economic organization, partic-
ularly new developments in marketing, distribution, and investment, it is a fair
assumption that white-collar crime has increased at a rate which exceeds popula-
tion growth. Its effects intersect with and interact with other problems of our soci-
ety, such as poverty and discrimination. It also weighs heavily on the aged who are,
in our society, divorced from the homes and community of their children in con-
trast to most prior human social organization. . . . White-collar crime, like com-
mon crime, can have a serious influence on the social fabric, and on the freedom of
commercial and interpersonal transactions. Every stock market fraud lessens confi-
dence in the securities market. Every commercial bribe or kickback debases the
level of business competition, often forcing other suppliers to join in the practice if
they are to survive. . . . The pharmaceutical company which markets a new drug
based on fraudulent test results undercuts its competitors who are still marketing
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fraud against the government. In 1978, the Comptroller General re-
ported that the opportunities for defrauding the government were
virtually unlimited. 228 More than $250 billion worth of economic
assistance programs then existed, many of which passed through
state and local hands and could be the subject of RICO civil suits, if
fraud were uncovered. In fact, the Department of Justice estimated a
one to ten percent incidence of fraud: 2.5 to 25 billion dollars a
year.2 29 Other studies have focused on commodity investment
the properly tested drugs, and may cause them to adopt similar methods. Competi-
tors who join in a conspiracy to freeze out their competition, or to fix prices, may
gravely influence the course of our economy, in addition to harming their competi-
tors and customers.
H. EDELHERTr-, THE NATURE, IMPACT, AND PROSECUTION OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME 6-7
(1970) [hereinafter cited as EDELHERTL].
228 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL AGENCIES CAN AND SHOULD Do MORE
TO COMBAT FRAUD IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS (1978). A follow-up study was made in
1980. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FRAUD IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS: - How EXTEN-
SIVE IS IT? - How CAN IT BE CONTROLLED (1980). The 1980 study concluded that the prob-
lem remained "widespread." Id. It also found that the "number of cases [uncovered] ma[de]
it impossible for the Department ofJustice to prosecute every case of fraud referred to it." Id.
at v. Sixty-one percent of the over 12,900 referrals were declined. Id. at ii. Only about one-
third of those prosecuted and convicted received prison time. Id. at iii. The Department of
Justice failed, too, to follow up on the civil aspects. Id. The Report concluded: "Most fraud
is undetected. For those. . . committing fraud, the chances of being prosecuted and eventu-
ally going to jail are slim. . . . The sad truth is that crime against the Government often
does pay." Id. at cover summary. See M. SAXON, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE PROBLEM
AND THE FEDERAL RESPONSE (1980) for a general survey of the literature including up-to-
date data on impact and resource allocation and the effectiveness of public programs for
control. The picture remains less than bright, particularly in light of recent cutbacks in all
government funding, including the administration ofjustice. See 1983 Appropriation Hearings,
supra note 223, at 26 (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden: "The FBI is going to lose 408 positions,
including 121 special agents, as the Bureau is being forced to absorb inflation by reducing its
staff. . . . According to. . . [my] analysis of. . . the nine most prominent law enforcement
agencies, [Coast Guard, Customs, ATF, Secret Service, U.S. Attorneys and Marshalls, DEA,
FBI, INS, and IRS] . . . their personnel will decrease by almost 20,000 positions from the
1981 levels."). Overall, of the 18 programmatic categories of the federal budget, "administra-
tion ofjustice" ($4.5 billion) is last. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS: 1982, at
101 (1981). The only "law enforcement" consolation will be that with less governmental
spending, there will be less government-related fraud. That prospect hardly consoles.
229 N.Y. Times, May 17, 1982, at 11, col. 2 ("Fraud in Government benefit programs is
now widely viewed to be a serious national problem . . . cost[ing] the public anywhere from
$2.5 to $25 billion per year."). A recent report by the Stanford Research Institute concluded
that "no comprehensive fraud prevention strategy has emerged" in the operation of benefit
programs. d.
To put this fraud in perspective, consider: A stack of $1,000 bills four inches high would
equal a million dollars. A billion dollars would be 333.3 feet high, more than half as high as
the Washington Monument. If the lower figure ($2.5 billion) is correct, it comes close to what
the federal government in fact spent for law enforcement protection in 1977: police ($1.765
billion), judiciary ($.289 billion), legal prosecution ($.185 billion), legal defense ($.140 bil-
lion), corrections (S.298 billion) and other ($.098 billion), a total of $2.775 billion. Trends in
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fraud,230 a field said to be "vast and growing."'23t It is estimated that
$200 million is in fact lost through commodity investment fraud each
year.232 Arson-for-profit has been called the "easiest crime" 233 as well
as the nation's "fastest-growing" crime.2 34 Its economic and other
impact is great.2 35 Accordingly, it takes but a passing familiarity
with the developing literature on fraud in our society to come to the
firm conclusion that curtailing it is one of the unmet needs of our
system of justice, both criminal and civil.
Resources devoted to investigation and prosecution of fraud,
moreover, are not impressive. In 1977, the Section on Criminal Jus-
tice of the American Bar Association, under a federal grant, con-
ducted a study of those resources.235 The Section studied the
Expenditure and Employment Data for the CiminalJustice Svstem 1971-1977 at 39 (1980). If the
higher figure is correct, it exceeded total expenditures for police, courts, corrections, etc. for
the federal, state, and local governments: $21.573 billion. Id. at 37.
230 See SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, COMMODITY INVESTMENT FRAUD,
S. REP. No. 495, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinafter cited as COMMODITY INVESTMENT
FRAUD]. See also S. REP. No. 210, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (home health care fraud and
abuse); N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1982, at 1, col. 1 (multibillion dollar New York construction
industry "plagued by corruption"); id, Apr. 26, 1982, at 1, col. 2; id., Apr. 27, 1982, at 1, col.
5; id, July 31, 1982, at 1, col. 6 (New Jersey local sewer project, $1.8 billion; since 1970
millions of dollars squandered and stolen); id, Nov. 6, 1982, at 10, col. I (counterfeiting of
records and tapes robs $400 million a year in lost royalties).
231 COMMODITY INVESTMENT FRAUD, supra note 230, at v.
232 Id. The Committee recognized the need for private federal civil relief. Id. at 51 ("pos-
sible solution to the. . . ineffectiveness" of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission).
233 Arson-for-Hire, Hearings before the Peim. Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on
Government Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1978)(statement of Sen. John Glenn).
234 Id.
235 As of 1978, it was estimated that arson-for-profit caused losses of approximately $2
billion a year, and that the losses were rising at the rate of 25% annually. Id. at 1 (statement
of Senator Sam Nunn). Human costs, too, were high: 1,000 deaths in 1975 alone. Id. Fi-
nally, the insurance industry estimated 25% of each person's insurance bill goes to pay for
arson. Id. at 6. In addition, of the 1,000 deaths in 1975, 45 were firefighters. S. REP. No. 535,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1979). See also Flaherty, War on Arson Heals Up, The National Law
Journal, Jan. 10, 1983, at 1, col. 1 (National Fire Prevention Association estimate in 1981 154,
500 suspicious fires wreaked $1.66 billion damage and caused 220 deaths).
Arson fraud is only part of the problem of insurance fraud. It is estimated by the Ameri-
can Insurance Association that 15 to 20 percent of all claims are fraudulent-up 5 to 6 per-
cent in just ten years. N.Y. Times, July 6, 1980, at 27, col. 1. Today, fraudulent claims may
exceed $11 billion each year, and since the typical insurance company must generate $1.25 in
premiums for every $1 it pays in claims, policy holders are paying an extra $13.75 billion in
premiums. Id. at 28, col. 4. These individual figures, too, are considerably higher than the
1974 general estimate of the Chamber of Commerce. See text accompanying note 224 supra.
These studies also make the ABA recommendations all the more difficult to justify, for a
principal impact of them would be to narrow RICO's application in the fraud area. See ABA,
supra note 25, at 17 (two offenses, one of which is not fraud).
236 The final report of the study is reprinted in White Collar Crime 1978" Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, House Committee on theJudiiag, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 260-82 (1978).
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Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, the United States Postal Inspection Service, the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare, the Internal Revenue Service, the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, various banking
agencies, and selected state and local efforts. Its findings were deeply
disturbing. The Section found that the "total federal effort against
economic crime [was]. . . underfunded, undirected, and un-coordi-
nated and [was]. . . in need of the development of priorities. ' '23 7 In
addition, "available resources [were]. . . unequal to the task of com-
batting economic crime. '238 The "lack of resources," the Section
found, "at the federal and local level [was]. . . a function of insuffi-
cient manpower and inadequately trained personnel. ' 23 9 The impli-
237 Id. at 264. However, priorities have now been set. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, NA-
TIONAL PRIORITIES FOR THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME
(1980). They have yet to be adequately staffed, funded, or organized. Seegeneral, GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FRAUD IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS: How EXTENSIVE IS IT? How
CAN IT BE CONTROLLED? REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL (May 7, 1981). Studies
by the General Accounting Office have revealed that the Department of Justice has "not
emphasized the civil aspects of fraud cases and [has] needed to better coordinate criminal and
civil actions." Id. at iii. The Department's "tradition of giving preeminence to criminal sanc-
tions. . .[has been] implemented in such a manner that the decision to proceed against fraud
was made without early consideration of available civil remedies [even though] civil remedies
may be a greater deterrent than criminal prosecution because civil remedies may be more
commensurate with the damage caused by the fraud." Id. at 32-34.
238 Id. EDELHERTZ aptly wrote:
The increasing complexity of our society heightens vulnerability because it in-
creases the difficulty of obtaining redress for losses suffered. Legal services are
costly, prosecutors and investigators are overburdened, and court calendars are
clogged. A victim must measure the time it takes to obtain redress and wonder
whether he will not be the major sufferer, rather than the target of his complaint.
The prevention, deterrence, investigation, and prosecution of white-collar crime
must compete with other interests for allocation of law enforcement dollars, in an
atmosphere in which every other national problem is made more serious and more
costly of solution by the increasing complexities of our society.
EDELHERTZ, s.tpra note 227, at 8. The need for a private supplement to public redress seems
manifest.
239 Id. at 265. Although FBI personnel are generally well-trained, as the mission of the
Bureau has shifted from bank robbery to white collar fraud a change has also occurred in the
skills demanded of the agents to implement the Bureau's new "Quality Case Concept." 1983
Appropriation Hearings, supra note 168, at 994, 1095 (testimony of William H. Webster). See
N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1982, at 12, col. 3 ("The need for special skill has grown rapidly in recent
years as the bureau has shifted its priorities. Its focus today on white-collar crimes, organized
crime and foreign counter intelligence has led to more sophisticated, long term investigations
than in years past, when the bureau devoted greater efforts to apprehending fugitives and
solving bank robberies"). See also FBI Overight, 1979-Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights, House Corn= on theJudtiay, 96th Cong., Ist and 2d Sess. 128 (1979)(Con-
gressman Edwards: "Certainly crime is going to get.. . more sophisticated, more difficult to
detect. . . [for example, the] transfer of money by changing the mechanism of a computer.
You have to have [the] capability of resolving that." Mr. Webster: "I think we have it better
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cations of that study for private enforcement under RICO are
obvious.
While analogies to the jurisprudence of section 4 of the Clayton
Act are limited in the RICO context, much can be learned from an
than anybody else, but we have a long way to go."). But today the Bureau, along with other
governmental agencies, must operate as "part of the overall economic picture." 1982 Appro-
priations Hearings,supra note 168, at 1145. See also Cormption,supra note 176, at 18 ("You speak
to a thirsty man in the desert when you ask. . .[about resources]. Of course we need more
resources consistent with the economy's ability to supply it and willingness of the American
people to dedicate it."). Currently, the Bureau places white collar and organized crime
among its top programs. 1982 Appropriations Hearings, supra note 168, at 1064 (testimony of
William H. Webster). The top three are white-collar crime, organized crime and foreign
counter intelligence. Id In the organized crime area, the Bureau's priorities are focused on
"hoodlum infiltration of legitimate business; labor racketeering; corruption; arson for profit;
loan sharking; and pornographic operations which are national in scope, involve major organ-
ized crime figures, or which deal in the use of children." Id. at 1070. In addition, the Bureau
is now deeply involved in the effort to control the drug traffic, with a particular emphasis on
"financial flow investigations . .. [looking to use the] forfeiture procedures of. . .RICO
." Id at 1071. But the picture is not bright. Id. at 1141 ("[I]t is clear that the FBI and
the DEA can't do this alone or. . .with existing resources.'). In the white collar crime area,
the Bureau has committed 25% of its agents (1757) and a total of 2907 personnel positions; the
program costs exceed $125,000,000. Id. at 1069, 1085. It has 1328 investigations of public
corruption underway. Id. at 994. Yet it has also had its complement of agent positions
devoted to white collar crime cut by 95 agents. Id. at 995. Indeed, the lasi five years have
seen the number of agents remain stable, while the Bureau has assumed ever more sophisti-
cated responsibilities. Compare id at 1050 (8,021 agents ) with Departments of State, Justice, Com-
merce, The Judiciag and Related Agencies Appropriation for 1978, Hearings before a Subcomr. of the
House Conm on Appropriation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 653 (1977) (8077 agents). Similarly, the
numbers of cases referred to the Department of Justice by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, defendants indicted, and convictions has sharply declined from a high in 1977. U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: SOURCEBOOKS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1981, at 434
(1982). In addition, mail fraud complaints made to the U.S. Postal Inspection Service have
risen 63% (125,898 to 200,000), while investigations completed have fallen 44% (10,047 to
4,430). Id. at 430. Convictions have, however, risen 66% (910 to 1,370). Id. As in the organ-
ized crime area, a need exists here to supplement these necessarily limited efforts and to in-
crease their impact by developing and implementing new crime control strategies that
include the use of civil sanctions and private enforcement.
Between 1969 and 1980, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA)
granted nearly $8 billion to state and local agencies. N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1982, at 4, col. 6
(U.S. enforcement unit closes after 13 years). One priority in the LEAA program was organ-
ized crime. See, e.g, Crime Control Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-83, 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 231, 87 Stat. 199, 204, 209 (1973). Over time, that priority was expanded to
include white collar crime and public corruption. Justice System Improvement Act of 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-157, 93 Stat. 1172, 1179, 1195, 1198 (1979). Funds are no longer available
under the LEAA to state and local governments. This absence of federal funds will be felt.
Cormption, supra note 176, at 337 (testimony of New Jersey Attorney General Degnan: "We
will maintain a fairly vigorous effort in the area [of organized crime and corruption], but it
would be misleading if I didn't concede that the absence of federal seed money and actual
operating money for some. . . projects will greatly impair our ability.. . . My colleagues
around the country, I am sure you know, have not managed to secure funding on a perma-
nent basis for [these kinds] of programs.').
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analysis of the concept of private civil suits under that Act. Keeping
the marketplace competitive is not, of course, the same as curtailing
violence, inhibiting the consumption of illicit goods and services, or
seeking to promote integrity among private fiduciaries or public offi-
cials. Nevertheless, what the Supreme Court has said of section 4
may be legitimately observed of RICO. In 1970, Congress author-
ized private civil remedies under RICO to create "a private enforce-
ment mechanism that would deter violators . . . and . . . provide
ample compensation to . . . victims. ' ' 2 4° Such "private . . . litiga-
tion is one of the surest weapons for effective enforcement." 241 Con-
gress "created the treble-damage remedy . . . precisely for the
purpose of encouraging pniate challenges to . . . violations. '242 Pri-
vate suits in fact "provide a significant supplement to the limited
resources available to the Department of Justice. '243 Accordingly, no
need exists "to burden the private litigant beyond what is specifically
set forth" in RICO itself 2 4 4 No court ought to make a "niggardly
construction of the statutory language. '245 Congress knew "that ex-
isting law, state and federal, was not adequate to address the prob-
lem, which was of national dimensions. '246 Efforts to circumscribe
240 Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 50 U.S.L.W. 4723 (U.S. June 22, 1982).
241 Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54, 59 (1965).
242 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979)(emphasis in original).
243 Id. In fact, between 1960 and 1980, of the 22,585 civil and criminal cases brought
under the antitrust provisions by the government or private parties, 84% were instituted by
private plaintiffs. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SOURCE BOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STA-
TISTICS 1981, at 431.
244 Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454 (1957).
245 Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. at 59.
246 United States v. Turkette , 452 U.S. 576, 586 (1981).
Sound economic reasons also support Congress's 1970 judgment. Professor (now Judge)
Posner argues forcefully for private enforcement of more than actual damage awards against
deliberate anti-social conduct, particularly where the factor of concealment was present. R.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 462 (private enforcement), 143, 272 (more than ac-
tual damages for deliberate conduct), 235 (concealment) (2d ed. 1977). His concern with
"over enforcement" by private rather than public bodies, id. at 463-64, 471-72, is mitigated
under RICO by its requirement of multiple predicate acts that violate discrete statutes. Pos-
ner recognized the "importance of private enforcement of public law" and its "historical pre-
cedent" in the "criminal and regulatory law of England." Id at 462. He also recognized that
"if the offender is judgment proof, as is so often the case with criminal offenders, the [civil]
remedy is ineffectual." Id. at 467. The need for a careful blend of public and private enforce-
ment, therefore, is manifest. On the question of provisional relief to make possible execution
and mitigate the fact of judgment proof defendants, see notes 59, 217 supra.
Nevertheless, whether Posner's analysis is valid or invalid is beside the point, for our
society has entrusted the framing of this sort of equation and the resolution of its sum to the
legislative branch. When it has been done-as it has been done in the processing of RICO-
that judgment binds the judicial branch. As Justice Rehnquist noted, speaking for the Court
in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Store, 421 U.S. 723, 748 (1975):
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RICO in the courts should, therefore, be turned aside. As the court
of appeals in Bennett v. Berg has now happily done, other courts
should similarly redeem Congress' 1970 promise of new remedies for
victims of crime, particularly in the fraud area.
247
We quite agree that if Congress had legislated the elements of a private cause of
action for damages, the duty of the judicial Branch would be to administer the law
which Congress enacted; the Judiciary may not circumscribe a right which Con-
gress has conferred because of any disagreement it might have with Congress about
the wisdom of creating so expansive a liability.
247 Edelhertz wrote:
If substantial progress can be made in the prevention, deterrence and success-
ful prosecution of. . . [white collar] crimes we may reasonably anticipate substan-
tial benefits to the material and qualitative aspects of our national life.
EDELHERTZ, .upra note 227, at 11.
One final word: the thrust of much that has been written here is adverse to the works of
some courts. Nevertheless, to borrow a quote from Mr. Justice Jackson, these materials have
"select[ed] for discussion only the debits, but there are many credits which, though not rele-
vant to our present purpose, must enter into any balanced judgement of the works of the
courts." R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY xix (1941). This criticism
of the courts grows out of a profound respect for their work. District courts especially are not
well served by the bar that appears before them. They are burdened with too many of our
society's problems, many of which should be handled elsewhere, particularly in our national
and state legislatures as well as in private institutions. Not all of society's problems belong in
court. But some do, and the vindication of the rights of victims of crime is surely one of them.
Hopefully, the courts that are now hostile to RICO will come to see that. It is in this spirit,
therefore, that this discussion of RICO is offered, and it is hoped that it will be received in the
spirit in which it was written.
Finally, as Mr. Justice Cardozo has written:
I sometimes think that we worry ourselves overmuch about the enduring conse-
quences of our errors. They may work a little confusion for a time. In the end, they
will be modified or corrected or their teachings ignored. The future takes care of
such things.
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 179 (1921).
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